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ABSTRACT 
 
Few l egal dev elopments in South Africa a nd el sewhere i n t he w orld i n r ecent 
times have ex cited s uch co ntroversy as the l egal r ecognition of so cial a nd 
economic rights. South Africa has created a special place for itself in world affairs 
for bei ng one o f t he co untries that r ecognise so cio-economic rights in a 
justiciable B ill o f R ights. P artly t his is in r esponse t o t he appalling l evels of 
poverty pr evalent i n t he c ountry which co uld p otentially dest abilise t he new  
democracy. Improvement of the quality of life of every citizen is a crucial step in 
consolidating the constitutional democracy. The question that will face any court 
in g iving ef fect to socio-economic rights is: how are these r ights to be judicially 
enforced in a g iven context? The crux of this thesis lies in the resolution of this 
question. F irstly t his thesis traces the philosophical foundations t o t he l egal 
recognition o f so cio-economic rights. I t i s stated t hat t he r ecognition o f t hese 
rights in a justiciable bill of rights requires a conceptually sound understanding of 
the nature of obligations that these rights place on the state. It is emphasised that 
it i s imperative t hat access to j ustice be facilitated to po or a nd v ulnerable 
members of so ciety f or t he r ealisation o f t he co nstitutional g oal o f addr essing 
inequality. P articular concern a nd pr iority should i n t his context be g iven t o 
women, children and the disabled.  The study explores various judicial remedies 
and makes suggestions on new and i nnovative co nstitutional mechanisms for 
judicial enforcement of these rights. It is concluded that there is an important role 
to be played by civil society in giving meaningful effect to socio-economic rights. 
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CHAPTER 1  
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Constitutionalism an d t he r ule o f l aw ar e essential features of many pol itical 
democracies that r espect h uman r ights. A  j udiciary t hat i s sufficiently 
independent from the ex ecutive i s a g uardian o f the r ule o f l aw ensu ring t hat 
proper checks and balances are maintained in a system where the separation of 
powers doctrine is entrenched in a Constitution.1
‘It is no accident that constitutions usually come into being as a result of 
bad r ather than g ood ex periences. Their t ext or  su b-text i s almost 
invariably: ‘‘never again’’. In the case of South Africa the new constitution 
arises out of the need to escape the profound humiliations and oppression 
created by  apar theid. T hrough t he co nstitution w e af firm t hat w e l earn 
something from our dolorous history.  
 Otherwise there is no guarantee 
that the executive will respect fundamental rights and act according to the rule of 
law. As Albie Sachs once said 
  
It i s worth repeating: all constitutions are based on  m istrust. If we could 
trust our rulers, our parties, ourselves, we would not need constitutions.  
 
Power not only corrupts, it intoxicates, it confuses. Like nature it abhors a 
vacuum. Like water i t follows the path o f least resistance. Oppression is 
oppression, but i n so me w ays oppression in t he na me o f t he g ood i s 
worse than oppression in defence of the bad, since i t tarnishes the very 
ideas it seeks to protect and deprives people even of the image or hope of 
a better society.’2
 
 
A Constitution of a nation is therefore a fundamental law of  the land. I t defines 
and g uides actions by g overnment, i t pr ohibits and se ts sanctions f or u nlawful 
conduct.  I t bonds the nat ion together and represents a collective vision for the 
                                                 
1 See M Mutua ‘Justice Under Siege: The Rule of Law and Judicial Subservience in Kenya’ (2001) 23 
Human Rights Quarterly 96. 
 
2 A Sachs ‘The Constitution is Natural Justice Writ Large’ in H Corder and F McLennan (eds) Controlling 
Public Power (Department of Public Law, UCT: Cape Town 1995) 51. 
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future.3 The S outh A frican C onstitution i s also f ounded o n t he i dea of 
constitutionalism. It is the supreme law of the land.4 Law or conduct inconsistent 
with it is invalid to the extent of such inconsistency. The obligations imposed by it 
must be fulfilled. I t aims to create a society where the achievement of equality, 
human dignity and freedom ar e t he co re v alues.5
 
 An important f eature o f the 
Constitution i s the express recognition o f socio-economic r ights in a  j usticiable 
Bill o f R ights. These r ights include t he r ight t o basi c ed ucation, acc ess to 
adequate shelter and housing, adequate health care services, the right of access 
to sufficient food, water and social security.  
The i ncorporation of t hese r ights was a co ntentious issue at t he t ime o f t he 
adoption o f the Constitution. The debate about their enforceability i s now over, 
but crucial questions that remain relate to how these rights will be en forced in a 
given si tuation. B y i ncluding t hese r ights, t he l egislature r ecognised t hat t he 
elimination of poverty and the achievement of substantive equality are critical in 
the establishment of a so ciety bas ed on so cial j ustice, a v ision t hat t he 
Constitution expressly ar ticulates. The Constitutional Court has itself noted that 
the goal of poverty eradication ‘lies at the heart of our new constitutional order’.6
 
 
At the time the interim Constitution came into force many people, i n par ticular, 
the African rural and urban poor were living under conditions of extreme poverty 
and hopelessness. They had to survive without access to clean water, sanitation, 
basic health se rvices and h ad no  ch ances of e mployment. These people 
constituted t he m ajority of  t he ci tizens in t he co untry. O n t he o ther ha nd, a 
relatively few people l ived in better off conditions, where access to these basic 
                                                 
3 See Hunter et al v Southam Inc (1985) 11 DLR (4th ) 641, 649; S v Acheson 1991 (2) SA 805 (Nm HC) 
813A-C.  
 
4 Section 2 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996 (the Constitution).  
 
5 Section 1(a). 
 
6 Soobramoney v Minister of Health, Kwazulu Natal 1998 (1) SA 765 (CC)  para 8. 
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services was almost t aken for g ranted. Whilst e fforts aimed at  addressing 
inequality have started there is lot that still needs to be done to complete the task 
of transformation. As Bongani Majola says: 
‘South A frica r emains a co untry of  d evastating di chotomy. M illions 
languish in abject poverty, thousands starve –while a f ortunate few relish 
the wealth of the nation. Despite the marvelous reforms of the recent past, 
we remain a c ountry in which most cannot afford the price tag which has 
been at tached t o t hose basi c, t hose co re r ights through w hich inherent 
human dignity is secured.’7
 
   
This is not an accident. It is a product of history. It is history that has shaped the 
unbalanced di stribution o f w ealth, t he ske wed dev elopment, r epression and 
exploitation. A history designed and implemented by man. Various means were 
used to further the cause of oppression. Law was an important tool of social and 
political r epression. Apartheid l aws were of ten designed and implemented w ith 
total di sregard o f hu man di gnity and i nviolability of  t he person. While i t i s not 
possible for the purposes of this study to engage in a thorough and microscopic 
discourse about t he history of  t his country, su ffices to s tate that South A frica’s 
political hi story i s ch aracterised by  aut horitarianism, r ace, g ender and cl ass 
discrimination a nd generally a sy stematic abuse o f h uman r ights. Li ke m any 
colonial states, a minority arrogated to itself the right to control the resources of 
the nation. M ore e mphasis was put o n pow er t han r ights. A  defining 
characteristic of t he apar theid l aws was that i t w as one’s pigmentation t hat 
determined whether one could have access to jobs, houses and other forms of 
subsistence.8 As a r esult r esistance w as sure t o follow l eading t o co nflict 
between the majority and t he minority. In Azapo and Others v President of the 
RSA9
                                                 
7 B Majola ‘The Legal Resource Centre, South Africa. Promoting Access to Justice. Welcoming the 
Challenges of a Constitutionally Entrenched Bill of Rights.’ (unpublished 1998) 1. 
 Mohamed J summarises this history thus 
 
8 See E Roux  Time Longer than Rope: A History of the Black Man’s Struggle for Freedom in South Africa 
(University of Wisconsin Press 1967) , ‘The Truth and Reconciliation Report' (1998) 1,  24. A Cockrell 
‘The SA Bill of Rights and the Duck Rabbit’ (1997) 60 Modern LR 5.  
 
9 Azanian Peoples Organisation (AZAPO) and Others v President of the RSA 1996 (4) SA 671 (CC). 
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‘For decades South African history has been dominated by a deep conflict 
between a  m inority w hich r eserved for i tself all co ntrol ov er t he political 
instruments of t he S tate a nd a m ajority who so ught t o r esist th at 
domination. Fundamental human r ights became a major casualty of  t his 
conflict as  t he r esistance o f t hose punished by  t heir d enial w as met by  
laws designed to counter the effectiveness of such resistance. [T]he result 
was a de bilitating w ar o f i nternal p olitical di ssension an d c onfrontation, 
massive ex pressions of l abour m ilitancy, per ennial st udent unrest, 
punishing i nternational eco nomic isolation, w idespread dislocation i n 
crucial areas of national endeavour, accelerated l evels of armed conflict 
and a dangerous combination o f anx iety, f rustration an d anger among 
expanding pr oportions o f t he p opulace. T he l egitimacy of  l aw i tself w as 
deeply wounded as the country haemorrhaged dangerously in the face of 
this tragic conflict which had begun to traumatise the entire nation.’10
 
   
The context t herefore of t he S outh A frican h istory i s one of di spossession and 
oppression. The Constitution commits the nation to move away f rom the racial, 
class and gender divisions of t he past. Through the preamble, t he Constitution 
commits the n ation t o ‘ [h]eal t he di visions of t he pas t and est ablish a so ciety 
based on de mocratic values, social j ustice and fundamental human r ights’ and 
also to ‘…Improve the quality of l ife of all citizens and free the potential of each 
person…’. The Constitution embraces the values of freedom, equality and dignity 
as central in the establishment of such a society.11
 
 
Since 19 94, w hen t he dem ocratically el ected g overnment ca me i nto pow er, 
various initiatives including laws, policies, and projects have been adopted by the 
executive i n r esponse t o t he o bligations imposed by t he C onstitution. The 
judiciary has also o n the other hand r esponded t o the t ask laid dow n i n t he 
Constitution w ith t he nec essary co mmitment. I n a few hea dline h ogging 
judgments, courts have been seen to fill the vacuum left and sometimes created 
by the executive and the legislature, the elected branches of government.12
                                                 
10 Ibid para 1.  
 They 
 
11 The centrality of these values is strengthened by the fact that they collectively appear at least four times 
in the text of the Constitution. See sections 1(a), 7(1), 36(1), and 39(1) (a). 
 
12 See Government of the RSA and Others v Grootboom and Others 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC),  Ngxuza 
and Others v Secretary, Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape Provincial Government and Another 2000 
(12) BCLR 1322, Mahambehlala v MEC for Welfare, Eastern Cape Provincial Government and Another 
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are starting to develop a significant jurisprudence based on the values of the rule 
of law, the achievement of equality, freedom and human dignity.13
 
 
But having a C onstitution, which guarantees fundamental r ights does not on i ts 
own r esolve t he pr oblems confronting so ciety. I n S outh A frica t he l evels of 
poverty are disturbing. An authoritative study on Poverty and Inequality in South 
Africa, reported in 1998 that 71,6% of the poor live in rural areas; and 70,9 % of 
the people l iving in rural areas are poor.14
‘If the enormous and deplorable gap between poverty and opulence 
and bet ween d evelopment and un derdevelopment w ould be  
diminished; and t he m isery and ignorance which characterise a  
majority of the peoples…sensibly decreased, an acceleration in the 
 A critical task facing the government 
under t he C onstitution i s to bridge t he co ntinuously widening g ap b etween t he 
rich and the poor. Steps in that direction have to be taken swiftly and w ithin the 
strictures of the rule of law. For constitutionalism to prosper, it must have a fertile 
ground on which to grow. The levels of poverty in this country effectively deny to 
many access to their r ights and freedoms that the Constitution guarantees. The 
challenge to all role players therefore is not an easy  one. In the words of Gross 
Espiel: 
                                                                                                                                                 
2001 (9) BCLR 890 (SE), Mbanga v MEC for Welfare, Eastern Cape Provincial Government 2001 (8) 
BCLR 821 (E).  
 
13 There are a number of decisions handed down in recent times by the Constitutional Court which affirm 
the centrality of rule of law, human dignity and the notion of progressive achievement of substantive 
equality in our jurisprudence. As examples one could highlight Pharmaceutical Manufactures Association 
of SA; In re Ex Parte Application of the President of RSA and Others 2000 (3) BCLR 241 (CC) which held 
that the Constitution is the source of all law including the common law and that the common law does not 
continue to have its own separate application parallel to the Constitution. The common law principles are to 
the extent that they continue to have any application subsumed under the Constitution. It was also held that 
the President could not bring a law into force without the necessary regulatory framework. In Minister of 
Public Works and Others v Kyalami Ridge Environmental Association and Others 2001 (7) BCLR 652 
(CC) the Constitutional Court held that the President could act without an empowering legislation if the 
source of his power could be located in the Constitution itself in order to bring emergency aid to homeless 
victims of floods. See also A Chaskalson ‘Human Dignity as a Foundational Value of our Constitutional 
Order (2000) 16 SAJHR 193. 
 
14 J May (ed) Poverty and inequality in South Africa (report prepared for the office of the executive deputy 
President and the Inter-Ministerial Committee on Poverty and inequality) (1998) 27. The full report can 
accessed from the government website www.polity.org.za . 
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process of t he e ffective r ecognition of  hu man r ights...could b e 
looked for.’15
 
 
 
1.2 T he S outh African C onstitution a s a  C harter f or S ocio-Economic 
Transformation 
 
It is argued in this study that the Constitution should not be seen as a document 
that makes colourful p ronouncements about r ights and obl igations w ith no r eal 
effect o n t he l ives of t he m any who l ive i n pov erty and des titution. T he 
Constitution sh ould be use d as an i nstrument t o facilitate so cio-economic 
transformation. O n i ts ow n pr ovisions the Constitution pl aces the ch allenge o f 
socio-economic transformation on the national agenda. This should be used as a 
rallying point for all those whose concerns are to improve the standard of living of 
poor communities.   
 
Chaskalson P has emphasised that commitment to ‘transform’ the South African 
society is a central goal of the Constitution.16
‘In some countries the Constitution only formalises, in a legal instrument, a 
historical consensus of values and aspirations evolved incrementally from 
a stable and unbroken past to accommodate the needs of the future. The 
South African Constitution is different: It retains from the past only what is 
defensible and represents a decisive break from and a ringing rejection of, 
that part of the past which is disgracefully racist, authoritarian, insular, and 
repressive, and a v igorous identification o f an d co mmitment t o a  
democratic, u niversalistic, ca ring and as pirationally eg alitarian et hos, 
 It is important that in the process of 
building co nstitutionalism i n t he co untry co urts and all r ole players concerned 
take poverty alleviation as a central feature. In one of his most quoted passages 
Mahomed J said 
                                                 
15 G Espiell ‘The Evolving Concept of Human Rights: Western Socialist and Third World Approaches to 
Human Rights (1978) 64 cited by T Madala in ‘The Role of the Courts in Transforming our Legal System’ 
4 October 1996 (unpublished paper). 
 
16 In Soobramoney (note 6 above) para 8. See also A Chaskalson (note 13 above) 202. The idea of 
‘transformative constitutionalism’ as a goal of the South African Constitution is usefully discussed by K 
Klare in ‘Legal culture and transformative constitutionalism’ (1998) 14 SAJHR 146, 155. This idea is also 
endorsed by P de Vos in ‘Grootboom, the right of access to housing and substantive equality as contextual 
fairness’ (2001) 17 SAJHR 258, 260-263.      
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expressly articulated i n t he C onstitution. The co ntrast be tween t he past  
which it repudiates and the future to which it seeks to commit the nation is 
stark and dramatic.’17
 
 
In a sense, these comments remind us about the gross violations of human rights 
and that the Constitution now seeks to commit t he na tion to demonstrate ca re 
and se nsitivity t o gr oups and p eople that w ere ex cluded from par ticipating 
effectively i n t he ec onomy. There ar e many su ch g roups. They include bl ack 
women and men generally, and in particular people with disabilities, children and  
the elderly. A ‘caring’ society respects the rights of these groups and takes their 
concerns i nto co gnisance. I t i s the g overnment t hat i s at t he forefront of 
demonstrating this care and concern.   
 
In d eveloping l egislation, t he l egislature sh ould be as tute t o t his ch allenge of 
poverty. It must draft legislation that is sensitive to the needs of the poor people, -
- legislation that accelerates rather than impedes access to basic services. This 
is how the law-makers can account to the poor who put them into power. Such 
legislation will always be tested against the standard of the Constitution to see if 
it does not conflict with the provisions of the Constitution, the supreme law of the 
land. 
 
The primary dut y o f t he ex ecutive w ith the administrative machinery i s to 
implement legislation. The impact of the legislation, is felt by the citizens through 
the act ions of the a dministration. I t is administrative decisions, actions and 
processes t hat bring l aw i nto r eality. T hese ad ministrative pr ocedures are al so 
the tools with w hich t he administration d elivers on t he pr omises m ade by  t he 
Constitution or a ny l egislation. The r esources of t he n ation a re ke pt a nd 
administered by  t he administration. I n t his se nse i t i s the adm inistration t hat 
assists the st ate t o ‘ progressively realise’ t he so cio-economic rights in t he 
Constitution. I f t he a dministration t herefore does not t reat t he ci tizens in a  
                                                 
17 S v Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) para 262. 
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manner that accords with the values in the Constitution, i t i s guilty of  failing to 
give e ffect t o t he c onstitutional o bligations of t he st ate. On t he o ne hand, i t i s 
important t hat ci tizens have acce ss to m eans of r eviewing t he deci sions or 
actions of t hese or gans where deci sions and/ or act ions adversely af fect t heir 
rights, interests and legitimate expectations. This is the overall context in which a 
study on remedies against breaches of constitutionally protected rights should be 
viewed. Access to judicial review is an important component of that mechanism 
to keep the legislature and the executive in check. It is not by any means the only 
way i n which t he sa me g oals can be ac hieved. T here are ot her m echanisms, 
which also have to be nurtured. They are different to courts but are nonetheless 
important mechanisms. 
 
1.3 Are the Courts an Appropriate Forum? 
 
The Constitution contains provisions which are intended to ensure that the state 
in giving ef fect to i ts mandate acts within i ts lawful mandate and does so fairly. 
Courts are the guardians of the Constitution and the freedoms it contains.18 Their 
role is to interpret the Constitution. It is the role of government to implement the 
orders of the courts where mandated to do so. A characteristic feature of socio-
economic rights is that they impose positive obligations on the state and that their 
realisation may involve massive expenditure of public resources.19
                                                 
18 Hunter et al v Southam Inc (note 3 above) at 649. 
 But courts are 
traditionally r eluctant to i nvolve t hemselves in ca ses which i nvolve deci sion 
making ab out t he al location o f p ublic resources.  L on F uller says that t his 
reluctance is due to the fact that 
 
19 It is not suggested that the realisation of civil and political rights is cost free. The Constitutional Court in 
Ex Parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification of the Constitution of the Republic 
of South Africa, 1996 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC) para 78 held that sometimes in giving effect to some civil and 
political rights like the right to legal representation at the state’s expense the courts will make decisions 
with budgetary implications. Holmes and Sunstein in ‘The Cost of Rights’ (W.W. Norton and Company 
1999) suggest that all rights impose positive obligations on the state and that the implementation of all 
rights requires expenditure of public resources.  
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‘A pul l o n o ne st rand will di stribute t ensions a fter a co mplicated pattern 
throughout t he w eb as a w hole. D oubling t he or iginal pul l w ill, i n al l 
likelihood, not simply double each of the resulting tensions but will rather 
create a di fferent co mplicated pa ttern o f t ensions. T his would ce rtainly 
occur, for example, if the doubled pull caused one or more of the weaker 
strands to sn ap. T his i s a “polycentric” s ituation beca use i t i s “many 
centred” –-each cr ossing of  st rands is a di stant ce nter for di stributing 
tensions.’20
 
   
The se cond r eason i s that o ften t he r esources in q uestion ar e l imited a nd t he 
demands placed upon t hem are q uite si gnificant.21 So t he q uestion ca n be 
asked: will the incorporation of socio-economic rights change this reluctance and 
if so what type of cases will encourage the courts to be involved in cases which 
involve al location and expenditure of public resources.  The jurisprudence from 
Soobramoney22 and Government of the RSA and Others v Grootboom and 
Others,23 the only ‘socio-economic rights’ cases to reach the apex court so far is 
helpful. In  Soobramoney, t he C onstitutional Court st ated t hat c ourts should be 
slow t o i nterfere w ith r ational deci sions taken by  or gans of g overnment, which 
are best suited to make such decisions.24 Yacoob J in Grootboom stated that it 
was unreasonable for the government to expect to progressively realise the right 
of acce ss to a dequate housi ng w ithout a p rogramme t hat pr oritises people i n 
desperate situations.25 He also stated that the adoption of a rationally conceived 
programme w as not on i ts own su fficient.26 Steps had to be  taken in a  
reasonable way to implement the programme.27
                                                 
20 L Fuller ‘The Forms and Limits of Adjudication’ (1978-1979) 92 Harvard LR 353, 395.  
 Consistent with the separation of 
powers doctrine, the court also said that the precise contours of the programme 
 
21 See A Chaskalson (note 13 above) 202. 
 
22 Soobramoney (note 6 above). 
 
23 Grootboom (note 12 above).  
 
24 Note 6 above para 29. 
 
25 Ibid paras 40-41 and 44. 
 
26 Ibid  para 42. 
 
27 Ibid. 
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should be left to government in the initial instance.28
 
 It can therefore be ar gued 
that co urts will not  i nstruct t he g overnment on t he al location o f sca rce publ ic 
resources. They w ill how ever be w illing t o co nsider t he r easonableness of t he 
measures that the government is taking in giving effect to socio-economic rights.  
In t his study, i t w ill be  argued t hat courts should adopt an ac tivist approach in 
socio-economic rights cases.  This will include devising new remedies for such 
cases. To co mplement t he r ole o f t he co urts, l awyers who br ing t he c ases t o 
courts should themselves be creative about the type of cases and the manner in 
which they br ing cases to court. In some quarters, this has been referred to as 
‘strategic litigation’.29 In l ine w ith t he st rategic litigation appr oach, G eoff 
Budlender proposes certain cases, which he asserts will encourage courts to be 
involved in cases involving expenditure o f public resources.30
 
 These cases are 
those w here t he state has misconceived i ts constitutional m andate; w here t he 
state delays without justification in progressively realising socio-economic rights; 
where t he st ate takes retrogressive m easures. I n ca ses w here r etrogressive 
measures have been taken, there may be a requirement for special justification. 
There may al so be cases where a  formal pr omise h as been m ade to the 
recipients of the benefits and the budget has been allocated for that purpose but 
remains unjustifiably unspent. In these cases courts will be the last resort where 
the constitutionality of the actions of the government will be tested. 
In enforcing rights, courts should be mindful of the separation of powers doctrine. 
Although, the line between what strictly falls under each branch of government is 
not absolute and often crossed, there is in our Constitution a clear separation of 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
28 Ibid  para 41. 
 
29 G Bellow ‘Turning Solutions into Problems: The Legal Aid Experience' (1977) at 
www.garybellow.org/garywords/solutions.html  15.  
 
30 G Budlender ‘Using the South African Constitution as a Mechanism for Addressing Poverty: A Strategy  
Memorandum for the Legal Resources Centre’ (unpublished 2000) 
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powers which has to be respected.31 The courts should leave decisions, which 
would be b est suited for the legislature and the executive to carry to those two 
institutions. They should not substitute their decisions for what they think is right 
or is a more preferable policy alternative.32 On the other hand the other branches 
of government should help the courts protect their own integrity by co-operating 
with them.33 An important aspect of this co-operation is compliance with judicial 
decisions. A  disturbing t rend i s emerging with g overnment d epartments simply 
ignoring court decisions.34 Whereas such actions should be ad monished in the 
strongest possible terms, that is not enough. The courts need to fashion ways of 
both pr eempting and  deal ing with non co mpliance w ith t heir o rders. B ut a 
limitation t hat co urts face i s that t hey do not hav e co ercive m eans like t he 
assistance of soldiers and police to force anyone to comply with their directives.35 
So how do t hey ensure the compliance with such orders? Mahomed suggested 
that first and foremost the power of the courts lies in their independence from the 
executive. H e pr oposed t hat n o ex ecutive w ould r un t he political r isk of 
disobeying a judiciary that is not only independent but is seen by the populace to 
be so independent.36
 
 Mahomed’s views are important. They serve, however, only 
as a starting point. 
The Constitution gives the courts wide ranging powers to ensure the compliance 
with t heir deci sions. They hav e t he power t o g rant ‘ appropriate r elief’ to any 
                                                 
31 See Bernstein and Others v Bester NO and Others 1996 (4) BCLR 449 (CC)  para 105, De Lange v 
Smuts NO and Others 1998 (7) BCLR 779 (CC) paras 60-61, South African Association of Personal Injury 
Lawyers v Heath and Others 2001 (1) BCLR 77 (CC) paras 23-26, S v Dodo 2001 (5) BCLR 423 (CC) para 
22. 
 
32 Soobramoney (note 6 above) para 29, Pharmaceutical Manufactures (note 13 above)  para 90. 
 
33 See section 165 (4) of the Constitution. 
 
34 See C Rickard ‘Judges Orders Ignored-Make Officials Pay, Urges Law Professor’ an article that 
appeared on the Sunday Times of 1 April 2001. See too the comments by Jafta J in Mjeni v Minister of 
Health and Welfare 2000 (4) SA 446 (Tk) 452B-D. 
 
35 See I Mahomed ‘The Independence of the Judiciary’ (1998) 115 SALJ 658, 660. 
 
36 Ibid 659. 
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person who alleges that a right in the Bill of Rights has been violated.37 They can 
invalidate legislation which is in conflict with the Constitution.38 They also have 
the inherent power to regulate and develop their own processes in l ine with the 
values in the Constitution.39 It is clear that the power of the judiciary is awesome. 
Like any  ot her p ower, i t i s capable of b eing abuse d. J udicial power sh ould 
therefore go with judicial responsibility.40 The courts should in discharging their 
mandate t ake t his factor i nto account. They m ust i n g iving ef fect to r ights and 
socio-economic rights in particular consider the resources available on the part of 
the st ate, t he co mpeting cl aims in so ciety and the practical e ffect o f t heir 
decisions.41 If t he co urts make j udgments with em otional a ppeal but  w hich 
cannot b e i mplemented, t hey r un t he r isk of bei ng r egarded as  i rrelevant a nd 
therefore hampering t he rule o f l aw because t hey w ill not  be r espected b y t he 
government any more.42
 
 
1.4 Promoting Access to Justice: An Important Goal of the Constitution 
 
A constitution that guarantees rights and sets the rule of law as its fundamental 
pillar pr esents a pr omising pi cture. This is so esp ecially where t here is a 
                                                 
37 Section 38 of the Constitution. 
 
38 Section 172 of the Constitution. 
 
39 Section 173 of the Constitution. 
 
40 I Mahomed (note 35 above ) 662.  
 
41 In Soobramoney (note 6 above) para 31 Chaskalson P stated that in dealing with a claim for the provision 
of dialysis treatment to the applicant the court has to bear in mind that ‘[T]here are those who need access 
to housing, food and water, employment opportunities, and social security. These too are the aspects of the 
right to “…human life: the right to live as a human being,…”’. 
 
42 In DM Davis et al ‘Democracy and Constitutionalism: the Role of Constitutional Interpretation’ edited 
by Van Wyk et al Rights and Constitutionalism (Juta 1994) 1, 61, the authors state that the growth of public 
interest litigation in India led to a flurry of cases which the courts in the early 90s were increasingly unable 
to handle owing to resource limitations and the fact that the government was simply not carrying out the 
orders. See also J Cassels ‘Judicial Activism and Public Interest Litigation in India: Attempting the 
Impossible’s (1989) 37 American J of Comparative L 495. The point being made here is not that the courts 
must not give orders unfavourable to government in the fear that they will be ignored but that they should 
take the means available to give effect to those orders into account. 
 
 13 
guarantee that the people will have access to basic services to meet their basic 
needs. Where they are denied access to these services without justification they 
will have access to means of redress like courts. Access to courts as institutions 
to articulate a nd e nforce r ights is an i mportant el ement of t he promotion of 
access to j ustice. I n South A frica, many peopl e do n ot h ave acce ss to courts. 
Many people are unemployed and t he i nfrastructure i n m any rural par ts of t he 
country i s poorly de veloped. I t i s difficult t o co nsult w ith a l awyer f or a p oor 
person. The costs of l itigation are also fairly prohibitive for people who want to 
bring lawsuits to courts.43
 
 
For the realisation of the objective of access to justice i t is important that many 
people have acce ss to l awyers. T here i s therefore a nee d t o t ake co nscious 
steps by all role players to promote access to lawyers. Lawyers have during the 
apartheid era pl ayed a si gnificant r ole i n t he ov erall st ruggle ag ainst 
oppression.44
                                                 
43 See Mohlomi v Minister of Defence 1997 (1) SA 124 (CC)  para 14, cited with approval in Ngxuza and 
Others v Secretary, Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape Provincial Governmnet and Another (note 13 
above) 1329F-G.  
 For m any peo ple w ho w ere t hreatened w ith ev ictions f rom t heir 
homes, s eparation from their s pouses and families, forced r emovals and 
relocations, arbitrary arrests and detentions, lawyers provided a sense of hope in 
the w ake of  d espair. I t i s not pr oposed t hat l awyers sh ould dea l w ith t he 
democratic government in the same way as they responded to the hostile regime 
of apar theid. B ut t he se nse o f c ommitment t o t he ca use o f t he struggle t hat 
 
44 See RL Abel Politics by Other Means: Law in the Struggle Against Apartheid, 1980-1994 
(Routledge1995). For a further discussion see the following articles; ‘The Legal System in South Africa 
1960-1994 Representations to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission’ (1998) 115 SALJ  21, C Plasket 
‘The Eastern Cape Bench, Civil Liberties and the 1985/1986 State of Emergency (1986) 2 SAJHR 142, D 
Basson ‘Judicial Activism in a State of Emergency: An Examination of Recent Decisions of the South 
African Courts (1987) 3 SAJHR 28, Human Rights Index 17 June 1987-30 October 1987 (1987) SAJHR 
398, South Africa: Human Rights and the Rule of Law International Commission of Jurists Geoffrey 
Bindman (ed) (1988) 64, A Chaskalson ‘Legal Control of the Administrative Process’ (1985) 102 SALJ 419 
and N Haysom and C Plasket ‘The War Against Law: Judicial Activism and the Appellate Division’ (1988) 
4 SAJHR 303. See also the following cases: Oos-Randse Administratiesraad en ‘n Ander v Rikhoto 1983 
(3) 595(A), Komani NO v Bantu Affairs Administration Board, Peninsula Area 1980 (4) SA 448 (A), In Re 
Dube 1979 (3) SA 820(N), In Re Duma 1983 (4) SA 466 (N), Black Affairs Administration Board Western 
Cape and Another v Mthiya 1985 (4) SA 754 (A), Minister of Law and Order v Hurley and Another 1986 
(3) SA 568 (A). 
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prevailed dur ing apa rtheid sh ould st ill pr evail. Law yers should m ake t heir 
services available to the poor to accelerate the fight for social justice, a fight that 
started ev en before t he c onstitutional er a. I n s o doing t hey sh ould take i nto 
account that both the political context and t he law have changed. We have now 
moved from a cu lture of  a uthoritarianism i nto a cu lture w here g overnmental 
action should be justified.45 One way of doing that is to promote public interest 
litigation.46 Section 38 o f t he C onstitution contains a flexible p rovision on 
standing t o sue i n constitutional matters. These provisions are important. They 
need to be utilised in a manner that facilitates access to courts for many.47
 
 
Access to justice does not mean access to courts. No at tempt w ill be m ade in 
this study t o de fine w hat acce ss to j ustice means. The p oint w ill how ever be 
made that there are many elements of facilitating access to justice. Access to the 
courts is one of them, and an important one, too. There is also a need to utilise 
the system of Advice Offices. They play a ve ry useful role for many people who 
live in  the r ural ar eas. They ar e al so t he i nitial poi nt o f i nterface between the 
people they serve and t he state administration.48 The Constitution a lso creates 
institutions that are intended to complement constitutional democracy. They must 
also be accessible and be used to realise the goals of the Constitution. The office 
of the Public Protector and the Human Rights Commission are examples of such 
institutions.49
                                                 
45 E Mureinik ‘A Bridge to Where?: Introducing the Interim Bill of Rights’ (1994) 10 SAJHR 31, 32. 
 
 
46 G Budlender ‘On Practising Law’ in H Corder (ed) Essays in Law and Social Practice in South Africa 
(Juta and Co 1988) 319. 
 
47 Mokgoro J in Chief Lesapo v North West Agricultural Bank And Another 2000 (1) SA 409 (CC)  para 22, 
said that the right of access to courts is a ‘bulwark against vigilantism’. 
 
48 See G Budlender ‘The Accessibility of Administrative Justice’ (1993) Acta Juridica 128,  131. See too C 
Plasket ‘Accessibility Through Public Interest Litigation’  in Corder and Maluwa (eds) Administrative 
Justice in Southern Africa (Dept of Public Law: UCT, Cape Town 1996) 119, 124. 
 
49 Section 181 of the Constitution provides for the establishment of the following institutions: The Public 
Protector, The South African Human Rights Commission, The Commission for the Promotion and 
Protection of the Rights of Cultural, Religious and Linguistic Communities, The Commission on Gender 
Equality, The Auditor General and the Electoral Commission. For the purposes of this study only the first 
two are examined. 
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A fair and a just society, a v ision that our Constitution seeks to accomplish will 
undoubtedly take time to achieve. In the words of Mohamed DP 
‘Generations of c hildren b orn a nd y et to be  b orn w ill su ffer t he 
consequences of pov erty, of m alnutrition, o f homelessness, o f illiteracy 
and disempowerment generated and sustained by institutions of apartheid 
and i ts manifest effects on l ife and l iving f or so  m any. T he co untry has 
neither the resources nor the skills to reverse these massive wrongs. It will 
take many y ears of st rong co mmitment, se nsitivity and l abour t o 
“reconstruct our  so ciety” so  as to f ulfil t he l egitimate dr eams of new  
generations exposed t o r eal oppor tunities for adv ancement d enied t o 
preceding generations…’50
 
  
A C onstitution, w hich em bodies civil and pol itical r ights and so cio-economic 
rights, i s based o n t he r ule o f l aw and g uarantees the i ndependence o f t he 
judiciary is a necessary condition for the achievement of such a society. It is not, 
however, a sufficient condition. The achievement of such a society requires many 
things. A mongst t hem i s a co mmitment from t he g overnment t o addr ess the 
wrongs of the past, a cooperative and y et vigilant civil society, a s trong and a n 
independent j udiciary to de fine t he a mbit o f t he C onstitution an d t o hol d t he 
government accountable for its breaches of the law. Lest one be misunderstood, 
there is no suggestion that the courts will resolve all the ills of society created by 
apartheid. They hav e their sp ecific functions. A nd further, t hey ha ve t heir ow n 
limitations.51
‘We must always remember that social action litigation is a necessary and 
valuable al ly i n t he c ause of t he p oor, but i t ca nnot b e a s ubstitute for 
organization of  t he p oor, dev elopment o f co mmunity se lf-reliance and  
establishment of effective organizational structures through which the poor 
can combat exploitation and i njustice, protect, and defend their i nterests 
and secure their rights and entitlements.’
  According to the former Chief Justice of India P.N. Bhagwati: 
52
                                                                                                                                                 
 
 
50Azanian Peoples Organisation (AZAPO) v President of the Republic of South Africa (note 10 above) para 
43.  
 
51 See GN Rosenberg  The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change? (University of Chicago 
1991), and GN Rosenberg ‘Knowledge and Desire: Thinking about Courts and Social Change’ in David A. 
Schultz Leveraging the Law: Using the Courts to Achieve Social Change (Peter Lang 1998) . 
 
52 Quoted in J Cooper ‘Public Interest Law Revisited’ (1999) 25 Commonwealth L Bulletin 135, 140. 
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Thus another important point is that the people must be empowered to take care 
of themselves and not to be perpetually dependent on handouts from the State. 
But before that goal is realised, the government must give effect to its obligations 
under the Constitution. In this context this study contributes towards the broader 
debate ab out h ow t he C onstitution c an be us ed as a means o f a lleviating 
poverty, and t he co urts as instruments to ar ticulate and en force t he s ocio-
economic rights contained in the Constitution.   
 
1.5 Scope of Inquiry 
 
This study is divided into seven discursive chapters including this chapter. The 
second ch apter will deal  w ith t he r ecognition o f s ocial a nd ec onomic rights as 
legal r ights. This discussion looks at various international and regional  hu man 
rights instruments which recognise socio-economic rights and the way in which 
these rights are reflected in those instruments. A comparison is also made with 
India as a co untry which, al though i t does not have j usticiable socio-economic 
rights, has enforced socio-economic rights through widening the interpretation of 
civil and political rights. The third chapter will look at the meaning of the concept 
of 'progressive realisation' as articulated in ss 26(2) and 27(2) of the Constitution. 
In so  doi ng r eliance will be pl aced on t he U nited N ations General A ssembly 
Comments, the Maastricht Guidelines and the Limburg Principles. In chapter four 
the relationship between the rules of locus standi and socio-economic rights will 
be examined. It will be argued that our courts should learn from examples of how 
other countries have expanded the notion of locus standi to accommodate poor 
and marginalised g roups in so ciety. C hapter f ive ex amines the v arious judicial 
remedies that obtain under the common law and how these remedies have been 
affected by the Constitution. New remedies are proposed to cater for the socially 
vulnerable groups in society and t o v indicate the rule o f law. The sixth chapter 
examines the av ailability and e ffectiveness of o ther non-judicial r emedies. T he 
Human R ights Commission and t he o ffice o f t he P ublic Protector are use d as  
 17 
examples of t he i nstitutions which se rve t he r ole o f pr omoting h uman r ights 
alongside the courts. The weaknesses of these institutions will be discussed and 
proposals will be m ade on h ow t hese i nstitutions can overcome t hese 
weaknesses to ens ure t hat t hese i nstitutions serve as effective bodi es in t he 
promotion of human rights. Chapter seven is the conclusion. I t is a summary of 
the study in which the key aspects will be highlighted.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
THE C ONSTITUTIONAL R ECOGNITION OF  S OCIAL AND E CONOMIC 
RIGHTS 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter t races the l egal r ecognition of so cio-economic rights from an  
international law perspective. The term ‘socio-economic rights’ is used to refer to 
the rights under section 24 to section 29 of the Constitution. This chapter follows 
the debates that led to their incorporation into the South African Constitution. I t 
lays the b asis for t heir i nterpretation i n t he context o f a ddressing pov erty and  
addressing i nequalities. I n t his chapter, i t i s argued t hat t he C onstitution i s a 
starting poi nt i n t he efforts to er ode pov erty and i nequality. T he r ecognition o f 
socio-economic rights as justiciable r ights affirms that assertion. The challenge 
facing those committed to the erosion of poverty and inequality is about how the 
rights can be c onverted from paper g uarantees to r eality. A ll t he arms of 
government have a r ole to play in this effort. The legislature can do so through 
developing just legislation which facilitates access to the rights in question. The 
executive has to adm inister and i mplement t he l aw i n a f air m anner w hich i s 
sensitive to the needs of the disadvantaged groups. The judiciary has a duty to 
interpret the Constitution and to ensure proper checks and balances between the 
other ar ms o f g overnment. A ll t hese ar ms of g overnment h ave an  ov erall 
responsibility to uphold the Constitution. They should do so collectively driven by 
a common goal of facilitating access to justice to everybody, especially the poor 
and the downtrodden.  
 
2.2 DEFINING HUMAN RIGHTS 
 
The introduction of the Constitution in South Africa signifies a paradigmatic shift 
from t he pr evious ‘rights’ r egime.  Whereas pr eviously, r ights existed i n ex tra-
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constitutional forms, this has largely been superseded by the advent of the new 
Constitution.  Because the principle of constitutional supremacy now obtains, all 
law derives authority from the Constitution. Any practice or law has to conform to 
the sp irit and t enor of t he C onstitution.1 Constitutional su premacy appl ies 
universally and so applies in the field of social and economic rights. Whereas, the 
state may have been under a moral duty to provide housing, social security and 
other socio-economic benefits to i ts citizens, i t is now constitutionally obl iged to 
do so. Failure has to be justified.2
 
 
It is necessary at the outset to define human rights. Two major theories occupy a 
central st age i n t he debate about the m eaning o f h uman r ights. The first 
conceives of human rights as independent from the legal instruments. Central to 
this conception i s that r ights are i ndependent from t he l egal syst em a nd t hat 
human beings have some claims from society simply because they are human. 
Rights are seen more as natural in the sense that all people deserve to live life in 
dignity and r espect i rrespective of  t heir so cial, eco nomic and ot her 
circumstances. Thus it is only when the functionaries of the state help individuals 
to realise their maximum potential that a just and fair society could be achieved. 
 
The second theory is that human rights are not 'rights' unless they receive some 
form of l egal r ecognition either by a st atute or, as in m any co untries, t he 
Constitution. In this sense, standards for the achievement of those rights are set 
and means of ensuring compliance are also designed. This set up also provides 
remedies against breaches of these legal rights. According to this theory human 
rights can o nly der ive a uthority i f t hey a re i nscribed i n l egal doc uments, 
institutions for implementation created and remedies against breaches provided. 
In this sense the state may legislate for the protection of the individual as well as 
                                                 
1 See Pharmaceutical Manufactures Association of SA; In Re Ex Parte Application of the President of RSA 
and Others 2000 (3) BCLR 241 (CC) para 44. 
 
2 See S v Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) para 156. See also E Mureinik ‘A Bridge to Where? 
Introducing the Interim Bill of Rights’ (1994) 10 SAJHR 31. 
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develop p olicy m easures to ensure t hat t he i ndividual fully r ealises his or h er 
being.3
 
 
But as we have seen, the theoretical meaning of rights will not play a significant 
role i n t he i nterpretation o f t he C onstitution. I n S v M akwanyane4 the 
Constitutional Court stressed the importance of looking into the st ructure of the 
words that ar e use d i n t he t ext and al so pay ing due r egard t o t he v alues 
underlying the text. In S v Mhlungu5 Mahomed DP cautioned against the use of 
‘the a usterity of  tabulated l egal formalism’. I n o ur co ntext t he v alues that 
permeate the text of  the Constitution are human dignity, equality and freedom. 
The test of the constitutional state is the extent to which these values, which in a 
way are also ‘moral’ standards, guide the interpretation of the words used in the 
statute, which i s seen as guaranteeing ‘ legal’ r ights. T he Constitution o f South 
Africa co mmits the nat ion t o t he g oal of  a ttaining so cial j ustice and t he 
improvement of t he q uality of  l ife for everyone.6 The C onstitution r ecognises 
everybody’s civil and pol itical r ights. I t enjoins the st ate t o pr ogressively m ake 
available to everyone their social and economic rights.7
 
  
2.3 INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS 
 
Social and economic rights are drawn from diffuse sources. S teiner and A lston 
argue that the recognition of the entitlement of man to inherent dignity and hence 
to subsistence can be traced from Christian sources. In Catholicism, for instance, 
papal ency clicals promoted t he r ight t o su bsistence w ith di gnity and h ave had  
programmes to care for the poor and the needy in society. Other sources have 
                                                 
3 See P Sieghart The International Law of Human Rights (Clarendon Press: Oxford 1983) 6-23. 
 
4 S v Makwanyane (note 2 above) para 9. 
 
5 S v Mhlungu 1995 (3) SA 867 (CC) para 8. 
 
6 Government of the RSA and Others v Grootboom and Others 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC) para 1. 
 
7 See sections 26(2) and 27(2) of the 1996 Constitution (the Constitution).  
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little to do with Christianity. Philosophers like Karl Marx recognised the need to 
fight i njustice an d d eprivation o f w orkers and w anted t o g uarantee h umane 
conditions for all workers of the world. Bismarck of Germany introduced the first 
social insurance schemes in Germany during the early 1880s.8
 
One of t he e arliest l egal docu ments, however, t o r ecognise s ocio-economic 
rights of workers as ‘rights’ at  an i nternational l evel was the Convention o f t he 
International Labour Organisation (the ILO). The ILO was established under the 
Treaty o f V ersailles and w as seen by  so me as a r esponse t o t he r ise of 
Bolshevism after the Russian revolution of 1917. The ILO’s main objective is ‘to 
abolish t he i njustice, har dship and pr ivation w hich w orkers suffered and t o 
guarantee fair and humane conditions of labour’. 
 
In the United States of America, interesting developments took place towards the 
end of the Second World War. The President at the time, Franklin D. Roosevelt 
spelt out  his dream of the future world order. He was of the view that ‘ freedom 
from want’ should constitute the basis of the new world order and in his address 
to the Union in 1944 he said that ‘ necessitous men are not free men.’
 
 9 In hi s 
speech he also included a l ist of r ights, which he felt should be included in the 
‘second b ill o f r ights’. These included, the r ight to have a r emunerative job, the 
right of  every f amily t o a d ecent ho me, t he r ight t o adeq uate medical ca re, t o 
enjoy good health, to a good education and to adequate protection from sickness 
and disability. H e further ur ged t he A merican so ciety t o m ove f orward i n t he 
‘implementation o f t hese r ights to new g oals of happiness and w ell bei ng’.10
                                                 
8 H Steiner and P Alston International Human Rights in Context Law, Politics, Morals (Clarendon Press-
Oxford 1996) 256 (hereafter Steiner and Alston).  
 
 
 
9 Eleventh Annual Message to Congress (11 January 1944) in FL Israel (ed) The State of the Union 
Messages of the Presidents, 1790-1966 (New York: Chelsea House 1966) 3 2875, 2881. 
 
10 R Russell and J Muther A History of the United Nations Charter: The Role of the United States 1940-
1945 (Washington DC: Brookings Institution 1958) 786. See also J Dugard International Law: A South 
African Perspective (Cape Town: Juta 1994) 198-230.  
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These views were reflected in the International Bill of Rights, which was drafted 
by the American Law Institute ( the ALI). The ALI enjoined states to ensure that 
man enjoys these freedoms, which are essential to his being. The proposals that 
came from t he i nstitute w ere reflected i n t he U nited N ations first dr aft o f t he 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which appeared first in 1947.11
 
The Universal D eclaration o f H uman R ights, t he I nternational C ovenant o n 
Economic, S ocial a nd C ultural R ights, an d t he C onvention of t he I LO w ere 
among t he first i nstruments in the w orld t o r ecognise s ocio-economic rights. 
While the Universal Declaration of Human Rights contained social and economic 
rights alongside civil and p olitical r ights, the Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural R ights was an ex clusive and co mprehensive docu ment t o g ive 
expression to social and economic rights. These documents still serve as models 
for r egional decl arations and many nat ional co nstitutions in t he pr otection of 
social and economic rights. 
 
 
2.3.1 The United Nations Charter 
 
 The United Nations Charter (the Charter) makes it a duty for the United Nations 
to ‘ promote … higher st andards of l iving, full em ployment an d co nditions of 
economic and social progress and development’. In addition, all members pledge 
themselves to t ake j oint and se parate act ion i n co operation w ith t he U nited 
Nations Organisation for the achievement of the purposes set in the Charter. As 
a result, members who sign the Charter have a duty to put into effect government 
programmes aimed at the attainment of a higher standard of living, a goal of the 
Charter.12
 
  
 
                                                 
11 Statement of Essential Human Rights, UN Doc A/148 (1947) Articles 11-15. 
 
12 Charter of the United Nations adopted 26 June 1945 entered into force 24 October 1945.  
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2.3.2 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
 
In 1948 the Universal Declaration o f Human R ights (UDHR or  the Declaration) 
was adopted.13
‘Whereas disregard a nd co ntempt for human r ights have r esulted i n 
barbarous acts which have outraged the conscience of mankind, and the 
advent of a w orld in which human beings shall enjoy f reedom of speech 
and belief and freedom from fear and w ant has been proclaimed as the 
highest aspiration of the common people.’ 
 The a doption o f t he D eclaration followed a p eriod o f m assive 
human rights violations, which occurred during the Second World War. Largely, it 
was viewed as a r esponse t o t hose v iolations. It w as intended t o foster g ood 
relations amongst the nations of the world and to encourage all nations to work 
for peace and the attainment of a w orld order based on the respect o f human 
dignity. In its preamble the declaration states: 
 
The Declaration guarantees the r ights of everyone to social security and t o the 
realisation of the economic, social and cultural rights indispensable for his or her 
dignity and t he free development o f hi s or her per sonality.14 It guar antees the 
right t o work, t o f ree ch oice o f em ployment, t o j ust an d f avourable w orking 
conditions, to equal pay for work and to form trade unions.15 The Declaration also 
protects the r ight to rest and l eisure, to education, to participate in cu ltural l ife, 
and to an adequate standard of living including food, clothing, housing and health 
and welfare provisions.16
 
 Article 26 recognises the right to education and it states 
that educ ation shall be f ree, at least in t he el ementary fundamental st ages. 
Article 28 provides for the right of everyone ‘to a social and international order in 
which the rights and freedoms set forth in the Declaration can be fully realised’. 
                                                 
13 UNGA Res. 217 (111) adopted by 48 countries whilst 8 others abstained. 
 
13 Article 22 of the UDHR. 
 
14 Article 22 of the UDHR. 
 
15 Article 23 of the UDHR. 
 
16 Articles 24 and 25 of the UDHR. 
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This Declaration is not a treaty and is therefore not a legally binding document. In 
many jurisdictions however, its aspirations have been used as benchmarks in the 
development of h uman r ights law and i t i s now r egarded a s customary 
international law. Provisions of the Declaration have thus infiltrated the domestic 
law i n m any co untries and have i nformed t he co ntents of many n ational 
constitutions. Its provisions have been cited in countless judgments in the sphere 
of international law worldwide. 
 
2.3.3 The International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial 
Discrimination 
 
The I nternational C onvention on t he E limination o f A ll F orms of R acial 
Discrimination was adopted by the General Assembly on 21 December 1965 and 
came into force in 1969. The Convention recognises that all human beings have 
inherent di gnity, which m ust be pr otected. I t se ts its main objective as the 
elimination of race as a ground for unfair discrimination. It does not only prohibit 
racial discrimination but other forms of discrimination as well. 
 
In or der t o ach ieve i ts objectives, t he C onvention enj oins the st ate par ties to 
guarantee to their citizens social, economic and cultural r ights.17
(i) The r ights to work, t o free choice o f employment, to just and favourable 
conditions of w ork, t o eq ual pay  f or eq ual w ork, t o j ust and favourable 
remuneration. 
 The r ights that 
the Covenant specifically mentions are the following; 
(ii) The right to form and join trade unions. 
(iii) The right to housing. 
(iv) The r ight t o p ublic health, medical c are, so cial se curity and  so cial 
services.  
(v) The right to education and training and 
                                                 
 
17 Article 5 of the Convention Against Racial Discrimination. 
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(vi) The right to equal participation in cultural activities. 
   
The Covenant further requires member states to ensure that they establish within 
their j urisdictions e ffective i nstitutions and r emedies t o de al w ith r acial 
discrimination and g enerally ot her forms of di scrimination.18 State parties are 
also urged to adopt immediate and effective measures particularly in the fields of 
teaching, education, culture and information, with a view to combating prejudices, 
which lead to racial discrimination.19
 
  
2.3.4 The Declaration on Social Progress and Development 
 
The Declaration on Social Progress was proclaimed by the General Assembly of 
the U nited N ations in 1969.20
 
 It sp ells out i n br oad t erms the ne ed t o co mbat 
racism and discrimination and the need for states to take steps to achieve social 
progress and development as a part of combating discrimination. Article 2 of the 
Declaration s tates that so cial progress and dev elopment sh all b e founded on  
respect for t he di gnity and v alue of the h uman person a nd sh all ens ure t he 
promotion of human rights and social justice. 
The objectives of the declaration are to continuously raise material and spiritual 
standards of all members of society. For this to happen the states should strive to 
achieve the following goals; 
(a) The assurance at all levels of the right to work, to form and join trade unions; 
to establish equitable and favourable conditions of employment; as well as a 
sufficiently high minimum wage to ensure a decent standard of living. 
(b) The el imination of hunger and malnutrition and the guarantee of the r ight to 
proper nutrition. 
                                                 
 
18 Article 6 of the Convention Against Racial Discrimination. 
 
19 Article 7 of the Convention Against Racial Discrimination. 
 
20 UNGA Resolution 2542 (XXIV). 
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(c) The elimination of poverty. 
(d) The ach ievement of the highest standard o f health for t he entire population 
free of charge where possible. 
(e) The eradication of illiteracy and the assurance of the right to universal access 
to cu lture, t o free compulsory educa tion at  the elementary level and t o free 
education at all levels. 
(f) The pr ovision f or al l, par ticularly persons in low-income g roups a nd l arge 
families, of adequate housing and community services.21
 
 
The D eclaration further r equires states to m obilise nat ional r esources and 
effectively utilise them for the attainment of these goals.22 It calls upon states to 
adopt a ppropriate l egislative and a dministrative m easures to provide ev eryone 
not only their civil and pol itical rights but also their social, economic and cultural 
rights as well.23
 
 
The D eclaration i s not a treaty a nd therefore not  l egally bi nding on  st ates. It 
serves, however, as an inspirational charter on the standards of social progress 
that states must aim to achieve. In this sense it plays an important role in setting 
out how states can improve the social and economic well-being of their citizens.  
 
2.3.5 The International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights 
 
The International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (the ICESCR 
or the Covenant) is a comprehensive instrument in the area of socio-economic 
rights internationally. I t was initially conceived as an expansion of the Universal 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
21 Article 10 of the Declaration on Social Progress. 
 
22 Article 16 (a) of the Declaration on Social Progress. 
 
23 Article 18 of the Declaration on Social Progress. 
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Declaration on  Human R ights and se rved as a counterpart o f the I nternational 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (the ICCPR).24
 
 
2.3.5(a) The Terms of the Covenant 
 
The Covenant is a treaty and therefore has to be signed by countries wishing to 
be bound by i ts provisions. A lthough i t was signed by  some m ember states in 
1966, i t only came into effect in 1976. The Covenant guarantees a l ist of  social 
and economic rights. These r ights are: the right t o w ork, i ncluding t he r ight o f 
everyone t o t he o pportunity t o g ain hi s or her  l iving by  work which he or  s he 
freely chooses or  accepts;25 the r ight to just and favourable conditions of work, 
including f air r emuneration, s afe and h ealthy w orking co nditions, eq ual 
opportunity for pr omotion, as well as reasonable w orking ho urs and pa id 
holidays;26 the r ight of  t rade uni ons to or ganise, su bject t o l aws necessary f or 
national security or public order or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of 
others; the r ight to strike, provided i t is exercised in conformity with the laws of 
the particular country;27 the right to social security;28the right to the protection of 
the family, mothers (including the right to maternity leave) and young persons;29 
the right to an adequate standard of living, including adequate food, clothing and 
housing and the continuous improvement of l iving conditions;30
                                                 
24 See C Scott 'The Interdependence and Permeability of Human Rights Norms: Towards a Partial Fusion 
of the International Covenants on Human Rights'  (1989) 27 Osgoode Hall LJ  792. (hereafter Craig Scott) 
The author gives an account on why there are two covenants and not one. He says that at the time of 
drafting the treaties in 1951 the Soviet bloc argued that economic rights should be reflected in a Resolution 
of the General Assembly. These rights were to be recognised in the same document as the ICCPR. The 
western bloc disagreed with this motion and it was subsequently agreed that there should be two documents 
and the states should have an option of choosing which one to sign. 
 the r ight t o the 
 
25 Article 6 of the ICESCR. 
 
26 Article 7 of the ICESCR. 
 
27 Article 8 of the ICESCR. 
 
28 Article 9 of the ICESCR. 
 
29 Article 10 of the ICESCR. 
 
30 Article 11 of the ICESCR. 
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highest at tainable st andard o f phy sical and  m ental he alth, w hich i ncludes the 
improvement of environmental and industrial hygiene and the creation of services 
ensuring to all medical services and attention in the event of sickness.31 The right 
to ed ucation, i ncluding co mpulsory and f ree pr imary educa tion, g enerally 
available secondary education and higher education equally accessible to all, on 
the basis of capacity;32 and the right to take part in cultural life.33
 
 
The i mplementation o f the ICESCR i s based o n t he pr inciple o f ‘ progressive 
realisation’. The C ovenant al so st ates that st ate p arties shall t ake s teps, 
individually and t hrough i nternational assi stance a nd c ooperation, es pecially 
economic and t echnical, t o t he m aximum of  t heir av ailable r esources, to 
progressively achieve the full realisation of the rights in the Covenant. Relevant 
legislation must be adopted in order to give effect to socio-economic rights.34
 
 
The language that is used to give effect to socio-economic rights in terms of the 
ICESCR differs from the ICCPR (which is its sister covenant) as the latter obliges 
the state parties to immediately ‘ respect and ensure’ the r ights in the ICCPR.35 
However, as will be shown later, this difference does not mean that social and 
economic rights do not warrant immediate respect. Even the fact that these two 
sets of rights are contained in separate documents does not mean that they are 
separable from each other.36
 
  
                                                                                                                                                 
 
31 Article 12 of the ICESCR. 
 
32 Article 13 of the ICESCR. 
 
33 Article 15 of the ICESCR. 
 
34 Article 2 of the ICESCR. 
 
35 Article 2 of the ICCPR. 
 
36 See Craig Scott (note 24 above) 780-781. He says that ‘separation did not mean separability’ and that 
these two sets of rights are ‘interdependent and indivisible’. 
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The I CESCR i s intended t o en hance n ational an d g lobal so cial j ustice. I t i s 
designed to promote social progress, freedom from want, and better standards of 
life as envisaged by the Universal Declaration on Human Rights. As of July 1995 
some 131 states, including 38 African states, had acceded to the treaty either by 
ratifying i t or  acce pting i ts provisions.37
 
 At i ts inception t he co venant w as 
conceived o f as breaking new  ground i n i nternational t reaty-making f or t wo 
reasons: first, i t l inked the advancement of human r ights directly to government 
policies to promote economic, social and cultural development and the adoption 
and execution of international economic and technical cooperation programmes; 
secondly, by so doing, the treaty is aimed at ensuring that economic and social 
development programmes safeguard and enlarge the enjoyment of human rights 
internationally. 
2.3.5.(b) Machinery for Enforcement of the ICESCR 
 
The I CESCR cr eates specialised agencies to ov ersee t he i mplementation and 
enforcement of the Covenant amongst member states. The Covenant entrusted 
the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) with the task of considering reports 
which states are expected to provide regularly to the United Nations on the steps 
they have taken to promote and protect economic, social and cultural rights and 
in the progress made in the realization of these rights.38
 
 There currently exists a 
Committee o f Experts which was established i n 1986 t o r eceive r eports from 
state p arties on b ehalf o f the U N S ecretary General. A part from r eceiving t he 
reports handed in by member states the Committee may make recommendations 
to ECOSOC on i ts study of  these reports and of those i t receives from special 
agencies of the United Nations. 
                                                 
 
37 See J Oloka-Onyango 'Beyond the Rhetoric: Reinvigorating the Struggle for Economic and Social Rights 
in Africa'  (1995) 26 California Western Int LJ 4 (hereafter Oloka-Onyango). 
 
38 Article 16 (2) (a)-(b). 
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This system is not without its problems. The first problem is that often when state 
parties make their reports, their focus is on the legislative mechanisms they have 
created in compliance with the Covenant. Often states’ reports focus exclusively 
on legislative measures and do not go beyond these ‘paper’ protections of social 
and economic rights. They often do not report on statistics relating to successes 
or failures of poverty relief programmes, for instance, or other forms of assessing 
the efficacy of their legislative frameworks.  
 
The se cond pr oblem is the co mplexity of t he r eporting pr ocedure i tself. T he 
procedure followed is set out in Articles 16 and 17 of the Covenant as follows. 
Reports must be su bmitted t o t he U nited N ations Secretary General. The 
Secretary G eneral transmits the r eports to t he C ommittee an d t o sp ecialised 
agencies. The Committee refers both state and specialised agency reports to the 
Commission o n H uman R ights, ( a U nited N ations special bo dy deal ing with 
rights), for study and general recommendation or  for information. The agencies 
and t he st ates may t hen co mment upo n t he C ommission’s recommendations. 
The C ommittee r eports to t he U nited N ations G eneral Assembly w ith 
recommendations of a general nature and a summary of information from states 
and sp ecialised ag encies. M any st ates find it di fficult t o follow t his procedure 
properly. A  si mpler procedure w hich al lows the C ommittee s ome r oom t o 
carefully asse ss the r eports and al so g ives i t acce ss to so me co ncrete data 
obtaining in the countries themselves is a desirable option. 
 
The third problem relates to the nature of international law i tself. Internationally 
human rights are enforced and implemented by persuasive rather than coercive 
means. Since t here i s no  i nternational ‘ government’ there i s no way i n w hich 
states can i mpose t heir j urisdiction ov er ot her st ates. I nternational l aw is 
governed by the principle of equality of states. There are bodies created in order 
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to ensu re t hat t he st ates meet t heir m inimum obl igations but, i n esse nce t he 
functions of these bodies are to ‘formalise the persuasive process’.39
 
  
In an effort to counter some of these weaknesses, the Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights has been preparing a draft protocol to the ICESCR to 
permit i ndividuals and g roups to h ave acce ss to t he co mplaints procedure 
against v iolations of social and economic rights to the UN.40
 
 The motivation for 
such a  pr otocol i s that g overnments will be m ore l ikely t o t ake the C ovenant 
seriously if their decisions can be reviewed by an international monitoring body. 
The si gnificance o f t he dr aft op tional pr otocol i s that i t ease s the co mplaints 
procedure. For the protocol to see the light of day it will need to be ratified and it 
will bi nd onl y t hose c ountries that r atify i t. With t he bel ief st ill hel d i n so me 
countries that socio-economic rights are not justiciable it will be difficult to extract 
this concession. Perhaps the solution will be found in De Wet’s suggestion that 
those promoting the optional protocol must convince the others that ‘ almost al l 
economic, s ocial a nd cu ltural r ights have so me j usticiable l ayers’ t he 
development o f w hich co uld be nefit g reatly f rom a us er-friendly co mplaints 
procedure.41
 
 
2.3.6 The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
 
The A frican C harter on H uman and P eoples’ R ights (the B anjul Charter) wa s 
adopted in 1981 by the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). It came into force in 
1986. I t i s founded u pon t he r ecognition that ‘ freedom, equality, j ustice a nd 
                                                 
39 See M Schein, Economic and Social Rights as Legal Rights in A Eide et al (eds) Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights: A Textbook (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1995) 41. 
 
40 E De Wet, 'Recent Developments Concerning the Draft Optional Protocol to the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights' (1997) 13 SAJHR 154 (hereafter De Wet). 
 
41 De Wet (note 40 above) 543. See also G Bekker ‘An NGO Shadow Report on Socio-Economic Rights’ 
(1999) ESR Rev 16.  
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dignity are essential objectives for the achievement of the legitimate aspirations 
of the African Peoples’.  T he Charter guarantees the right to property and g ives 
the right to the state to only interfere where it is in the public interest to do so.42
 
 
The Charter al so guarantees some social and economic rights. The r ights that 
the charter guarantees include the following; the r ight to work under favourable 
conditions and to r eceive eq ual pay  for equal w ork;43 the r ight o f ev eryone t o 
attain the best attainable state of physical and mental health; the state has a duty 
to provide health care and medical facilities for the realisation of this right;44 the 
right to education for everyone and the right of  everyone to take part in cultural 
life;45 the obligation on the state to ensure that the aged and the disabled receive 
special protection in keeping with their moral and physical needs.46
 
  
2.3.7. The European Social Charter 
 
In Europe, a regional charter exists in the form of the European Social Charter. 
This Charter pr edates t he I CESCR as it c ame i nto o peration i n 1961 . E ven 
though its status is that of a charter and not a treaty, it does however, determine 
quite an ex tensive l ist of  s ocial obj ectives that member st ates should se ek to 
achieve.  
 
The European Charter guarantees the right to work,47 the right to just conditions 
of wo rk,48 the r ight t o healthy working co nditions,49
                                                 
42 Article 14 of the Banjul Charter. 
 the r ight t o f air 
 
43 Article 15 of the Banjul Charter. 
 
44 Article 16 of the Banjul Charter. 
 
45 Article 17 of the Banjul  Charter. 
 
46 Article 18 (4) of the Banjul Charter. 
 
47 Article 1 of the European Social Charter. 
 
48 Article 2 of the European Social Charter. 
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remuneration,50 the right of workers to organize,51 the right of workers to bargain 
collectively,52 the right of children and young persons to protection,53 the right of 
unemployed w omen to pr otection,54 the right t o pr otection o f h ealth,55 and t he 
right t o so cial se curity.56
 
 Various committees that ar e es tablished un der t he 
charter undertake the implementation of the charter. S tates bind themselves to 
observe the social policies contained in the Charter.  
2.4 THE R ECOGNITION OF  S OCIAL A ND E CONOMIC R IGHTS IN  
PARTICULAR JURISDICTIONS 
 
2.4.1 As Directives of State Policy The Indian Approach  
 
The I ndian C onstitution do es not c ontain s ocio-economic rights in a  ju sticiable 
form. Instead, Article 37 contains a list of social and economic objectives of the 
state. These ar e ca lled t he di rectives of s tate p olicy. T he I ndian C onstitution 
specifically st ates that t hese di rectives of st ate pol icy pr ovisions ‘shall not  b e 
enforceable by  any  court, but the principles therein laid down are nevertheless 
fundamental in the governance of the country and it shall be the duty of the State 
to apply these principles in making laws’.  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
49 Article 3 of the European Social Charter. 
 
50 Article 4 of the European Social Charter. 
 
51 Article 5 of the European Social Charter. 
 
52 Article 6 of the European Social Charter. 
 
53 Article 7 of the European Social Charter. 
 
54 Article 8 of the European Social Charter. 
 
55 Article 11 of the European Social Charter. 
 
56 Article 12 of the European Social Charter. 
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This has a two-fold meaning. The first is that a person cannot approach a court to 
seek relief on t he b asis that a so cio-economic directive has been v iolated or  
ignored. The second is that the legislature is obliged to act in a manner that gives 
effect to the directives of state policy. This will apply in instances where laws and 
policies of the country are drafted and implemented. The ambit of ‘making laws’ 
is wide enough to include interpreting them and therefore the courts should give 
consideration to the principles when interpreting the law.57
 
  
The Constitution provides that the state shall endeavour to promote the welfare 
of the people by effectively securing and protecting a social order in which social, 
economic and pol itical j ustice sh all i nform all t he i nstitutions of national l ife.58
 
 
Article 39 pr ovides for specific objectives. It requires that the state should direct 
its policy t owards securing t he r ight of  ci tizens to an ad equate m eans of 
livelihood; t hat t he o wnership and co ntrol of  t he m aterial r esources of t he 
community be so  di stributed as best t o s erve t he co mmon g ood; t hat t he 
economic system should not result in the concentration of wealth and the means 
of production to the common det riment; that there shall be equal pay for equal 
work for b oth m en an d women; t hat t he state should en deavour t o se cure t he 
health and s trength of workers, men and w omen and to ensure that the tender 
age of children is not abused; and that the citizens are not forced by economic 
necessity t o ent er a vocations unsuited t o t heir ag e and st rength and t hat 
childhood and youth are protected from exploitation and from moral and material 
abandonment. 
The C onstitution further pr ovides for t he r ight t o work, t o education a nd p ublic 
assistance in certain cases.59
                                                 
57 HM Seervai Constitutional Law of India (4 ed) N M Tripathi Pvt Ltd Bombay: 1993, 2008. 
 In order to carry out this function the state must act 
within the limits of economic capacity. Public assistance is specifically required in 
 
58 Article 38 of the Constitution of India. 
 
59 Article 41 of the Constitution of India.  
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cases of unemployment, old age, sickness and disability. Provision is also made 
for just and humane conditions of work and maternity relief,60 to a living wage,61 
to free and compulsory education for children,62 and the state is put under a duty 
raise t he l evel o f n utrition an d t he st andard o f l iving and t o i mprove pu blic 
health.63
 
 
2.4.1 (a) The Application of Directive Principles by Courts 
 
The directive principles are not directly enforceable by courts of law.64 The view 
that has been taken by the Supreme Court of India is that the directive principles 
and fundamental rights in the Constitution complement each other.65 In Minerva 
Mills Ltd v Union of India66
 
 the co urt r ecognised t he i mportance o f di rective 
principles stating t hat ‘ harmony and  bal ance be tween fundamental r ights and 
directive pr inciples is an esse ntial feature o f t he basi c structure o f t he 
Constitution’.  
In Kesavananda Bharati v State of Kerala67
‘…I think there are rights which inhere in human beings because they are 
human beings  whether you ca ll t hem na tural r ights or by  some other 
appellation is immaterial. As the preamble indicates, i t was to secure the 
basic human r ights like l iberty and equality t hat t he pe ople g ave unt o 
 Mathew J explained the relationship 
between t he di rective principles of st ate p olicy and f undamental r ights in t he 
following terms 
                                                 
60 Article 42 of the Constitution of India. 
 
61 Article 43 of the Constitution of India. 
 
62 Article 45 of the Constitution of India. 
 
63 Article 47 of the Constitution of India. 
 
64 B De Villiers ‘Directive Principles of State Policy and Fundamental Rights: The Indian Experience’ 
(1992) 9 SAJHR 29, 34 (hereafter De Villiers). 
 
65 CB Boarding & Lodging v State of Mysore (1969) 3 SCC 84. 
 
66 (1980) 2 SCC 591. 
 
67 (1973) 4 SCC 225,  880-881 para 1714. 
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themselves the C onstitution a nd t hese b asic rights are an es sential 
feature o f t he C onstitution; t he C onstitution w as also enact ed by t he 
people t o s ecure j ustice, pol itical, so cial a nd ec onomic. Therefore t he 
moral r ights embodied i n P art I V of  t he C onstitution ar e eq ually an 
essential feature o f i t, t he only di fference being t hat t he m oral r ights 
embodied in Part IV are not specifically enforceable as against the State 
by a ci tizen in a co urt of law in case the State fails to implement i ts duty 
but, nevertheless, they are fundamental in their governance of the country 
and all t he organs of t he State, i ncluding t he j udiciary, ar e bou nd to 
enforce those directives. The fundamental rights themselves have no fixed 
content; most of them are mere empty vessels into which each generation 
must p our i ts content i n t he l ight of  i ts experience. R estrictions, 
abridgment, c urtailment, an d even a brogation of these r ights in 
circumstances not v isualised by t he C onstitution-makers might become 
necessary; their claim to supremacy or priority is liable to be overborne at 
particular stages in the history of the nation by the moral claims embodied 
in Part IV.’  
 
In some cases the Supreme Court has not only emphasised the importance of 
harmonisation between fundamental r ights and di rective pr inciples but has also 
given more weight to the directive principles over the rights. In one case the court 
held that the right of every child to education until they reach 14 years should be 
respected. The r ight t o educ ation i s protected un der A rticles 41 and 4 5 as a 
directive of state policy. It has been held that this right is only ‘subject to the limits 
of economic capacity and development of the State’.68
 
  
The Supreme Court has also used the directive principles to give content to the 
freedoms guaranteed by the fundamental rights. The right to life under the Indian 
Constitution has been used to give substance to the socio-economic directives. 
In Olga T ellis and Others v Bombay Municipal C orporation and Others69
                                                 
68 Unni Krishnan v State of A.P (1993) 1 SCC 645, 765. 
 
proceedings were brought to prevent the Bombay Municipality from carrying out 
its threat to evict the street dwellers from the streets of Bombay. The petitioners 
relied upon Article 21, of the Constitution which provides that no person shall be 
deprived o f t heir l ife e xcept acco rding t o a pr ocedure est ablished by  l aw. T he 
 
69 (1985) 3 SCC 545. 
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contention was that the street dwellers had a right to life, and that this right could 
not be exercised without the means of l ivelihood. I t was further contended that 
the Bombay Municipality was contemplating t aking away t he r ight t o l ife o f the 
street dwellers in an arbitrary m anner i n t hat t he st reet dwellers had n ot b een 
given adeq uate notice o f t heir ev iction from t he st reet an d t hat t here w ere n o 
alternative accommodation arrangements in place. The procedure contemplated 
by the Constitution on the other hand had to be fair and reasonable.  
 
The court held that the forced removal of  the street dwellers was in violation of 
their right to life under the Indian Constitution. It held that the forcible removal of 
squatters even i f they are resettled in other areas totally disrupts the economic 
life of the household. In coming to this conclusion the court found that Article 39 
(a) of the Constitution which is a directive principle, provides that the state should 
direct i ts policy towards securing that al l the citizens have the right to adequate 
means of livelihood. The principles should play a fundamental role in interpreting 
the Constitution. I t held that ‘ [i]f there is there is an obligation upon the state to 
secure t o t he ci tizens an adeq uate m eans of l ivelihood…it w ould be sh eer 
pedantry to exclude the right to livelihood from the content of the right to life’. 70
  
  
The Olga Tellis decision followed t he reasoning o f t he court i n Francis Coralie 
Mullin v Administrator, U nion T erritory of Delhi.71
‘We think that the right to life includes the right to live with human dignity 
and al l t hat g oes with i t, namely t he b are nec essities of l ife s uch as 
adequate nu trition, cl othing and s helter ov er t he he ad a nd facilities for 
 A de tainee p etitioned t he 
Supreme C ourt on the g rounds that she h ad b een denied v isits by her  f amily. 
The court held that although the Constitution allows for deprivation of liberty, the 
actions of t he aut horities in t his instance h ad v iolated t he pe titioner’s right t o 
human dignity, a co mponent of the right to life. The Supreme Court in finding in 
favour of the petitioner said 
                                                 
70 Ibid para 33. 
 
71 (1981) 1 SCC 608. 
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reading, w riting and ex pressing onese lf i n diverse f orms, freely m oving 
about and mixing and commingling with fellow beings. 
Of co urse t he m agnitude an d co ntent o f t his right would depen d 
upon the extent of the economic development of the country…[but] every 
act w hich o ffends against or i mpairs human di gnity w ould co nstitute 
deprivation pr o t anto o f t his right t o l ive and i t w ould have t o be i n 
accordance w ith r easonable, fair and j ust procedure est ablished by law 
which stands the test of other fundamental rights.’72
 
 
In State of Himachal Pradesh v Sharma73
‘The applicant has also the right under art 21 to his life and that right under 
art 21 em braces not only physical e xistence o f l ife but t he quality of  l ife 
and for residents of hilly areas, access to a road is access to life itself … 
To the residents of the hi lly areas as far as feasible and possible society 
has [a] constitutional obligation to provide roads for communication.’
 the applicant, who was a resident of a 
remote village complained that the villagers’ only access to the rest of India was 
via a four to five m ile desc ent dow n a  st eep mountain o n foot a nd t hat u nder 
these circumstances democracy was meaningless to them. The government had 
in earlier years promised to construct a r oad to the village but i t never did. The 
Supreme Court, in holding that the government was under a constitutional duty to 
construct the road, held:  
74
 
  
Singh states that the difference between directives and fundamental rights is that 
fundamental r ights are pr imarily ai med at assu ring pol itical freedom to th e 
citizens by pr otecting t hem ag ainst ex cessive st ate action w hile t he di rective 
principles are ai med at  se curing t he so cial and  eco nomic freedoms by 
appropriate action.75
   
  
                                                 
72 Ibid  618-619. See also Uppendra Baxi v State of Uttar Pradesh (1986) 4 SCC 106. 
 
73 (1986) 2 SCC 68. 
 
74 Ibid 75 (italics mine). See also Peoples’ Union for the Democratic Rights v Union of India AIR 1982 SC 
1473 and Pandey v State of West Bengal [1988] LRC (Const) 241 (SC) where the same principle was used 
in the context of labour law.  
 
75 M P Singh V N Shulka’s Constitution of India 9 ed (Lucknow Eastern Book Co: 1994) 299. 
 39 
The Supreme Court stresses that there should be a balance between the two. It  
does not co ncentrate on w hat m akes a di rective pr inciple unen forceable bu t 
rather on what social justice requires. The importance of this discussion on the 
Indian C onstitution i s t hat t he C onstitution does not ex pressly protect so cio-
economic rights as justiciable r ights but this has  no t prevented the courts from 
making orders with clear socio-economic impact. The Supreme Court has stated 
that w here t he co urt i s called up on t o g ive ef fect to a directive pol icy or  
fundamental duty, it ca nnot sh rug i ts shoulders and sa y t hat i t i s a m atter of 
policy and therefore a matter for policy-making authority.76
 
  
2.5 THE I NCLUSION O F S OCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS IN T HE S OUTH 
AFRICAN BILL OF RIGHTS 
 
2.5.1 The debates that preceded the recognition 
 
The former president, Nelson Mandela, in 1991 said: 
‘A si mple v ote w ithout sh elter i s to use  first g eneration r ights as a 
smokescreen t o o bscure t he de ep un derlying f orces that deh umanise 
people. We do n ot w ant freedom w ithout b read nor do w e w ant br ead 
without freedom.’77
 
 
The recognition of socio-economic directives as legal rights which are justiciable 
has been subjected to attack on three fronts. The first is that these rights do not 
enjoy uni versal r ecognition i nternationally as rights.78 They appe ar m ainly as 
social goals of the state and n ot as rights.79
                                                 
76 Pandey v State of West Bengal (note 74 above). 
 This argument goes further to add 
 
77 N Mandela ‘Address on the Occasion of the ANC’s Bill of Rights Conference’ (1991) CDS A Bill of 
Rights for A Democratic South Africa 12. 
 
78 E Mureinik ‘Beyond a Charter of Luxuries: Economic Rights in the Constitution’ (1992) 8 SAJHR 464. 
A Sachs ‘Towards a Bill of Rights in a Democratic South Africa’ (1990) 6 SAJHR 1. 
 
79 DM Davis ‘A Case Against the Inclusion of Socio-Economic Demands in a Bill of Rights Except as 
Directive Principles’ (1992) 8 SAJHR 475. H Corder et al A Charter For Social Justice: A Contribution to 
the South African Bill of Rights Debate Cape Town, University of Cape Town: 1992. 
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that in the South African context it would be better if social and economic rights 
were only recognised as directive principles because of the excessive demands 
that their implementation would place on the budget. It is pointed out that South 
Africa i s a d eveloping co untry w ith a hi gh l evel o f p overty a nd a sk ewed 
distribution of income. 
 
Secondly, it has been argued that the recognition of social and economic rights is 
in violation of a constitutionally entrenched principle of separation of powers. The 
judiciary would, once  t hese r ights have been r ecognised, hav e t o di rect t he 
government on how the budget should be spent. This effectively means that the 
judiciary would be i nterfering i n a t errain t hat i s primarily reserved f or t he 
legislature and the executive. The court is not a proper forum to make decisions 
on how the budget should be allocated.80
 
  
The third point is closely related to the second in that it has been argued that the 
nature of so cio-economic rights requires expenditure of public resources. They 
cannot b e ac hieved i mmediately but  ov er a per iod o f time. C ivil and political 
rights are se en t o be  abso lute and ‘ immediate’ w hereas social and eco nomic 
rights are ‘programmatic’ and have to be realised over a period of time.  The fact 
that t hey ar e not  i mmediately ach ievable r enders them no n-justiciable. 
Internationally, i t has been argued further, that j usticiability i s closely related to 
immediate av ailability. I f t he st ate c annot be ordered t o i mmediately m ake t he 
rights available to the people who claim them, then they can hardly be said to be 
justiciable.81
                                                 
80 See A Eide 'Economic, Social and Cultural Rights as Human Rights' in Economic Social and Cultural 
Rights (note 39 above) 22. See also P De Vos ‘Pious Wishes or Directly Enforceable Rights: Social and 
Economic Rights in South Africa’s 1996 Constitution’ (1997) 13 SAJHR 67. 
  
 
81 See G Van Bueren ‘Alleviating Poverty Through The Constitutional Court’ (1999) 15 SAJHR 52. Craig 
Scott (note 24 above) illustrates the problem of distinction between these rights by means of the following 
table and he concludes that such simplicity of division is untenable. 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights  vs Civil and Political Rights 
1. Positive       vs Negative 
2. Resource Intensive     vs Cost Free 
3. Progressive       vs Immediate 
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2.5.2 The Constitutional Court Certification Judgment  
 
In Ex Parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In Re Certification of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (the Certification Judgment)82 
the Constitutional Court rejected al l of these arguments against the inclusion of 
socio-economic rights as fundamental rights in a bi ll of rights. On the separation 
of powers point, the court reasoned that this could not be raised as an objection 
because ev en i n t he enforcement o f ci vil and pol itical r ights, t he co urt o ften 
makes decisions with bu dgetary i mplications without c ompromising t he 
justiciability o f su ch r ights. I t gave an ex ample o f a court directing t he state to 
ensure a fair t rial t o an accu sed i n a cr iminal ca se by  pr oviding t hat acc used 
person with legal representation at the state’s expense. The court concluded that 
it ca nnot be sa id that a t ask conferred on  t he c ourts to m onitor t he 
implementation of social and economic rights is different from the role it plays to 
monitor civil and political rights.83
 
 
The court held further that the fact that socio-economic rights almost inevitably 
give r ise to courts making decisions with budgetary implications is not  a bar to 
their j usticiability. T he co urt w as of t he v iew t hat so cio-economic rights can a t 
least be ‘negatively protected from improper invasion’.84
                                                                                                                                                 
4. Vague      vs Precise 
 This judgment effectively 
put an end to the argument that socio-economic rights are not justiciable on t he 
5. Unmanageably Complex    vs Manageable 
6. Ideologically Divisive / Political    vs Non Ideological/ Non Political 
7. Non Justiciable     vs Justiciable 
8. Aspirations or Goals     vs ‘Real’ or ‘Legal’ Rights. 
 
82 Ex Parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In Re Certification of the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa, 1996 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC) (hereafter Certification Judgment). 
 
83 Ibid  para 77. 
 
84 Ibid  para 78. 
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basis that they i nvolve pol icy deci sions a nd t hat t hey i nvolve t he co urts in 
decisions which have budgetary implications.       
 
The ce rtification j udgment w as in l ine with t he d evelopment of i nternational 
jurisprudence on socio-economic rights. The Committee on Economic Social and 
Cultural Rights has recognised that for the realisation of both categories of rights, 
there i s a ne ed for st ates to ack nowledge t hat t hey ar e i nseparable an d must 
coexist. To this extent the Committee has commented 
‘Full r ealisation of h uman r ights can never be achieved as  a mere by  
product or fortuitous consequence, of some other development no m atter 
how posi tive. F or t hat r eason, su ggestions t hat t he full r ealisation o f 
economic, social and cultural rights will be a direct consequence of, or will 
flow aut omatically f rom, t he enj oyment of civil and pol itical r ights are 
misplaced.  
 
Such optimism i s neither co mpatible w ith t he b asic principles of hu man 
rights nor i s it supported by empirical ev idence. The reality i s that every 
society must work in a del iberate and carefully st ructured way to ensure 
the enjoyment by all of its members of their economic, social and cultural 
rights… 
 
Just as carefully targeted policies and unremitting vigilance are necessary 
to ens ure t hat r espect f or ci vil and pol itical r ights will f ollow f rom, for 
example the holding of a free and fair elections or from the introduction or 
restoration of an essentially democratic system of government, so too is it 
essential t hat s pecific policies and pr ogrammes be d evised and  
implemented by any government which aims to ensure the respect of the 
economic, social and cultural rights of its citizens and of others for whom it 
is responsible… 
 
Some governments in the industrialised countries tend to assume that that 
the ex istence o f a g enuinely dem ocratic system a nd t he g eneration o f 
relatively hi gh l evels o f pr e ca pita i ncome ar e su fficient ev idence of 
comprehensive respect for human rights. Yet, the committee’s experience 
shows that t hat su ch conditions are per fectly ca pable o f co existing with 
significant ar eas of n eglect of  t he b asic economic, so cial an d cu ltural 
rights of l arge n umbers of t heir ci tizens. H igh i nfant m ortality r ate, a  
significant ev idence o f hung er and m alnutrition, m ass unemployment, 
large sca le hom eless people at  l east pr ima facie ar e ex amples of 
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violations of ec onomic social an d cu ltural r ights and hence h uman 
rights.’85
 
 
And as the former Tanzanian President, Julius Nyerere observed: 
 
‘What f reedom has our subsistence farmer?… Certainly he has  freedom 
to vote and t o speak as he wishes. But these f reedoms are less real t o 
him than his freedom to be ex ploited. Only as his poverty is reduced will 
his existing political freedom become properly meaningful and hi s right to 
human dignity become a fact of human dignity.’86
 
  
Human rights, both civil and political as well as socio-economic rights, are in this 
sense no luxury. T hey are essential to a person’s existence. They supplement 
and give meaning to the concept of human dignity.87
 
  
2.6 SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC RIGHTS IN THE BILL OF RIGHTS 
 
The S outh African C onstitution co ntains within i t a num ber o f so cial a nd 
economic rights. Most of these r ights are derived from international instruments 
like the ICESCR and ICCPR. These rights are; the rights of workers to fair labour 
practices, to form an d j oin t rade unions, and t o st rike;88 the r ight t o a h ealthy 
environment;89 the r ight o f ev eryone t o own pr operty and the r elated pr operty 
rights;90
                                                 
85 Statement to the World Conference on Human Rights on behalf of the Committee on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights, UN Doc, E/1993/22, Annex III quoted by Steiner and Allston (note 8 above) 1127. 
 the r ight t o have access t o adequate housing which i ncludes the r ight 
 
86 Quoted by R Howard, ‘The Full-Belly Thesis: Should Economic Rights take Priority over Civil and 
Political Rights? Evidence from Sub Saharan Africa’ (1983) Human Rights Quarterly 476. 
 
87 See E Bondzie-Simpson ‘A Critique of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights’ (1988) 3 
Howard LJ  659. See also Craig Scott (note 24 above) 834.  
 
88 Section 23. 
 
89 Section 24. 
 
90 Section 25. This right also includes the right not to be deprived of ownership of property without lawful 
process and without fair compensation. The state ought to take ‘reasonable legislative and other measures, 
within its available resources, to foster conditions which enable citizens to gain access to land on an 
equitable basis’. 
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not t o b e ar bitrarily e victed f rom one’s home;91 the r ight of  ev eryone t o hav e 
access to health care, food, water and social security;92 the rights of children to 
basic nutrition, shelter, basic health care services, and social services;93 the right 
of everyone to basic education including basic adult education.94
 
  
The r ealisation o f the r ights under ss2 6 a nd 2 7 i s based on the pr inciple of 
progressive r ealisation. The r ealisation o f these r ights is also subject t o t he 
available r esources. This is an i nternal l imitation.95 Some r ights do n ot c arry 
internal l imitations. They ar e su bject t o t he l imitation i mposed by se ction 36 
which applies to all the rights in the Bill of Rights. They may be l imited by law of 
general application that is ‘reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic 
society based on human dignity, equality and freedom’. 96
 
  
2.6.1 Interpreting S ocio-Economic R ights unde r t he S outh African 
Constitution 
 
The interpretation of the Bill of Rights is guided by section 39, which provides 
‘(1) When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum- 
(a) must promote the values that underlie an open and democratic society 
based on human dignity, equality and freedom; 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
91 Section 26. This section enjoins the state to take ‘reasonable legislative and other measures within its 
available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation’ of the right to access to adequate housing. 
 
92 Section 27 The state is also placed under an obligation to take reasonable legislative and other measures 
within its available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of each of the rights.  This right 
includes the right not to be refused emergency medical treatment. 
 
93 Section 28. 
 
94 Section 29. This right is also extended to further education, which the state through reasonable measures 
must make progressively available, and accessible. 
 
95 It is not only ss 26 and 27 which carry internal limitations. Section 29(1) (b) does also carry such a 
limitation. See S Liebernberg 'Socio-Economic Rights'  in M Chaskalson (et al)Constitutional Law of South 
Africa Revision Service 3, 1998, (Juta and Co 1996) 41-6. In Grootboom (note 6 above) para 74 the 
Constitutional Court stated that although section 28(1)(c) does not refer to available resources, a proper 
construction of the section would entail taking into account the resources available. 
 
96 See s36.  
 45 
(b) must consider international law; and  
(c) may consider foreign law. 
(2) When interpreting any legislation, and w hen developing the common law 
or cu stomary l aw, t he co urt, t ribunal or forum must pr omote t he sp irit, 
purport and objects of the Bill of Rights. 
(3) The B ill o f Rig hts does not de ny t he ex istence of a ny ot her r ights and 
freedoms that are recognised or conferred by common law, customary law 
or legislation, to the extent that they are consistent with the Bill.’ 
 
Courts have a pi votal r ole i n ens uring t hat t he C onstitution i s made a l iving 
instrument. The courts must fashion their interpretation in a manner that ensures 
that t he l aw as articulated by  t he C onstitution finds expression i n a so cial 
context.97
‘The central concern of legal interpretation is not the meaning of the words 
but the purpose and structure of the rules in terms of which the pattern of 
the w ords can be understood…[Judges] s hould be g uided by a se t of 
principles in forming a  judgment…principles do not operate on  an all-or-
nothing basi s. The st rength o f a principle i s dependent up on i ts i nnate 
appeal and influence, which will determine the extent to which it guides or 
shapes a deci sion. [ …] I n i ts struggle t owards democracy S outh A frica 
needs a cr itical j urisprudence, o ne w hich al lows us to ex amine t he 
dominant v alues of t he l egal sy stem; i ts quest f or co herence and t he 
structure and j ustification of i t. I n t his m anner l aw m ight assist i n t he 
transformation to a pl uralist democracy rather than being a t ool for social 
engineering towards a non-racial autocracy.’
 The task that faces the courts was explained by one eminent author in 
these terms 
98
 
  
The i nterpretation of socio-economic rights occurs in t he context o f t he overall 
interpretation of t he Constitution. The r ights in t he C onstitution r einforce o ne 
another. They ar e al so no t m utually ex clusive but  ar e i nterconnected t o one 
another. In interpreting them, courts should take this factor into account. At the 
centre of t he n ew co nstitutional framework are v alues which m ust b e up held 
each t ime t he co urts give m eaning t o t he w ords in t he C onstitution. T he 
                                                 
97 In Ngxuza and Others v Secretary, Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape Provincial Government and 
Another 2000 (12) BCLR 1322 (E) 1325F-G, Froneman J recognised the importance of applying law in a 
given social context. See also Didcott J’s comments in Mohlomi v Minister of Defence 1997 (1) SA 124 
(CC) para 14. 
 
98 DM Davis ‘Integration and Ideology: Towards a Critical Theory of the Judicial Function’ (1996) 113 
SALJ 104, 130. 
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Constitution commits the nation to the goal of attaining social justice. It seeks to 
lay a f oundation for the recognition and respect of ‘human dignity, equality and 
freedom’. I t h as been not ed t hat t he v alue of  human di gnity i s central t o t he 
interpretation o f so cial and eco nomic rights.99 In i nterpreting t he C onstitution 
courts must co nsider appl icable i nternational l aw and m ay co nsider r elevant 
foreign law.100
 
 
While international law and foreign precedents offer great value and assistance 
in the interpretation of the Constitution, the Constitutional Court has warned that 
‘the us e o f foreign pr ecedent r equires introspection an d ack nowledgment t hat 
transplants require ca reful m anagement’.101 The co urts have developed a  
theoretical framework for the interpretation of the Constitution. They require that 
the Constitution be read textually and co ntextually.102  The true meaning of the 
Constitution can only be arrived at when the overall structure of the Constitution 
is looked at .103 This means that the court must look both at  the text as well as  
historical, social and political context of the rights.104
                                                 
99 See Grootboom (note 6 above) para 1.  
  
 
100 See Section 39(1)(b)-(c). See also S v Makwanyane (note 2 above) paras 36-37. 
 
101 Sanderson v Attorney General (Eastern Cape) 1998 (2) SA 38 (CC) para 26.  
 
102 See S v Zuma and Others 1995 (2) SA 642 (CC) paras 17-18 where the Constitutional Court stressed the 
importance of the text of the Constitution in the following terms: ‘While we must always be conscious of 
the values underlying the Constitution, it is nonetheless our task to interpret a written instrument. I am well 
aware of the fallacy of supposing that general language must have a single “objective” meaning. Nor is it 
easy to avoid the influence of one’s personal intellectual and moral preconceptions. But it cannot be too 
strongly stressed that the Constitution does not mean whatever we might wish it to mean. We must heed 
Wilberforce’s reminder that even a constitution is a legal instrument, the language of which, must be 
respected. If the language used by the lawgiver is ignored in favour of a general resort to “values” the result 
is not interpretation but divination.’ 
 
103 See S v Makwanyane (note 2 above) para 10. 
 
104 Grootboom  (note 6 above) para 22, President of RSA v Hugo 1997 (4) SA 1 (CC) para 41, S v Mhlungu 
(note 5 above) para 10, Sanderson v Attorney General, Eastern Cape 1998 (2) SA 38, 50 para 22, S v 
Williams and Others 1995 (7) BCLR 861 (CC) 877 para 47, Ferreira v Levin NO and Others 1996 (1) SA 
984 (CC) para 165, Beukes v Krugerdorp Transitional Local Council and Another 1996 (3) SA 467(T)  
474G-H, Shabalala v Attorney General of the Transvaal 1996 (1) SA 725 (CC) Pretoria City Council v 
Walker 1998 (2) SA 363 (CC) para 26.  
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The values that the Constitution embodies play a si gnificant role in informing its 
interpretation. The Constitutional Court has noted the centrality of these values in 
the context of  socio-economic rights. I n Government of  t he RSA and O thers v 
Grootboom and Others Yacoob J stated 
‘Our Constitution ent renches both civil and pol itical r ights and social and 
economic rights. A ll t he r ights in o ur B ill o f Rig hts are in ter-related a nd 
mutually supporting. There can be no doubt that human dignity, f reedom 
and equality, t he foundational values of our society, are denied to those 
who have no f ood, clothing or shelter. Affording socio-economic rights to 
all peopl e t herefore e nables them t o e njoy the ot her r ights enshrined i n 
chapter 2. The realisation of these rights is also key to the advancement of 
race and gender equality and the evolution of a society in which men and 
women are equally able to achieve their full potential.’105
 
  
 
2.6.2 The  O bligations of  t he S tate i n R espect of   S ocial a nd E conomic 
Rights 
 
The C onstitution enj oins the st ate t o take positive act ion t o r ealise t he r ights 
contained i n t he C onstitution. H enry S hue, an A merican sch olar, developed a  
three-tiered definition of social and eco nomic obligations that has been adopted 
by many commentators and followed by the United Nations in much of its work in 
this field. The structure of government duties was originally used to examine the 
protection of subsistence r ights but has been applied by commentators to both 
civil a nd p olitical a s w ell a s socio-economic rights. S ection 7 ( 2) o f t he 
Constitution follows this three t ired d efinition o f t he o bligations of t he st ate t o 
realise t he fundamental r ights. I t provides that t he s tate ‘must r espect, protect, 
promote, and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights.’ The three types of obligations 
that t his formulation creates are, first, t he obl igation t o r espect, se condly t o 
protect and thirdly to promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights.  
 
                                                 
105 Grooboom (note 6 above) para 23. See too A Chaskalson ‘Human Dignity as a Foundational Value of 
our Constitutional Order’ (2000) 16 SAJHR 193. 
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2.6.2 (a) The Obligation to Respect 
 
The obligation to respect socio-economic rights is to the effect that the state may 
not i nfringe the r ights in question. The thrust o f many socio-economic r ights i s 
that they place positive duties on the state. They also invariably place a negative 
obligation on t he state to refrain f rom their infringement. For instance, the state 
would be i nfringing so cio-economic rights if it ca rried ou t ar bitrary evictions or 
denied people access to means of subsistence l ike pensions or o ther forms of 
state grants without lawful justification. The Constitution provides in s26(3) that 
‘no one may be evicted from their home or have their home demolished, without 
an order of court made after considering all the relevant circumstances’. Section 
27(3) states that ‘no one may be refused emergency medical treatment’. 
 
Most civil and political rights are couched in this language. Both civil and political 
rights and so cio-economic rights may t herefore be i nfringed i n this way. T he 
administrative j ustice pr ovision i s an i mportant m eans to e nsure t hat t he 
obligation to respect human rights is adhered to. In the South African context, it 
has been utilised extensively in the area of the protection of the right of access to 
social security.106
 
  
2.6.2 (b) The Obligation to Protect 
 
The o bligation t o pr otect so cio-economic rights is a posi tive obl igation t hat i s 
placed o n t he st ate. The st ate h as an obl igation t o ensu re t hat a f ramework 
exists to ena ble ci tizens to enjoy t heir r ights without i nterference f rom others. 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
106 The following cases demonstrate how the courts used the right to administrative justice to defend 
already existing social benefits Rangani v Superintendent-General, Department of Health and Welfare 
1999 (4) SA 385 (T), Bushula v Permanent Secretary Department of Welfare Eastern Cape Provincial 
Government 2000 (7) BCLR 728 (E), Bacela v MEC for Health and Welfare (EC) 1998 All SA 525 (E), 
Ngxuza and Others v MEC for Welfare and Another (note 97 above). Ross v South Peninsula Municipality 
2000 (1) SA 589 (C) dealt with the prevention of unlawful eviction from housing in the context of section 
26 of the Constitution.  
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This includes ensuring that pr ivate bodies do not  act  i n a manner that v iolates 
peoples’ social and economic rights. De Vos states ‘the obligation is not to act 
positively in the sense of providing money or resources directly to individuals, but 
to protect individuals by creating a framework in which they will be able to realise 
their protected rights without interference by others’.107
 
 
The obligation to protect therefore, whilst it does not only create a negative duty 
for t he st ate i s not r esource b ased b ut r equires the st ate onl y to cr eate ‘ an 
enabling env ironment’ f or t he enjoyment o f socio-economic rights. T his can be 
done by  making pol icies and legislation which facilitate the enjoyment o f t hese 
rights.108
 
 
2.6.2 (c) The Obligation to Promote and Fulfil Human Rights 
 
The obligation to promote and fulfil comprises of the duty to create an e nabling 
environment for the enjoyment of socio-economic rights. It also enjoins the state 
to t ake positive act ion t o assist t hose who cannot do so  on  t heir own t o enjoy 
their r ights fully. T he state o ught t o m ake provisions for basi c commodities to 
individuals, especially vulnerable and disadvantaged communities. Because such 
people generally do not  hav e m eans to acc ess these basic services the st ate 
ought to make them available.109 The South African Constitution is, however, a 
far cr y f rom t he co mmonly hel d per ception o f s ocio-economic rights as 
commodities to be dispensed by the state on demand and free of charge.110
 
 
                                                 
107 De Vos (note 80 above) 83. 
 
108 Grootboom (note 6 above) para 35. 
 
109 See for instance the report of the South African Human Rights Commission on Economic and Social 
Rights 1999/2000 which reported that approximately 20 million people in South Africa live below the 
poverty line and that the poverty alleviation programmes of the government reach only 2,8 million of those 
people. The full report can be accessed from the Human Rights Commission website at www.sahrc.org.za . 
  
110 Ibid para 95. 
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The Constitution provides for access to the rights under ss 26 and 27.111 This is 
in r ecognition of t he fact t hat i ndividuals and g roups in s ociety h ave di vergent 
socio-economic needs because of t heir di fferent so cio-economic standing. T he 
state h as a dut y t o pr ovide i ndividuals in di fferent so cial ci rcumstances with 
appropriate m easures t o hel p t hem r ealise t hese r ights. T hese may i nclude 
subsidy allocations and other measures. In other words, this means that a s tate 
department must have a programme. This programme must take into account the 
different circumstances that exist for the different people that are served by the 
department. The C onstitutional C ourt h as held t hat s uch a plan w ill not  hav e 
sufficiently complied with the constitutional requirements if it makes no provision 
for people in desperate and crisis conditions.112
 
   
In ca rrying out  t hese obligations the state must ac t rationally and i n good faith 
and i s required t o j ustify i ts failure t o ca rry out  i ts obligations.113 In 
Soobramoney114
                                                 
111 Both sections use the qualification of ‘progressive realisation’. 
 this duty was emphasised and the court concluded that it could 
see no r eason t o i nterfere w ith r ational p olicies of g overnment made i n g ood 
faith.  Sections 33 and 36 reinforce this duty. Section 33 guarantees the right of 
everyone to just administrative action. Section 36, which deals with limitations of 
the rights in the Bill of Rights requires any limitation of a fundamental right to be 
effected i n t erms of a l aw of  g eneral appl ication a nd t he l imitation sh ould be   
‘reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human 
dignity, equality and freedom…’. 
 
112 In Grootboom  (note 6 above) para 44. 
 
113 See K O’Regan ‘Introducing Socio-Economic Rights’ (1999) 1 ESR Rev 2. See too Pharmaceutical 
Manufactures  (note 1 above) para  90. See also Mureinik (note 2 above) 32.   
 
114 Soobramoney (note 7 above) para 30. See also Yacoob J’s comments in Grootboom (note 6 above) para 
42 where he asserts that that the standard that must be used to assess whether or not the state has complied 
with its constitutional duties under section 26 (2) is whether or not the measures that have been adopted are 
reasonable under the given circumstances…. The precise contours and content of the measures to be 
adopted are primarily a matter for the legislature and the executive. They must, however, ensure that the 
measures they adopt are reasonable.[…] A court considering reasonableness will not enquire whether other 
more desirable or favourable measures could have been adopted, or whether public money could have been 
better spent. The question is whether the measures that have been adopted are reasonable.’ 
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2.7 CONCLUSION 
 
Since t he F irst World War and probably eve n e arlier t han t hat, a ttempts have 
been m ade t o search f or sp ace for so cio-economic rights in the g lobal human 
rights agenda. That space has to a l arge extent been found. Many international 
instruments now r ecognise so cio-economic directives as rights. T here i s, 
however, a recognition t hat t he i mplementation o f t hese r ights may not  be  
possible i mmediately, w hich i s why m any instruments grant s ome form of 
discretion for st ates to t ake st eps progressively t owards the i mplementation of 
those r ights. The S outh A frican Constitution appr oaches the implementation of 
socio-economic rights in much the same way. The major challenge facing South 
Africa i s to ensu re t hat t he g ains represented by  t he i nclusion of so cial an d 
economic rights in the Constitution are i rreversible. The state must ensure that 
steps are taken to deliver on these constitutional obligations. This will not happen 
overnight. B ut st eps must b e t aken i mmediately t o ensu re t hat t he dr eam o f 
social an d economic j ustice as set o ut i n t he pr eamble of the C onstitution 
becomes a reality. The Indian Constitution and t he manner in which the Indian 
Supreme Court has interpreted it shows that even in countries where there is no 
express provision of  di rectly en forceable so cio-economic rights in t he 
Constitution, t he co urt ca n ' read i n' t he s ocio-economic provisions to ot her 
directly enforceable r ights. A lthough the South African Constitution is differently 
structured to the Indian Constitution, the South African courts can learn a great 
deal from t he I ndian jurisprudence i n deal ing with t he en forcement o f so cio-
economic directives. What has informed t he i nterpretation o f the I ndian 
Constitution is the need to address socio-economic imbalances in post -colonial 
India. The co urts have had t o r eject ol d f ashioned r ules and m ethods of 
interpretation to accommodate the Indian poor and t o facilitate access to justice 
for t he m ajority. T his i s a v aluable l esson for t he South A frican j udiciary, 
especially i n r espect of socio-economic rights. Such an approach w ill vindicate 
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the Constitution as an operational and effective landmark in the quest for respect, 
protection, promotion and fulfillment of human rights. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
DEFINING ‘PROGRESSIVE REALISATION’ UNDER THE CONSTITUTION 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The following discussion deals with the concept of progressive realisation and its 
significance in t he en forcement o f socio-economic rights. T he M aastricht 
Guidelines t ogether with t he Li mburg P rinciples are r eferred t o ex tensively. 
Guidance is also sought from the United Nations General Assembly Comments 
to define t he scope and content of t he s tate's obligations under sections 26(2) 
and 27(2). The cases of Grootboom1 and  Soobramoney2
                                                 
1 Government of RSA and Others v Grootboom and others 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC). 
 are used as the first 
‘socio-economic rights’ cases to reach the apex court so far. In both cases it is 
noted that the Constitutional Court has stayed clear o f interfering in the role o f 
the ex ecutive and t he l egislature. I n t he Soobramoney case, t he C ourt use d 
rationality as a benchmark to determine whether or  not t he decisions taken by  
the government were in accordance with section 27. In the Grootboom case, the 
court sa id t hat i n any  ch allenge b ased on section 26(2), t he e nquiry would be  
whether or not the measures that the government has adopted were reasonable 
to realise the rights in the section. It is noted that the principal difference between 
these two cases is that in Grootboom the applicant was able to show what the 
applicant had failed to show in Soobramoney: namely that the state had failed in 
its duty to progressively realise the socio-economic rights in the Constitution. It is 
concluded that progressive realisation is about careful and detailed planning. It is 
proposed in this chapter that the Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000, which has as 
one of its objectives to ‘assist national and provincial government in progressive 
realisation o f t he fundamental r ights in t he C onstitution’ w ill se rve as an 
instrument through which compliance with sections 26(2) and 27(2) in particular 
 
2 Soobramoney v Minister of Health, Kwazulu Natal 1998 (1) SA 765(CC). 
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could b e t ested. The Act r equires each municipality t o dev elop an I ntegrated 
Development P lanning ( the I DP) as a pl anning st rategy to del iver basic social 
services to the people. Where the local municipality has not adopted an IDP then 
it could be argued that it is not complying with its constitutional obligations in so 
far as socio-economic rights are concerned. 
 
The ach ievement o f t he r ights under se ctions 26 and 2 7 i n t he Constitution i s 
based on t he pr inciple o f ‘ progressive r ealisation’.3  These r ights hav e been  
described as rights of acce ss to su bsistence, for w ithout access to t hem i t i s 
difficult to comprehend how human beings can survive. In this way they are at  
the core of the existence of mankind.4
 
  
The International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (the ICESCR 
or the Covenant) provides that ‘each party to the present Covenant undertakes to 
take s teps, i ndividually and t hrough i nternational assistance a nd co-operation, 
especially eco nomic and t echnical, t o t he m aximum o f i ts available r esources, 
with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized 
in t he pr esent C ovenant by  al l appr opriate m eans, i ncluding pa rticularly the 
adoption of legislative measures’.5
 
 
Sections 26(2) an d 2 7(2) o f t he C onstitution pr ovide t hat ‘ the st ate must t ake 
reasonable l egislative and other m easures, w ithin i ts available r esources, t o 
achieve the progressive realisation of these rights’. There are thus three distinct 
elements contained b y t he l anguage o f these se ctions. They ar e ' progressive 
realisation', ' legislative and other m echanisms' an d ' within t he av ailable 
resources'. These elements will be discussed in the following section.  
 
                                                 
3 Sections 26 and 27 of the Constitution make provision for the right of access to housing, water, food, 
health care, adequate and social security. 
 
4 A Chaskalson ‘Dignity as a Foundational Value of our Constitutional Order’ (2000) 16 SAJHR 193, 203. 
 
5 Article 2 (1) of the ICESCR. 
 55 
 
3.2 PROGRESSIVE REALISATION 
 
3.2.1 The Limburg Principles 
 
From t he 2 nd to the 6 th
 
 June 1986, a g roup o f di stinguished l egal ex perts in 
international l aw m et in N etherlands, u nder t he aus pices of the International 
Commission of Jurists (the ICJ). The purpose of the meeting was to consider the 
nature an d scope o f the o bligations of t he states in t erms of t he I CESCR, t he 
reporting procedure by the Economic and Social Rights Council ( the ECOSOC) 
and t he i nternational co-operation t o r ealise so cial an d eco nomic rights. T he 
outcome of the meeting was that it was necessary to develop some guidelines to 
guide st ate act ion i n t he per formance o f t heir dut ies under A rticle 2( 1) o f t he 
ICESCR. These were documented and p ublished worldwide and a re referred to 
as the ‘ Limburg P rinciples’. T hey ar e us ed as an unofficial guide t o t he 
interpretation o f t he s tate act ion under t he ICESCR. They ar e r elevant i n t he 
interpretation of social, economic internationally and so cial r ights and especially 
in South Africa where most of the social and economic rights are provided for in 
similar language to the ICESCR.  
The Limburg Principles recognise that the full realisation of some economic and 
social rights is to be achieved progressively. Some rights can be made justiciable 
immediately w hile ot hers are j usticiable ov er t ime.6 It i s stated i n the Limburg 
Principles that the achievement of economic and social rights may be realised in 
a variety of  political settings and there is no single road to their full realisation.7
                                                 
6 Limburg Principles (1986) para 8. The Principles are reproduced in Human Rights Quarterly (1987) 9 No 
2. 
 
The r eport ca lled for f ull par ticipation by  st ate an d non -state ac tors as being 
indispensable for t he full r ealisation o f so cio-economic rights. T he st ate must 
 
7 Limburg Principles para 6. 
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always act i n g ood f aith t o fulfil t he o bligations it h as accepted und er t he 
ICESCR. 
 
The ICESCR obliges the state parties ‘to achieve progressively the full realisation 
of r ights’. T his according t o t he principles means that t he s tate is required t o 
move as expeditiously as possible towards the realisation of the rights. Under no 
circumstances shall t his be i nterpreted as implying f or st ates the r ight t o d efer 
indefinitely ef forts to ensure full r ealisation. O n t he co ntrary al l st ates parties 
have the obligation to beg in immediately to take steps to fulfill t heir obl igations 
under the Covenant.8
 
 Some obl igations under the Covenant require immediate 
implementation in full by all state parties. 
The obligation of progressive realisation exists independently of the increase in 
resources available to the state. This is so because apart from requiring the state 
to avail resources for progressive achievement of the r ights it requires effective 
use of available resources.9 Progressive implementation can be effected not only 
by i ncreasing r esources, bu t al so by  t he development of so cietal r esources 
necessary f or the r ealisation by  ev eryone o f t he r ights recognized i n the 
Covenant.10
 
  
3.2.2 The Maastricht Guidelines 
 
After ten years of the existence of the Limburg Principles, a group of more than 
thirty ex perts met i n M aastricht un der the auspices of t he I nternational 
Commission of Jurists ( the ICJ) with the purpose of elaborating on the Limburg 
Principles with regard to the nature and scope of v iolations of economic, social 
and cultural rights and the appropriate responses and remedies. The resolutions 
                                                 
 
8 Limburg Principles para 21. 
 
9 Limburg Principles para 23. 
 
10 Limburg Principles para 24. 
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and obs ervations that were m ade at  t he meeting w ere docu mented as the 
Maastricht Guidelines and have been used worldwide to identify the violations of 
social, eco nomic and so cial r ights and t o pr ovide f or ap propriate r emedies 
thereto. They have been q uoted i n many j udgments locally and i nternationally. 
They are of great use to the interpretation of the provisions of the Covenant and 
are also important in determining the instances where these rights are violated. 
 
The M aastricht G uidelines recognise t hat si nce t he e nd of t he Cold War there 
has been a trend in all regions of the world to reduce the role of the state and to 
rely on t he m arket t o resolve pr oblems of h uman welfare. The g uidelines also 
recognise that i t i s no longer taken for granted that the realisation of economic 
and social rights is primarily the responsibility of the state and state action is the 
starting point to their full realisation.11
 
  
The guidelines state further that as in the case of civil and pol itical rights, states 
may enjoy a m argin of  discretion in se lecting the means for implementing their 
respective obl igations. S tate pr actice a nd the ap plication o f l egal nor ms to 
concrete cases and situations by international treaty monitoring bodies as well as 
by dom estic courts have co ntributed to the development o f uni versal m inimum 
standards and the common understanding of the scope nature and l imitation of 
economic social an d cu ltural r ights. T he fact t hat full r ealisation o f eco nomic, 
social and cu ltural r ights can only be ach ieved progressively, does not alter the 
nature of the legal obligation of states which requires that certain steps be taken 
immediately and others as soon as possible. Therefore, i t i s upon t he st ate to 
demonstrate that it is making measurable progress towards the realisation of the 
rights in question.  
 
A state party cannot use the progressive realisation provisions of article 2 of the 
Covenant as a pretext for non-compliance. Nor can the state justify derogations 
                                                 
11 Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social & Cultural Rights (1997) para 2 (hereafter 
Maastricht Guidelines). These guidelines can be accessed at www.umn.edu/humanrts/. 
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or l imitations of r ights r ecognised i n t he C ovenant bec ause o f different so cial, 
religious and cu ltural backg rounds.12
 
 In th is sense t he co ncept o f pr ogressive 
realisation means that states must take steps over a period of time to ensure the 
full realisation of some social and economic rights. Strategies for their realisation 
differ depending on the circumstance of each and every country.  
Eide su ggests that g overnments should est ablish nat ion-wide sy stems o f 
identifying l ocal ne eds and o pportunities for t he enj oyment o f economic and 
social r ights. T hey sh ould i dentify di fferent g roups in so ciety, w hich hav e 
difficulties in accessing socio-economic rights. Socio-economic rights are needs 
based and therefore the information gathering exercise should have as its main 
focus the identification o f l ocal needs. When the government has  identified the 
area o f m ost pr essing need i t ca n d evelop st rategies and p olicies that ca n 
produce tangible and concrete results. The blueprint or general model may not fit 
each country in a si milar way. Again whilst t here is an appreciation of di fferent 
circumstances which obtain i n each c ountry t hat sh ould never b e use d as  a 
pretext not to provide access to socio-economic rights.13
     
  
The C onstitutional C ourt has said t hat t he use  of t he t erm ‘ progressive 
realisation’ in section 27(3) of the Constitution is in recognition of the fact that ‘the 
Constitution … cannot solve all society’s woes overnight, but must go on trying to 
resolve these problems.’14
  
  
3.2.3 UN General Assembly Comments 
 
ECOSOC ( the C ommittee), a su bcommittee o f t he U nited N ations, anal yses 
reports submitted by  st ates ab out t heir co mpliance w ith t he C ovenant. The 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
12 Maastricht Guidelines para 8. 
 
13 A Eide 'Economic, Social and Cultural Rights as Human Rights’ in Economic Social and Cultural 
Rights: A Textbook Eide et al eds (Marticuns Nijhoff 1995) 21, 40. 
 
 59 
Committee then makes observations about the nature of the reports of the states. 
Their obse rvations are ca lled c omments and ar e o ften used as  g uidelines to 
measure co mpliance o f t he st ates with t heir obl igations under t he C ovenant. 
They ar e an of ficial r eference poi nt. S tates ar e of ten pl aced un der a dut y t o 
observe standards set by the Committee in its comments. 
       
The U N G eneral A ssembly co mmentary15
 
 has urged st ates to i nclude i n t heir 
reports information which sh ows progressively, st eps taken t owards the 
realisation o f so cio-economic rights. T he c ommentary st ates further t hat b oth 
qualitative and quantitative data are required for an adequate assessment of the 
situation to be made. 
 In 1990, the UN General Assembly16
‘The concept of progressive realization constitutes a recognition of the fact 
that full realization of all economic, social and cultural rights will generally 
not be achieved in a short period of time… Nevertheless, the fact that the 
realization ov er t ime, or i n ot her w ords progressively, i s foreseen und er 
the Covenant should not  be misinterpreted as depriving the obl igation of 
all m eaningful co ntent. I t i s on t he ot her hand a n ecessary f lexibility 
device, reflecting the realities of the real world and the difficulties involved 
for any country in ensuring full realization of economic, social and cultural 
rights. O n t he other h and, t he p hrase must be r ead i n t he l ight of t he 
overall obj ective, i ndeed t he raison d’ être, of t he C ovenant w hich i s to 
establish a cl ear o bligations for st ates parties in r espect of t he full 
realization of the rights in question. It thus imposes an obligation to move 
as expeditiously and effectively as possible towards that goal. Moreover, 
any del iberately retrogressive measures in that regard would require the 
most c areful co nsideration a nd w ould ne ed t o be fully j ustified by  
reference to the totality of  the r ights provided for in the Covenant and in 
the context of the full use of the maximum available resources.’    
 sought to provide content to the concept of 
progressive realisation in the following manner  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
14 Soobramoney (note 2 above) para 43.  See also Grootboom (note 1 above) para 45. 
 
15 UN General Assembly Comment No1 (1989) ‘Reporting by State Parties’. 
 
16 UNGA Comment No 3 (1990). 
 60 
Progressive realisation also inhibits the state from taking retrogressive measures 
to deny  i ts citizens access to so cio-economic rights.17
 
 However, a d istinction 
should be drawn between measures which are taken in order to extend the level 
of benefit to other social classes which previously did not enjoy such benefit and 
measures which deny citizens the right of subsistence and do not benefit anyone 
altogether. The suspension of a person’s social grant, for instance, without lawful 
justification, which has an e ffect of denying him or  her access to the means of 
subsistence w ill not  be co mpatible w ith t he sp irit and t enor of  pr ogressive 
realisation and hence of t he Bill o f R ights. By t he same token where the state 
reduces t he l evel o f ben efit from on e s ector o f t he population, s ay w hite 
orphaned ch ildren, i n or der t o ex tend su ch ch ild su pport sy stem t o bl ack 
orphaned ch ildren w ho w ere pr eviously not ca tered for by  t he sy stem, su ch 
measures may not  be i ncompatible w ith t he r equirements of pr ogressive 
realisation. The onus, however, rests on the state to prove that the decision was 
made b ona fide an d t hat i t g uarantees access to t hose b enefits to a nother 
section of the population, which previously did not enjoy such benefits.  
 
3. 2 WITHIN THE AVAILABLE RESOURCES 
 
Whereas some years ago, al l t he essentials o f l ife co uld be found out side t he 
organised society, today most people depend on the organised society for their 
needs. The state in most developed and developing countries has become the 
major provider of employment and social security. In this sense organised society 
in the form of the state has also received a responsibility to cater for the needs of 
the unemployed an d t hose w ithout acce ss to basi c services like water, sh elter 
and food. The need t o i mprove t he so cial conditions of t he l ower cl asses in 
society g ave r ise t o t he d evelopment o f the w elfare st ate i n t he ni neteenth 
                                                 
 
17 See A Chapman ‘A “Violations Approach” for Monitoring the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights’ (1996) 18 Human Rights Quarterly  23.    
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century.18 This has largely been r eplaced by  w hat i s referred t o as the 
‘benefactor state’.19 The characteristics of the benefactor state have not changed 
significantly from the welfare state. The only distinction is that the creation of the 
welfare st ate w as inspired by  t he need t o adv ance backw ard so cial cl asses 
through the pr ovision of  so cial se rvices. T he m odel be nefactor state i s also 
inspired by  t he desi re t o i mprove t he so cial co nditions but i t a lso w ants to 
improve the economy of the state.20
 
  
The recognition that the state has become the major role-player in the day to day 
activities of mankind has made many people to be dependent on the state also 
for their physical survival. But there is a potential conflict between the provision of 
basic services and the dev elopment o f t he st ate economy. T his beco mes so  
especially where the disparities between the poor and the rich are as high as is 
the c ase i n South Africa. I t i s therefore necessary t o e nsure t hat a balance i s 
maintained b etween t hese two app arently co mpeting n eeds. I t i s necessary t o 
develop an approach that extends the basic services to the poor whilst it ensures 
that t here i s minimal i nterference w ith t he b ody pol itic. This, acco rding to 
Wiechers, is a ‘pragmatic, middle-of-the-road approach’.21
 
  
Because o f t he ne ed t o av oid t ension an d pot ential co nflict22
                                                 
18 C Reich ‘The New Property’ (1964) 73 Yale LJ  733. 
 the ICESCR 
requires the states to devote the ‘maximum of its available resources’ to realising 
economic, s ocial an d cu ltural r ights. T he resource co nstraint i s use d i n t he 
recognition t hat t he st ate h as other r esponsibilities that i t m ust fulfill but  i n s o 
doing i t m ust al so make pr ovision for so cial and economic rights. T he S outh 
African C onstitution u ses the w ords ‘within i ts available r esources’ w hile t he 
 
19 M Wiechers 'Administrative Law and the Benefactor State' (1993) Acta Juridica 248, 251  
 
20 Ibid 251. 
 
21 Ibid. 
 
22 See Soobramoney (note 2 above) para 11.  
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Covenant uses ‘to the maximum of i ts available resources’. I t i s submitted that 
the di fference in how these t wo provisions are st ructured does not change the 
nature of the obligations on the part of the state.  
 
The Li mburg P rinciples have i nterpreted the phr ase t o m ean t hat st ates are 
obligated, regardless of the level of economic development, to ensure respect for 
minimum s ubsistence rights for al l.23 Its available r esources refers to bot h t he 
resources within a st ate an d t hose available from the i nternational co mmunity 
through technical co-operation and assistance.24
 
 
In determining whether adequate measures have been taken for the realisation 
of the rights in the Covenant attention shall be paid to equitable and effective use 
of and access to the available resources.25 In the use of the available resources 
due priority sh all be given t o t he r ealisation o f t he rights recognised i n t he 
Covenant, m indful o f t he n eed t o ass ure t o ev eryone t he s atisfaction of 
subsistence requirements as well as the provision of essential services.26
 
 
The Maastricht Guidelines state t hat whilst some r ights in the I CESCR can be 
realised w ith very l ittle e ffect o n t he financial r esources some m ay depend for 
their r ealisation on adequate financial r esources. R esource scarcity sh ould no t 
relieve the states of their minimum core functions in terms of the Covenant.27
 
  
Even where the available resources are demonstrably inadequate, the obligation 
remains for a state party to strive to ensure the widest possible enjoyment of the 
relevant r ights under t he pr evailing ci rcumstances.28
                                                 
23 The Limburg Principles para 25. 
 The C ommittee has held 
 
24 The Limburg Principles para 26. 
 
25 The Limburg Principles para 27. 
 
26 The Limburg Principles para 28. 
 
27 The Maastricht Guidelines para 10. 
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that ev en i n t imes of se rious constraints whether ca used by  a pr ocess of 
adjustment, of economic recession, or by other factors the vulnerable members 
of society can and indeed must be protected by the adoption of relatively low cost 
targeted programmes.29
 
 
The words used in the ar ticle are ‘maximum’ and ‘available’. Robertson argues 
that the two are potentially in conflict in the sense that maximum represents the 
ideal whereas available represents realism. ‘Maximum’ is the usual rights rhetoric 
whilst ‘available’ is the political wiggle room.30
 
  
The duty to allocate the resources at the disposal of the state is outside the ambit 
of the courts. It rests with the executive. Courts will, however, examine whether 
there i s a r ationally co nceived pr ogramme in pl ace an d t here ar e r easonable 
steps that are taken towards its implementation.31
 
 
The term ‘resource’ is not limited only to the resources currently available to the 
government bu t al so extends to ot her r esources that can be available t hrough 
technical co -operation with ot her co untries. I t i s also n ot l imited t o f inancial 
resources but al so i ncludes cultural, human, t echnological, a nd i nformational 
resources.32
 
 The use of these resources must be directed at promoting the goal 
of economic, social and cultural well being of all the citizens of the state. If this is 
done that would signify a substantial if not total compliance with the requirements 
of the ICESCR.  
                                                                                                                                                 
28 UNGA No3 (1990) para 11. 
 
29 Ibid. 
 
30 E Robertson ‘Measuring State Compliance with the Obligation to Devote ‘s‘Maximum Available 
Resources’’ to Realising Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (1994) 16 Human Rights Quarterly  694.  
 
31 Note 1 above.  
 
32 Maastricht Guidelines para 26. 
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3.3 LEGISLATIVE AND OTHER MEASURES 
 
Another requirement in terms of sections 27(2) and 2 6(2) is that the state must 
‘take reasonable legislative and other measures’…[to ensure t he] r ealisation of 
social and economic rights. The s tate should not only legislate bu t should also 
engage in other measures, which will ensure that the social and economic rights 
in the Constitution are realised. The ICESCR provides that the state parties are 
obligated t o ‘ take st eps … by al l ap propriate m eans, i ncluding p articularly t he 
adoption of legislation’.33
 
 
The Limburg Principles provide that all state parties have an obl igation to begin 
immediately to take st eps towards the full r ealisation o f t he r ights in t he 
Covenant.34 At a national level the state shall use all appropriate means including 
legislative, administrative, judicial, economic, social, and educational measures, 
consistent with the nature of the rights in order to fulfill their obligations under the 
Covenant.35
 
  
The Li mburg P rinciples recognize t hat l egislative m easures alone ar e not 
sufficient to fulfill the obligations of the Covenant. It is however important that the 
states take l egislative act ion esp ecially i n cases where t he cu rrent l egislation 
conflicts with t he sp irit of  t he C ovenant.36
 
 The st ate par ties should i n t heir 
legislative m echanisms provide for e ffective r emedies including, w here 
appropriate, judicial remedies. The United Nations Economic and Social Council 
will determine whether or  no t t he legislative measures that have been adopted 
are sufficient or insufficient 
                                                 
33 Article 2(1) of the ICESCR. 
 
34 The Limburg Principles para 16. 
 
35 The Limburg Principles para 17. 
 
36 The Limburg Principles para 18. 
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The M aastricht G uidelines state t hat v iolations of the C ovenant o ccur w hen a  
state pursues either by  act  or  om ission, a p olicy or practice which del iberately 
contravenes or i gnores obligations of t he C ovenant, or fails to ach ieve t he 
required co nduct or r esult. The g uidelines i nclude as one of t he ar eas of 
discrimination social origin and property. It therefore encourages state parties to 
adopt l egislation and pol icies that di scourage di scrimination. By ef fecting 
discriminatory policies the state parties would be acting contrary to the provisions 
of t he Covenant.  A  state party f ails to comply with the terms of the Covenant 
when i t fails to e ffect l egislation or  put i n place policies that ar e desi gned t o 
achieve the objectives of the Covenant.37
 
  
The state should not adopt legislation or policies that are manifestly incompatible 
with e xisting i nternational obl igations giving ef fect to t hese r ights, unl ess it i s 
done w ith t he pur pose and e ffect o f i ncreasing eq uality and i mproving t he 
realisation of economic, social and cultural rights for the most vulnerable groups. 
 
The Committee has in i ts commentary sa id that t he requirement t hat the state 
should take steps should be interpreted to mean that the state is placed under a 
duty t o st art acting t owards the r ealisation of t he g oals of t he C ovenant. The 
Committee has recognised t hat l egislation i s necessary and i n ot her i nstances 
even i ndispensable. F or ex ample i t may be di fficult t o effectively f ight 
discrimination i n t he abse nce o f a so und l egislative m easure pr ohibiting 
discrimination. The most vulnerable groups like children and the elderly have to 
be protected through the adoption of legislation first and state action should then 
follow.38
 
 
Whereas the C ommittee h as recognised t hat t he a doption of l egislative 
measures is central to the realisation of the economic, social and cultural rights, 
                                                 
37 Maastricht Guidelines paras 14-16 
 
38 UNGA Comment No 3 (1990) para 3 (hereafter UNGA No3). 
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the adoption of the laws alone is by no means exhaustive of the obligations of the 
state p arties.39
 
 The st ate par ties should r ather t ake appr opriate m easures to 
realise the social r ights. The states are g iven a di scretion to determine what is 
‘appropriate’ t aking i nto acco unt their sp ecific circumstances. T his discretion, 
however does not override the power of the Committee to determine whether the 
measures used were indeed appropriate. Thus the appropriate measures must 
be taken in the context of the limitations imposed by the Committee. 
The C ommittee has also em phasized t hat t here i s a n eed t o develop j udicial 
remedies in r espect of r ights, w hich i n t he nat ional c ontext ar e co nsidered 
justiciable. The e njoyment o f t hese r ights can be ac hieved m eaningfully when 
there ar e j udicial r emedies in pl ace.40 The C ommittee has also stressed t hat 
where there is legislation that has been adopted, i t will be i ncumbent upon the 
state parties to inform the Committee of the effect that those policies are having. 
The Committee also wishes to receive information about whether or not in those 
countries that ex pressly pr ovide f or so cial and economic rights the r ights are 
considered justiciable or not.41
 
  
The ne ed t o t ake l egislative and ot her m easures should not be v iewed t o 
preclude a ny g overnment from i ntroducing a s ocial or  economic system t hat 
facilitates the achievement o f social r ights. Any t ype of  economy that does not 
violate t he t erms of t he C ovenant w ill be acce ptable t o t he C ommittee.42
                                                 
39 UNGA No 3 para 4. 
 The 
Constitutional C ourt h as held t hat mere l egislation i s not enough. T he st ate i s 
obliged t o act t o ach ieve t he i ntended r esult, and  t he l egislative m easures will 
invariably have t o be su pported by  appr opriate, w ell di rected pol icies and 
programmes implemented by the executive. The development of the programme 
is only the first stage. It must be reasonably implemented because ‘an otherwise 
 
40 UNGA No 3 para 5. 
 
41 UNGA No 3 para 6. 
42 UNGA No 3 para 8. 
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reasonable programme t hat i s not i mplemented w ill not  co nstitute co mpliance 
with the state’s obligations.’43
 
  
3.4 S ETTING M INIMUM S TANDARDS F OR RE ALISATION O F S OCIO-
ECONOMIC RIGHTS-THE ‘MINIMUM-CORE’ OBLIGATION OF THE STATE 
 
Paragraph 9 of the Maastricht Guidelines states that:  
‘Violations of t he I CESR occu r w hen a S tate fails to sa tisfy w hat t he 
Committee on E conomic, S ocial and C ultural R ights has referred t o as  
“minimum core” obligation to ensure the satisfaction of, at  the very least, 
minimum essential levels of each of these rights 
[…] T hus, for example, a st ate party i n which any  si gnificant nu mber of 
individuals is deprived of  essential foodstuffs, of  essential pr imary heal th 
care, of basic shelter and housing, or of the most basic forms of education 
is, prima facie, violating the Covenant.’  
 
Progressive realisation of social and economic rights will no doubt mean different 
things to different societies of the world for a long time to come. What the precise 
requirements for their attainment are will vary from case to case and will perhaps 
remain an i ssue for debate for the ent ire l ifespan o f the Constitution.44
 
 But t he 
task that faces the judiciary is at least identifying what the minimum requirements 
for compliance are in a given case. 
The core content of the right has to be viewed not in isolation but account should 
be t aken o f other r elevant factors. The i mportant factor i s the availability of  
resources on the part of the state. The minimum standards will not  be properly 
set except if reliance is had on the available resources of the state. In this regard 
the Maastricht Guidelines state that the state violates the terms of the Covenant 
if i t fails to sa tisfy the Committee about the ach ievement of t he ‘minimum core 
obligation to ensure the satisfaction of, at least, minimum essential levels of each 
                                                 
 
43 Per Yacoob J in Grootboom (note 1 above) para 42. 
 
44 See F Ka Mdumbe 'Van Biljon versus Soobramoney' (1998) 13 SAPL 460, 470. In that article the writer 
concludes that 'perhaps the last word on socio-economic rights will never be spoken'. 
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right’. T hus for ex ample, a s tate p arty i n w hich any  si gnificant nu mber o f 
individuals is deprived of essential foodstuffs, of essential primary health care, of 
basic shelter and housing, or of the most basic forms of education is, prima facie 
violating t he t erms of t he C ovenant. These m inimum co re o bligations apply 
irrespective of the resources in a country.45
 
  
The Li mburg P rinciples recognise t hat the scarcity of  t he r esources does not 
relieve t he st ate of so me minimum co re obl igations with r egards to t he 
implementation o f s ocial and ec onomic rights.46
 
 But a c ountry has to st rike a  
balance b etween the i deal and t he r ealistic. A n i deal so ciety i s the one where 
there i s equality f or al l. A  r ealistic society ai ms to ach ieve an equitable 
distribution of resources. 
In t he ca se o f Van B iljon v Minister of  C orrectional S ervices47 the co urt 
interpreted t he t erm ‘ adequate’ for t he p urposes of se ction 3 5(2)(e)48
 
 of t he 
Constitution. I n this case, four H IV posi tive pr isoners brought an  appl ication to 
direct the state to provide them with the prescribed treatment for their condition. 
The state argued that it did not have sufficient funds to provide for the treatment 
that the applicants wanted. The st ate further ar gued that w hat i s ‘adequate 
medical t reatment’ for pr isoners should be construed in the context of  al l o ther 
people who were outside prison. Just as it is not the duty of the state to provide 
prescribed medical treatment for HIV positive people outside the prison, it cannot 
not be held that the prisoners are entitled to something more.  
Brand J rejecting the argument on behalf of the state held  
                                                 
45 Maastricht Guidelines para 9. 
 
46 Limburg Principles paras 23-28. 
 
47 Van Biljon v Minister of Correctional Services 1997 (4) SA 441 (C). 
 
48 This section provides: 
 ‘ Everyone who is detained, including every sentenced prisoner, has the right to conditions of 
detention that are consistent with human dignity, including at least exercise and the provision, at 
state expense, of adequate accommodation, nutrition, reading material and medical treatment’. 
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‘…lack of funds cannot b e a n answ er t o t he pr isoners constitutional 
claims. Therefore, o nce i t i s established t hat anything l ess than a 
particular form of medical t reatment would not be a dequate, the prisoner 
has a constitutional right to that form of medical treatment and it would be 
no defence for the prison authorities that they cannot afford to provide that 
form o f medical t reatment. I  do n ot, h owever, ag ree t hat financial 
conditions or bu dgetary co nstraints are i rrelevant i n t he pr esent ca se. 
What is ‘’adequate medical treatment’’ cannot be determined in vacuo. In 
determining what is ‘’adequate’’ regard must be had to inter alia, what the 
state can afford. If the state authorities should therefore make out a case 
that as a r esult of b udgetary co nstraints they ca nnot afford a  pa rticular 
form o f medical t reatment or t hat t he pr ovision o f su ch t reatment would 
place an unwarranted burden on the state, the court may very well decide 
that t he l ess effective m edical t reatment which i s affordable t o t he state 
must i n t he ci rcumstances be acc epted as ‘’sufficient’’ or  ‘ ’adequate 
medical t reatment’’. After all [ the C onstitution] d oes not pr ovide for 
‘’optimal medical t reatment’’ or  ‘ ‘the best medical t reatment’’ but only f or 
‘’adequate medical treatment’’.’49
 
  
The approach seems to be that in determining the content of the right due regard 
must be  had to the availability of  resources. The onus is on the state to prove 
that the resources are unavailable. The Constitutional Court in Soobramoney put 
this matter in the following language  
 
‘What is apparent from these provisions is that the obligations imposed by 
the st ate by  se ctions 26 an d 27 i n r egard t o acce ss to housing, heal th 
care, food, water a nd so cial security ar e d ependant upon t he r esources 
available for such purposes, and that the corresponding rights themselves 
are limited by  r eason of l ack of r esources. Given t his lack of r esources 
and t he si gnificant d emands pl aced on t hem that h ave al ready be en 
referred t o, an unq ualified obl igation t o m eet t hese ne eds would no t 
presently be capable of being fulfilled.’50
 
  
 
Sachs J who del ivered a se parate but  co ncurring j udgment ca utioned ag ainst 
being too generous in the interpretation of the r ights guaranteed by section 27. 
                                                 
 
49 Note 47 above para 43. 
 
50 Note 2 above para 11. 
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He was of the view that the courts needs to be careful not to feel pressurised by 
the fear o f bei ng pe rceived as gambling with t he l ives of t he peopl e and 
eventually guaranteeing the most expensive and unaffordable medical treatment 
at t he ex pense o f ot hers.51 Yacoob J in Grootboom52
 
 held that i t i s di fficult t o 
determine w hat t he minimum co re i s with r espect t o the r ight of  acc ess to 
adequate housing in terms of section 26(2). This is so because the needs of the 
people in the context of access to adequate housing differ. There are those who 
need l and; ot hers need both l and and houses; y et ot hers need financial 
assistance i n t he form o f housing su bsidies. The cr iterion t o determine the 
obligations under the constitution is whether or not the measures adopted by the 
state are reasonable. 
3.5 PR OGRESSIVE REALISATION O F THE RIGHT OF AC CESS T O 
ADEQUATE HO USING UNDE R THE I CESCR A ND T HE S OUTH A FRICAN 
CONSTITUTION  
 
The Committee of the ICESCR functions on the basis of reports that are regularly 
submitted by  t he State par ties de tailing t he m easures they hav e taken t o fulfil 
their obl igations under t he Covenant. This process has t hree o bjectives: ( 1) t o 
develop t he nor mative co ntent of t he r ights in t he C ovenant; ( 2) t o dev elop 
benchmarks for the role of the state in achieving these rights as well as devising 
mechanisms for acco untability and r emedies for v ulnerable g roups in so ciety 
and; ( 3) t o hold t he states accountable at  i nternational l evel by  examining and 
commenting on their reports. 
 
 
3.5.1 What information does the Committee require? 
 
                                                 
 
51 Id paras 58-59. 
 
52 Note 1 above para 33. 
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The q uestionnaire t hat t he C ommittee s ends to s tate par ties is a v aluable 
guideline about the measures that the state party needs to undertake in order to 
comply with the Covenant. The Committee has developed some guidelines about 
the t ype o f i nformation t hat t he st ates must pr ovide. T he st ate m ust pr ovide 
statistical information about the housing situation in the country.  
 
It m ust also su pply d etailed i nformation a bout t hose g roups within so ciety t hat 
are v ulnerable a nd d isadvantaged w ith r egard t o ho using i n p articular; t he 
number of homeless individuals; the number of individuals and families currently 
inadequately housed and without ready access to basic amenities; the number of 
persons currently classified as living in ‘ illegal’ se ttlements or housing and;  t he 
number o f per sons evicted f rom h ouses and se ttlements within t he l ast f ive 
years. 
 
The states are requested to provide information with regard to the existence of 
any laws affecting the realisation of the r ight to housing and the measures that 
have been t aken t o fulfil t he r ight o f acce ss to adeq uate housi ng i ncluding: 
measures taken t o e ncourage ‘ enabling st rategies’ whereby l ocal co mmunity-
based or ganisations and t he ‘ informal se ctor’ ca n b uild h ousing and r elated 
services and whether such organisations are free to operate and receive funding 
from g overnment; m easures taken b y t he st ate t o b uild housi ng uni ts and t o 
increase o ther co nstruction of a ffordable, rental h ousing; m easures taken t o 
release unutilised, under utilised or mis-utilised land; financial measures taken by 
the st ate i ncluding de tails of the bu dget o f t he M inistry of  H ousing or  ot her 
relevant M inistry as a percentage o f t he national budget. The s tate parties are 
also required to give details of any difficulties or shortcomings encountered in the 
fulfilment of the right to adequate housing.53
 
  
                                                 
53 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Reporting Guidelines UN Doc. E/1991/23, Annex 
IV (hereafter ‘Reporting Guidelines’). See also Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
‘Concluding Observations on the Report by the Dominican Republic’ UN Doc E/C 12/1/1994/15 at para 3. 
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3.5.2 The Interpretation of the Right by the Committee 
 
The C ommittee has recognised t hat ev eryone has a r ight t o a n ‘ adequate 
standard o f l iving f or hi mself and his family (sic), i ncluding adeq uate food, 
clothing and housing, and to the continuous improvement of living conditions’. 
 
The Committee makes a distinction between housing and shelter and suggests 
that the right of access to adequate housing should not be equated with shelter. 
Shelter means that e veryone m ust h ave a r oof ov er t heir he ad. T he r ight t o 
adequate h ousing means ‘the r ight t o l ive so mewhere i n se curity, peace  a nd 
dignity’.54
 
  
It i s also ackn owledged t hat whilst ‘ adequacy’ sh ould t ake i nto a ccount so cial, 
economic, cultural and climatic factors, there are certain central elements of the 
right th at m ust b e considered i n d etermining what ‘ adequacy’ means for t he 
purpose of the Covenant. These, although not exhaustive, include the following: 
 
(a) Legal security of tenure 
 
Tenure may be i n the form of rental accommodation (whether private or public), 
co-operative housing, lease, emergency housing, informal settlements, including 
occupation o f l and or  property. A ll persons should, not withstanding t he t ype of  
tenure, possess a degree of tenure which protects them against forced evictions 
and harassment either by the state or private actors.  
 
(b) Availability of services, materials, facilities and infrastructure 
 
In order for housing to be adequate, there must be certain facilities essential for 
health, security, comfort and n utrition. A ll beneficiaries of the r ight t o adequate 
housing should have sustainable access to natural and common resources, safe 
                                                 
54 Reporting Guidelines para 7. 
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drinking water, energy for cooking, heating and l ighting, sanitation and w ashing 
facilities, means of food storage, refuse disposal, si te drainage and emergency 
services; 
 
(c) Affordability 
 
The costs associated with housing should not threaten the very attainment of the 
right. At the same time the resources that are spent on ensuring that housing is 
affordable to the most vulnerable and marginalised should not be to the detriment 
of the realisation of other rights.  
 
(d) Habitability 
 
The inhabitants should be protected from cold, damp, heat, rain, wind, or  other 
threats to health and other st ructural hazards. These factors ought to be taken 
into account when determining what is habitable. 
 
(e) Accessibility  
 
Those groups that are deserving because of their social status should be g iven 
access to adequate housing without unjustifiable inhibition. 
 
(f) Location 
 
Adequate h ousing m ust be i n a place w hich al lows access to e mployment 
options, h ealth c are services, sch ools, ch ild ca re ce ntres, and ot her so cial 
facilities. This is true both in l arge ci ties and i n rural areas where t he financial 
costs of getting to and from the place of work can place excessive demands on 
the budgets of the poor households. Housing should not be built on polluted sites 
or in immediate proximity to pollution sources that threaten the right to health of 
inhabitants; 
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(g) Cultural adequacy 
 
Housing should be constructed in a way that al lows different cultural formations 
to express themselves in their different cultures.55
 
  
State parties are further encouraged to adopt housing strategies in consultation 
with al l t he af fected communities including t he ho meless and t he inadequately 
housed. These guidelines, it is submitted, could serve as an important reference 
point in determining the minimum core content of the right of access to adequate 
housing in South Africa in a given case.  
 
3.5.2 The Government of the RSA and Others v Grootboom and Others56
 
 
(a) The Background 
 
The Constitutional Court of South Africa had occasion to deal with the provisions 
of se ction 2 6 o f t he Bill o f Rig hts in Government of  t he R SA and O thers v 
Grootboom and ot hers, an ap peal ag ainst a j udgment o f D avis J in t he C ape 
High Court.  Mrs. Grootboom and most of the respondents previously lived in an 
informal squatter settlement called Wallacedene in the Western Cape, under the 
municipal area of Oostenberg. Half of the population comprised of children under 
the age of 18. The conditions under which they lived were sub human. There was 
no water, no t oilet facilities and about 95% had no access to electricity. Most of 
the pe ople w ere une mployed an d t hose w ho w ere em ployed e arned meagre 
wages of less than R500 per month.  They had applied to be given access to low 
cost housing from the municipality and some had waited for periods in excess of 
five y ears. T hey st arted m oving out  o f t he sq uatter ca mp t o find t hemselves 
                                                 
55 See UNGA No 4 (1991) UN Doc E/1992/23 Annex III for the full text of the guidelines. 
 
56 Note 1 above. 
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alternative acco mmodation at  a pl ace ca lled ‘ New R ust’ be cause o f t he 
intolerable conditions they were l iving under. There, they built shacks and other 
forms of informal dwelling. The owner of New Rust applied for their eviction since 
they had no per mission t o occupy hi s land. He was successful and bul ldozers 
were se nt t o dem olish t he sh acks. Their sh acks were dest royed w ith sca nt 
regard t o t heir posse ssions and t hey had t o l eave. T hey l eft w ith t heir 
possessions and occ upied l and, w hich w as owned by  t he m unicipality. T he 
winter rains now destroyed their shacks, and they requested the municipality to 
provide them with some form of shelter and protection. The municipality did not 
oblige and they applied to the high court for assistance. They were successful as 
the municipality was ordered to make provision for shelter for the children of the 
adult squatters and since it is in the interests of the children that they be l ooked 
after by their parents, they parents should go in with their ch ildren. In doing so 
Davis J said 
‘…an order, which enforces a child’s right to shelter should take account of 
the need of the child to be accompanied by his parent. Such an approach 
would be i n acc ordance w ith t he sp irit a nd pur port of se ction 28 as a 
whole.’57
 
 
 
The Municipality, the Provincial government and N ational government appealed 
against this decision to the Constitutional Court.  
 
(b) The Constitutional Court Hearing 
 
The C onstitutional C ourt w as asked n ot o nly t o co nsider t he c orrectness or 
otherwise of the finding in the court a quo but also to examine the full extent of 
the obligations placed on the state by section 26 o f the Constitution. The court 
made extensive reference to international law and sp ecifically the ICESCR and 
the U N G eneral A ssembly co mments. I t held t hat i t w as important t hat a  
distinction be drawn bet ween t he pr ovisions of t he I CESCR a nd t he S outh 
African Constitution particularly on the right to housing. The ICESCR provides for 
                                                 
57 Grootboom v Oosternberg Municipality and Others 2000 (3) BCLR 277 (C) s289F-G. 
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the r ight to adequate housing whereas the Constitution provides for the r ight of  
access to ad equate housing. I n t his sense t he C onstitution ‘ recognises that 
housing i s more t han a m atter o f br icks and m ortar.’58
 
 For a per son t o h ave 
access to adequate housing all of these considerations must be met: there must 
be land, there must be services, there must be dwelling. Access to housing also 
means that i t i s no t only t he st ate that must m ake ho using av ailable, but al so 
non-state actors and other agents within society. Individuals must be assisted by 
state p olicy t o hav e a ccess to housi ng. T he pol icy of  t he st ate m ust t ake i nto 
account t he di fferent eco nomic levels in society. F or t hose w ho ca n a fford 
housing on their own means, the state must make policy that facilitates access to 
housing sch emes. F or t hose w ho ca nnot a fford, t he st ate must make s pecific 
provision f or t hem b ecause t hey ar e t he m ost v ulnerable an d m arginalised i n 
society.  
The co urt further held t hat i t di d not  co nsider i t n ecessary t o deal  w ith t he 
requirement of the minimum core obligation of the state. It did, however, hold that 
when a challenge against the government is based on section 26 regard must be 
had to w hether or  n ot t he m easures the g overnment h as taken r easonable 
legislative and ot her m easures. A  co urt co nsidering r easonableness will no t 
enquire whether other more desirable or favourable measures could have been 
adopted, or whether public money could have been better spent. The question is 
whether t he measures t hat h ave be en ad opted are r easonable. I n det ermining 
the reasonableness of the measures the court must look at housing programmes 
in t heir so cial, economic and hi storical co ntext. T he st ate o ught t o develop a 
programme t o deal w ith t hese social and economic problems. The programme 
must be reasonably implemented. The programme only constitutes the first stage 
of the compliance and is not necessarily total compliance. The court held further 
that a programme that excludes a significant segment of society cannot be said 
to be reasonable. Reasonableness in South Africa would mean for instance that 
                                                 
58 Note 1 above para 35. 
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those whose needs are most pressing and whose lives are in peril should receive 
first priority over those who can manage without direct state assistance. 
 
The court i n analysing t he national housing plan and policy of  t he government 
concluded t hat i t di d not  m ake pr ovision f or peopl e i n desp erate an d cr isis 
situations. On this basis it did not comply with the constitutional obligation placed 
on t he st ate t o r ealise pr ogressively t he r ights of acc ess to a dequate h ousing 
through legislative and ot her measures within its available resources. In making 
this point the court asked itself  
‘…whether or  not  a h ousing programme t hat l eaves out o f acc ount t he 
immediate amelioration o f t he ci rcumstances of t hose i n cr isis can meet 
the test of reasonableness established by the section.’59
 
 
The co urt found t hat i t was nece ssary f or t he nat ional ho using pol icy to m ake 
provision f or pe ople i n cr isis situations. A t that moment t he h ousing pol icy fell 
short because o f the absence o f the component that dealt w ith amelioration of 
crisis situations. The precise al location of the budget for this purpose, the court 
held, should be left to the executive.60
 
  
(c) Conclusion of the Court 
 
The court concluded that t he j udgment of the court a  q uo had t he po tential t o 
produce an an omalous result. P eople w ho hav e ch ildren hav e a di rect and  
enforceable r ight under section 28(1)(c), while others who have none or  whose 
children are adult are not entitled to housing under that section, no matter how 
old, di sabled or ot herwise dese rving t hey m ay be.  T he r equirement of 
progressive r ealisation would m ake l ittle se nse i f ‘ it co uld be t rumped i n every 
case by the rights of children to get shelter from the state on demand’. Children 
could be used as ‘stepping stones’ to housing for their parents instead of being 
                                                 
59 Ibid para 64. 
 
60 Ibid para 66. 
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valued for who they are. The court therefore granted an order directing that steps 
be taken by the state to devise and i mplement a programme within its available 
resources which provides relief for people who have no acce ss to land, no r oof 
over their heads, and who are living in intolerable conditions or crisis situations.    
 
(d) Commentary 
 
The case w as only t he se cond s ocio-economic rights case t o r each t he 
Constitutional Court. It raised an important socio-political issue regarding access 
to land and housing. The court recognised that housing shortages in this country 
will be with us for longer than many expected. The court kept a distance between 
itself and the making of policy. T he court s tated t hat i ts function i s confined t o 
whether or  not t he programmes that ar e i n pl ace ar e r easonable. I t i s for t he 
government to develop policies and allocate money towards the implementation 
of its programmes.  
 
The judgment has left t he scope o f further development o f the socio-economic 
rights discourse open in many ways. I t has made i t cl ear that t he ex istence of 
legislative measures alone does not mean total compliance with the Constitution. 
It i s only t he f irst st ep. F urther st eps must f ollow w hich sh ould i nclude t he 
development and implementation of programmes to facilitate access to housing 
and t hose programmes should make provisions for p eople i n cr isis situations. 
This i s a st ep forward i n the se nse that a  l itigant m ay now  app roach a co urt 
complaining that an organ of state either does not have a programme to deal with 
crisis situations or  is not putting into e ffect its programme. This will apply to all 
socio-economic rights and will not necessarily be limited to access to housing.  
 
The j udgment, h owever, ca n be cr iticised b ecause i t di d not  pr ovide co ncrete 
guidelines and t imeframes as to when t he housing programme by g overnment 
should be developed and implemented. Given the increasing level of neglect of 
judicial orders, t he court should a t l east have made an or der di recting that the 
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state must report frequently to the court on the measures it is taking to implement 
the order. There was evidence before the court about how the state had not only 
neglected the needs of t he applicants but al so harassed them. The court i tself 
had i n a  per iod o f l ess than a month before handing d own t he j udgment, 
entertained an i nterlocutory application to compel the government to provide for 
water, toilet facilities and temporary shelter to the applicants. Although, the order 
was made by agreement, the application had been occasioned by the failure of 
the government to keep i ts promise to provide those facilities to the applicants 
pending the outcome of the Constitutional Court case. Those should have been 
reasons enough for the court to conclude that something more was called for and 
that i t sh ould r etain a  su pervisory j urisdiction ov er t he i mplementation o f t he 
order.61
 
  
The decision in Grootboom has demonstrated the need for a careful and detailed 
planning at all levels of government for the proper realisation of socio-economic 
rights. The reasons for the application illustrated both poor planning and untimely 
execution of plans by the three tiers of government. In an attempt to remedy this, 
the c ourt s tressed t he i mportance of an i ntegrated a pproach t o pr ogramme 
delivery by the three tiers of government.62 But the court made no mention of the 
need t o i nclude t he b eneficiaries of a h ousing pr ogramme i n t he co nsultation 
process. I t should be noted that an acc ountable and responsive government is 
the cornerstone of our democracy and should not be given up because the issue 
at han d ben efits the co mmunity co ncerned. T he r ecently enac ted M unicipal 
Systems Act r ecognises this important pr inciple w hen i t r efers to cr eating a 
culture of public participation in issues of development.63
 
 
                                                 
61 See Chapter 6 below for a discussion on judicial remedies in general and supervisory jurisdiction in 
particular. 
 
62 Note 1 above paras 50 -51. 
 
63 In its preamble. See note 64 below for number and year of the Act. 
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3.6 PROGRESSIVE REALISATION OF THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS UNDER 
THE MUNICIPAL SYSTEMS ACT64
 
  
The M unicipal S ystems Act ( the A ct) i ntroduces the co ncept of  I ntegrated 
Development P lanning ( the I DP). This is a pr incipal planning method, w hich 
ought to be used by municipalities in delivering services to the communities they 
serve. Section 23(1) (c) of the Act states 
‘A municipality must undertake developmentally oriented planning so as to 
ensure t hat i t t ogether with ot her or gans of st ate co ntributes t o t he 
progressive realisation of the fundamental rights contained in sections 24, 
25, 26, 27 and 29 of the Constitution’ 
 
Each municipal council must immediately after i ts assumption of office design a 
plan i n co nsultation with t he pr ovincial and nat ional g overnment t o f acilitate 
access to the fundamental r ights as contained i n t he r elevant s ections o f t he 
Constitution.65 The IDP of each municipality must contain a short and long term 
developmental pl an o f the municipal ar ea. T he pl an must be developed i n 
consultation with communities and ratepayers.66
 
 The drafting and implementation 
of the IDP must be supervised by the provincial MEC for local government. The 
IDP must be reviewed and updated annually.  
An IDP adopted by a municipality will be the principal planning instrument which 
guides and informs al l planning and development, and al l decisions with regard 
to planning and development, in the municipality. It will bind all persons except to 
the extent of any inconsistency with a pr ovincial or  nat ional legislation in which 
instance such legislation has to prevail.67
                                                 
 
  
64 Act 32 of 2000. 
 
65 Section 24 of the Act. 
 
66 Section 25 of the Act. 
 
67 Sections 25- 32 of the Act. 
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It is expected that IDPs will in the future direct the planning and delivery of basic 
services by the government.68 A litigant who challenges the state for its failure to 
progressively r ealise t he r ight o f access to adequate h ousing, for i nstance w ill 
have to ask, as a starting point, two questions: Has the municipality adopted the 
IDP for its area of jurisdiction? If the answer is in the affirmative, the second point 
of attack will be whether or not the state is taking reasonable steps to implement 
the plan. Whether or not the municipality has adopted an IDP is related to access 
to i nformation held by t he st ate. A ccessing su ch i nformation oug ht n ot t o be  
difficult i n t he l ight o f t he C onstitution w hich pr omotes open and t ransparent 
governance and entitles everyone to information held by either state or anyone.69
 
  
3. 7 CONCLUSION 
 
The ch allenges for t he S outh A frican g overnment ar e v ast. T he Constitutional 
Court has noted 
‘We live in a society in which there are great disparities of wealth. Millions 
of people are living in deplorable conditions and in great poverty. There is 
a hi gh l evel o f unemployment, i nadequate s ocial se curity, an d many do 
not have acc ess to clean w ater or a dequate h ealth se rvices. T hese 
conditions already ex isted w hen the C onstitution w as adopted and a 
commitment t o addr ess them, and t o t ransform our  so ciety i nto one i n 
which there will be human dignity, freedom an equality, lies at the heart of 
our new  co nstitutional or der. F or as long as these co nditions exist t hat 
aspiration will have a hollow ring’.70
                                                 
68 Another point that can be made is that the spirit of the Systems Act is to locate the local government tier 
in a central role in the delivery of services to the people. This is also in keeping with the Constitutional 
Court’s view of the role played by the new local government which view was expressed in Fedsure Life 
Assurance Ltd v Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council 1998 (12) BCLR 1458 (CC) 
paras 26 and 38. 
 
  
69 Section 32 of the Constitution. See also the Promotion of Access to Information Act 2 of 2000. 
 
70 Per Chaskalson P in Soobramoney (note 2 above) para 8. Cited with approval by Yacoob J in Grootboom 
(note 1 above) para 25. See also the findings of the Lund Committee about the poverty patterns in South 
Africa. The Committee found that poverty is racially distributed: 95% of poor people are Africans; poverty 
is spatially distributed: 75% of poor people live in rural areas although only half the entire population lives 
there; and poverty has a gender dimension: many of the very poorest households are headed by younger 
women in rural areas. Lund Committee Report –Child and Family Support 1996 page 10. The report can be 
found at http://www.polity.gov.za/reports/1996/lund3.htm. 
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The challenge t o ach ieve the pr ogressive r ealisation o f so cial and economic 
rights requires the g overnment t o st art making a  del iberate move t owards 
addressing the pressing needs of poor people. I t i s a concrete recognition that 
democracy i tself w ill not  be s ustainable unl ess poverty and  i nequality i s 
substantially reduced.  
 
When the Constitution enjoins the state to take ‘reasonable legislative and other 
measures to achieve progressively within its available resources’ the rights under 
sections 26 and 27, it does not mean the same thing to everyone. Where income 
is fairly distributed and opportunities reasonably equal, individuals are in a better 
position to take care of themselves and not to rely on expenditure by the state. 
Where there is a skewed distribution of resources, there is a compelling need on 
the part of the state to balance the scale. This may include the state taking such 
measures as public taxation i n or der t o f und publ ic programmes. B ut t hese 
strategies must b e s ustainable and s hould se ek to e nsure that w eaker an d 
vulnerable g roups in society not  only have access to these resources but al so 
are able to use  them on a l onger term sustainable basis. This may also mean 
that t he g overnment has to eng age i n st rategies of l and r eform and l and 
redistribution in order to facilitate access to land and provide security of  tenure 
for v ulnerable and marginalised g roups in so ciety. T he C onstitution g ives the 
state the power to engage in land reform subject to certain legal constraints.71
 
 It 
is important that such measures be expedited. 
Progressive realisation involves detailed and careful planning. The t ime needed 
for pl anning sh ould n ot b e ex cessively l ong so  as to delay acc ess to t hese 
programmes. The judiciary has an important role to play in monitoring to ensure 
that t he st ate ca rries out i ts constitutional mandate fairly. B ut j udicial 
interventions are n o su bstitute for mass mobilisation and co mmunity 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
71 Section 25 of the Constitution. 
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participation. C ivil so ciety or ganisations play a si gnificant r ole i n ensu ring t hat 
governments deliver on t heir so cial w elfare pr ogrammes. I t i s c oncrete so cial 
programmes and fiscal arrangements that can provide a r ealistic solution to the 
problems of poverty and i nequality. Abstract constitutional provisions cannot do 
this alone. They are, however, a strategic starting point and therefore should not 
be overlooked.  
 
What g overnment departments sh ould do  i s draw up  a  framework for t he 
realisation of socio-economic rights at the national level based on the needs and 
means of t he co mmunities they se rve. They sh ould i dentify within su ch 
frameworks the ne eds of g roups which hav e t he g reatest di fficulties in t heir 
access to basic needs and set specific goals to ensure sustainable satisfaction of 
such needs.  In developing such frameworks and plans of action the government 
needs to co nsult w ith t he peo ple i t se rves. T his process requires ‘consistent 
vigilance t o i mprove t he c onditions for t he most v ulnerable, w ithout expecting 
dramatic and a brupt t ransformations of co mprehensive an d i nterlocking 
economic and social systems.’72
 
 
On t he ot her ha nd i t is imperative t hat t here ar e e ffective j udicial st rategies to 
play an ov ersight r ole i n t he i mplementation o f so cio-economic rights. I n t he 
words of G eraldine van Bueren what we need i s ‘a j udiciary with a v ision,’ ‘ an 
accessible a nd r esponsive C onstitutional C ourt’ and ‘ a l egal p rofession w ith 
compassion.’73
                                                 
 
  
72 A Eide ‘Strategies for the Realisation of the Right to Food’ in Mahoney and Mahoney (eds) Human 
Rights in the Twenty First Century: A Global Challenge (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers1993) 459, 470. 
 
73 G Van Bueren  'Alleviating Poverty Through the Constitutional Court' (1999) 15 SAJHR 152. See also G 
Bellow 'Turning solutions into problems: The Legal Aid experience' (1977) www.garybellow.org. For H 
Echenberg and B Porter ‘claimants of social and economic rights must begin to constitute a movement, 
both national and international, that incorporates political, social and judicial activity. The idea of 
movement is built into the legal definition of rights as being ''progressively realised''. The legal rights are 
validated only as they are sustained by a social and political movement that articulates their meaning and 
enforces them through public consensus.’ H Echenberg and B Porter 'Poverty Stops Equality: Equality 
Stops Poverty' RI Cholewinski (ed) Human Rights in Canada: Into the 1990's and Beyond (Human Rights 
Research and Education Centre: University of Ottawa: Canada 1990) 1, 14. 
 84 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
 
 
 119 
 
CHAPTER 5 
 
JUDICIAL REMEDIES FOR ENFORCEMENT OF  SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS 
   UNDER THE 1996 CONSTITUTION 
 
5. 1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter deal s with j udicial r emedies to en force co nstitutional r ights in 
general and socio-economic rights in particular. Various common law remedies 
will be di scussed to provide a starting point for the developments brought about 
by the Constitution. It is noted in this respect that the principles of administrative 
justice and t he remedies that flow f rom the application of these principles have 
played a significant role in protecting socio-economic rights before the adoption 
of the Constitution. It will be ar gued that these remedies are still relevant in the 
protection o f so cio-economic rights under the C onstitution. I t i s ar gued t hat 
certain o f t he t raditional co mmon l aw r emedies may st ill be su itable un der t he 
constitutional dispensation. They m ay i n some i nstances, however, need to be 
reshaped t o su it t he dictates of the C onstitution. T he i nherent p owers of t he 
courts to control and regulate their own process under the Constitution and how 
such powers should be used to enhance the promotion of social and economic 
rights are ex amined. This chapter also l ooks at t he pr oposals that h ave be en 
made r egarding t he development o f n ew an d creative r emedies under the 
Constitution. Non compliance with judicial orders by public officials is also dealt 
with. Lastly this chapter deals with limitations to judicial remedies and examines 
methods of ensuring that such limitations are not an unreasonable bar to litigants 
asserting their fundamental rights. 
 
5.1.1 The Received Assumptions 
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Private l aw l itigation di ffers significantly f rom p ublic law l itigation. S o do t he 
remedies that exist under  pr ivate l aw. O ur S outh A frican l aw o f r emedies has 
developed al ong t he l ines of pr ivate l aw. A s a r esult ce rtain assu mptions 
applicable i n pr ivate l aw di sputes have al so bee n acce pted t o appl y ev en i n 
public law disputes. For instance, it is assumed that l itigation is bipolar. In other 
words, i t i s a co ntest between t wo i ndividuals who hol d di ametrically oppose d 
positions and i s decided o n a w inner-takes-all-basis. T he i ssue t hey br ing t o 
court i s an i dentified se t o f ev ents. Often t he q uestion to b e determined i s 
whether or  no t t hose ev ents indeed occu rred a nd what t he factual an d l egal 
consequences of t hose i ssues are. I n t his model r ights and r emedies are 
interdependent. The scope of the relief is derived logically f rom the substantive 
violation under  t he g eneral t heory t hat t he pl aintiff w ill get co mpensation 
measured by the harm caused by the defendant’s breach of duty. In a contractual 
dispute, t he co urt t hat f inds a co ntract t o h ave been  br eached w ill aw ard t he 
plaintiff damages to place him or her in the position he or she would have been in 
had there been no v iolation. In this model, the judgment affects only those who 
are parties to the suit and nobody else.    
 
But as early as 1976 Chayes1
                                                 
1 Chayes A ‘The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation’ Harvard LR. [1976] (89) (7) 1281,1302 in DJ 
Galligan (ed) Administrative Law (Dartmouth 1992) (hereafter Chayes). 
 conceived of a different model of l itigation which 
he termed a ‘ public law litigation model’. If constitutional values are to guide the 
courts in enforcing socio-economic rights (as they must) it will be imperative that 
the c ourts recognize t hat pu blic law l itigation i s often different, and m ust be 
approached di fferently t o pr ivate l aw di sputes. C hayes suggested ce rtain 
features which ch aracterise t he pu blic law l itigation m odel. I n t his model t he 
scope of the lawsuit tends to be shaped by the parties and by the court. It tends 
not t o be r igidly bi lateral but  s prawling an d am orphous. The c ourt do es not 
confine it self t o a f actual i nquiry on hi storical basi s alone bu t a lso adopt s a 
predictive and legislative approach. The relief that the applicant seeks tends not 
to be co mpensation for past wrong but is forward looking, fashioned ad hoc  on 
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flexible and br oadly r emedial l ines, o ften h aving i mportant co nsequences for 
many people including those who are not parties. The remedy is often negotiated 
rather than imposed and the order granted by the court often does not terminate 
the involvement of the judge: its administration requires active participation of the 
court. The judge, in other words, tends not to be passive but is active in shaping 
the litigation to ensure a just and viable outcome.      
 
In g iving ef fect to socio-economic rights it w ill be i mportant t hat some o f these 
features should now  ch aracterise l itigation on  so cio-economic r ights cases. 
Froneman J  i n Ngxuza and O thers v Permanent Secretary Department o f 
Welfare, E astern C ape P rovincial G overnment and A nother2
 
 associated t his 
paradigmatic shift in the role of the courts with the socio-political role that the law 
plays. He said that it was important for the courts to develop a flexible approach 
to give disadvantaged and poor communities access to means of judicial redress 
in public law di sputes. This also has an effect o f ensuring t hat public power i s 
exercised in conformity with the rule of law. 
5.2 COMMON LAW REMEDIES 
 
In the case of Harris v Minister of Interior & Others3
‘To call the rights entrenched in the Constitution constitutional guarantees 
and at the same time to deny to the holders of those rights any remedy in 
law would be t o reduce the sa feguards enshrined in [ the constitution] t o 
nothing. T here ca n b e no dou bt i n m y m ind t hat t he aut hors of t he 
Constitution i ntended t hat t hose r ights should b e en forceable by t he 
Courts of L aw. T hey co uld n ever hav e bee n i ntended t o co nfer a r ight 
without a remedy. The remedy is, indeed, part and parcel of the right. Ubi 
jus, ibi remedium.’ 
  the court said: 
 
                                                 
2 2000 (12) BCLR 1322 (E). 
 
3 1952 (4) SA 769 (A), 780. In Nelles v Ontario (1989) 60 DLR (4th) 609 (SCC)  641-2. Lamer J said: 
‘When a person can demonstrate that one of his charter rights have been infringed, access to a court of 
competent jurisdiction to seek a remedy is essential for vindication of a constitutional wrong. To create a 
right without a remedy is antithetical to one of the purposes of the Charter which surely is to allow courts to 
fashion remedies when constitutional infringements occur’. 
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Wade and Forsyth4
5.2.1 Interdicts 
 suggest that rights depend upon remedies. There are various 
remedies that are applicable in South African. In the following section we discuss 
the various remedies and highlight essential elements of each remedy. 
 
An i nterdict i s a co urt or der pr ohibiting or  co mpelling t he p erformance of  a 
particular act  for t he pur pose o f pr otecting a l egally enforceable r ight which i s 
threatened by  co ntinuing or  ant icipated har m.5 An i nterdict m ay be use d t o 
prohibit the commission of an unl awful action by a publ ic official or to remedy a 
consequence that has been c ommissioned by the unlawful conduct or omission 
of an erring official. In order for an interdict to be granted there must be a legally 
recognised duty to act on the part of the public official. In order for an applicant to 
succeed in an application for an interdict, he or she must establish a clear right; 
an i njury act ually co mmitted or  r easonably appr ehended; and t he a bsence of 
another satisfactory remedy.6
 
 
(a) Prohibitory Interdict  
 
A prohibitory interdict seeks to prohibit the commission of an unl awful act. This 
form of an i nterdict can b e used whether t here h as been ac tual o r r easonably 
apprehended co mmission o f an  unl awful act. This remedy i s common, for 
example, i n ca ses involving pol ice br utality and i t i s used as a pr otection t o 
citizens against abuse of public authority.7  Wood v Ondangwa Tribal Authority8
                                                 
4 Wade and Forsyth Administrative Law  8 ed 551 (Oxford University Press 2000). This idea of the 
interconnectedness between a right and a remedy has also been endorsed by the United States Supreme 
Court  in Freeman v Pitts 503 U.S. 467, 489 where it was noted that ‘[the] nature of the violation 
determines the scope of the remedy.’ 
 
 
5 Van Winsen et al The Civil Practice of the Supreme Court of South Africa 4 ed, (Juta &Co 1997) 1063 
(hereafter Van Winsen). 
 
6 Setlogelo v Setlogelo 1914 AD 221. 
 
7 Achada v Divisional Commissioner, SA Police Witwatersrand Division 1981 (1) SA 658 (W). 
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provides a useful example of when and how a prohibitory interdict may be used. 
In that case the applicants succeeded in obtaining a prohibitory interdict against 
two tribal authorities to stop the brutality that was being meted out to South West 
African Political Organisation and Demkop members.9
 
  
(b) Mandatory Interdict 
 
Mandatory i nterdicts are esse ntially use d in t wo i nstances. The first i s the 
mandament van spolie, which, because of i ts nature has  o ften been applied in 
disputes between private parties. This of course does not mean that the remedy 
of t he mandament v an s polie does n ot avail an ap plicant ag ainst a  pu blic 
official.10
 
 The s econd i s the mandamus, which co mpels the p erformance o f 
specific functions by a publ ic official. The mandamus will be i nvoked where the 
public official i s under a st atutory dut y t o do so mething a nd he or sh e fails to 
perform that duty. 
5.2.2 Actions for Damages 
 
An i ndividual m ay su e a publ ic authority f or dam ages sustained t hrough t he 
unlawful ex ercise o f publ ic power. T his form o f r emedy i s frequently use d i n 
cases of police assaults and brutality.11 This remedy stems from the l iability of  
the st ate for co ntractual an d del ictual act s o f i ts employees.12
                                                                                                                                                 
8 1975 (2) SA 294 (A). See also Nanso v Speaker of The National Assembly for SWA and Others 1990 (1) 
SA 617 (SWA). 
  In a cl aim for 
damages, the plaintiff must in order to succeed, inter alia prove that the action or 
omission of the public official was unlawful. As the public official exercises public 
 
9 Baxter, Administrative Law  (Juta and Co 1984) 687. 
 
10 See Fredericks v Stellenbosch Divisional Council 1977 (3) SA 113(C). In this case a mandament van  
 spolie was issued against a municipal council to rebuild shacks that had been demolished on its         
 instructions.   
 
11 See Benett v Minister of Police 1980 (3) SA 24 (C).   
 
 124 
powers that are d efined a nd l imited by  st atute, establishing l iability in volves in 
effect, the judicial review of the exercise of the power concerned.13
 
 The nature of 
damages that the plaintiff would normally seek is monetary compensatory for a 
wrongful act that has already been committed.  
5.2.3 Declaration of Rights 
 
Declaratory or ders are use d i n pr ivate l aw14 as well as in publ ic law. A  
declaratory act ion i s intended a t determining the r ights or t he legal meaning o f 
the issue or document in question. The essence of a declarator is that i t states 
the legal position of the parties as they stand without changing them in any way. 
The declarator is often sought together with another remedy. The great merit of a 
declarator is that it is an efficient remedy against ultra vires action by government 
authorities because a dec larator to the effect that a ce rtain act ion is ultra vi res 
means that any consequence flowing from such action becomes a nullity. I f the 
court declares that some action either taken or proposed is unauthorised by law, 
that co ncludes the p oint bet ween t he p laintiff an d t he a uthority. T he e ffect, 
therefore o f a decl aration t hat a p ublic official act ed i n excess of t he st atutory 
limits is that he did not act at all. In other words the consequences of his actions 
stand to be reversed and he must act again.15
 
  
A declarator will be granted where the applicant has a real interest in the matter, 
which i s not merely hy pothetical or  a bstract i n a n ex isting or  future r ight or  
obligation an d on w hom t he decl arator w ill be bi nding.16
                                                                                                                                                 
12 See the State Liability Act No 20 of 1927. 
 A decl arator ca n be  
 
13 Baxter (note 9 above) 705. 
 
14 An example of a declarator in a private law dispute may be about the interpretation of certain clauses of a 
will.   
 
15 See Dyson v Attorney General [1911] 1 KB 410. 
 
16 Ex Parte Nell 1963 (1) SA 754 (A). 
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claimed o n i ts own without ano ther acc ompanying r emedy. I n ot her w ords an 
applicant may seek a declarator with an i ntention, for instance, of launching an 
application for a mandamus in enforcement of his right that has been declared.17
 
  
Baxter t abulates at  l east four r easons w hy t he r emedy of  a  decl arator i s 
important in public law disputes. Firstly it does not require the parties to do or to 
refrain f rom doing ce rtain act s. Where for i nstance t he court doe s not want t o 
unsettle the administrative arrangement through an interdict, i t may just declare 
the unlawfulness of t he ac t or  omission a nd l eave i t t o the ad ministration to 
decide what the solution is for the problem. Secondly the declarator will be used 
in si tuations where t he di spute has not y et ar isen. T he co urt m ay su ggest an 
appropriate meaning for a statute and through that interpretation an administrator 
may be dissuaded from exercising the powers conferred by the statute. Also the 
declarator can be used in circumstances where a coercive order will be difficult to 
enforce b ecause t he co urt w ill hav e jurisdictional l imitations. F ourthly a 
declaratory order may be granted where there are l imitations on the part of the 
court from granting an interdict. This is not applicable in South Africa but it is the 
case in English law where injunctions may not be given against the Crown and 
against act ions by P arliament. I n both t hese i nstances the declarator ca n be 
used.18
 
 
5.3 CONSTITUTIONAL REMEDIES 
 
5.3.1 Relevant Constitutional Provisions  
 
Constitutional remedies are about what can be done when a co nstitutional r ight 
has been violated. When a constitutional right has been violated the court making 
the finding must grant a remedy. The purpose of a constitutional remedy is  
                                                 
17 Munn Publishing (Pvt) Ltd v Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation 1995 (4) SA 675 (ZS). 
 
18 Baxter  (note 9 above) 702. 
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‘…first t o ad dress the w rong occa sioned by  t he i nfringement o f th e 
constitutional r ight; s econd to d eter future violations; t hird, t o make a n 
order that can be complied with; and fourth, [to make an order that is fair] 
to all those who might be affected by the relief.’19
 
 
The Constitution is the supreme law of the land and law or conduct inconsistent 
with i s i nvalid t o t he ex tent o f su ch i nconsistency.20
‘This Constitution i s the su preme l aw of  t he R epublic; l aw or  co nduct 
inconsistent w ith i t i s invalid, and t he obligations imposed by  i t m ust be  
fulfilled.’  
  One o f t he foundational 
values of t he South African C onstitution i s t he r ule of l aw. F or this reason a 
convenient st aring poi nt for a st udy o n co nstitutional r emedies is the 
constitutional supremacy clause. Section 2 states: 
 
Section 38 o f t he C onstitution e mpowers the co urts to g rant a ppropriate r elief 
including decl arations of  r ights whenever a  r ight i n t he bi ll of  r ights has been 
violated or threatened. This section provides: 
‘Anyone listed in this section has the right to approach a competent court, 
alleging that a r ight in the Bill of Rights has been infringed or threatened, 
and t he co urt m ay g rant ap propriate r elief, i ncluding a decl aration o f 
rights.’ 
 
Section 165 v ests judicial aut hority t o t he c ourts. C ourts are i ndependent and 
only su bject t o t he C onstitution an d t he l aw. T he se ction enj oins the co urts to 
apply the law without fear, favour or prejudice. Court orders or decisions bind all 
persons and or gans of s tate o n w hom they hav e be en made. I mportantly t his 
section r ecognises that co urts will be unab le t o ca rry out  t heir f unctions 
effectively without the co-operation of other organs of state. To this end section 
165(4) provides: 
‘Organs of state, through legislative and other measures, must assist and 
protect t he c ourts to ensu re t he i ndependence, i mpartiality, d ignity, 
accessibility and effectiveness of the courts.’ 
                                                 
19 Per Ngcobo J in Hoffman v South African Airways  2000 (11) BCLR 1211 (CC) para 45. 
 
20 Section 2. 
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Section 172(1) deals with various orders that a court can make when deciding a 
constitutional matter w ithin i ts power. O f si gnificance about t his section for our 
purposes is the power that it gives to the courts to make any order that is just and 
equitable. The section provides 
 ‘When deciding a constitutional matter within its power, a court- 
(a) must declare that an y l aw or  co nduct t hat i s inconsistent w ith t he 
Constitution is invalid to the extent of the inconsistency; and  
(b) may make any order that is just and equitable, including- 
(i) an or der l imiting t he r etrospective e ffect of t he d eclaration of 
invalidity; and  
(ii) an order suspending the declaration of invalidity for any period and 
on any  conditions, t o allow t he competent authority t o co rrect t he 
defect.’   
 
From this it follows that the courts have wide and nearly untrammeled powers to 
develop r emedies in l ine w ith t he C onstitution.21
‘The C onstitutional C ourt, S upreme C ourt o f A ppeal and H igh C ourts 
have the inherent power to protect and regulate their own process and to 
develop the common law, taking into account the interests of justice.’ 
 These w ide pow ers are al so 
reinforced by section 173 of the Constitution. It reads: 
 
The court may grant an appropriate remedy when a r ight i n the bill o f r ights is 
infringed. S uch an appropriate r emedy i s determined by  w hat i s ‘just and  
equitable’ under the particular circumstances of the case. The courts have power 
to safeguard the procedures that they put in place. 
 
It is important for the courts to develop the common law remedies in line with the 
provisions of the Constitution. In Amod v.  Multilateral Vehicle Accidents Fund22
                                                 
21 This must also be understood in the light of the provisions of section 39(2) which enjoins the courts to 
develop the common law in a manner that promotes the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights. 
 
Mahomed CJ said:  
 
22 1999 (4) SA 1319 (SCA) para 23. 
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‘The common law is not to be trapped within the limitations of its past. If it 
does not do this it w ould r isk losing t he v irility, r elevance and  c reativity 
which it needs to retain its legitimacy and effectiveness in the resolution of 
conflict be tween an d i n pur suit o f j ustice am ong t he ci tizens of a  
democratic society. F or t his reason c ommon l aw co nstantly ch anges to 
accommodate changing values and new needs.’ 
 
The Constitutional Court had this to say: 
‘The w ritten C onstitution ar ticulates and g ives effect t o t he g overning 
principles of co nstitutional l aw. E ven i f t he common-law co nstitutional 
principles continue to have any application in matters not expressly dealt 
with b y t he C onstitution, t he C onstitution i s the su preme l aw and t he 
common l aw, i n so  f ar as it has any appl ication, m ust be dev eloped 
consistently with it, and subject to constitutional control.’ 23
 
 
Beyond the need for the common law to move away f rom the t rappings of t he 
past, the Constitution requires that the common law must now be developed with 
the objects of the Constitution in mind.   
 
5.3.2 Orders of Constitutional Invalidity 
 
Section 1 72(1)(a) e mpowers courts to declare any  l aw or  co nduct t hat i s 
inconsistent w ith t he Constitution i nvalid t o t he ex tent o f su ch i nconsistency. 
Where the interpretation o f a statute w ill result i n t wo plausible meanings, o ne 
offending t he C onstitution a nd the ot her n ot, t he C onstitutional C ourt h as held 
that it would be d esirable that the meaning that promotes the spirit, purport and 
the object of the bill of rights should be preferred.24
                                                 
 
 On the other hand where the 
statute in question can only be construed to have one meaning and that meaning 
offends the sp irit, pu rport and obj ect o f t he C onstitution su ch par ts of t he 
legislation will be declared invalid to the extent of such inconsistency.\ 
23 Pharmaceutical Manufactures Association of SA and Others; In re Ex parte Application of President of 
RSA and Others 2000 (3) BCLR 241 (CC) para 45. 
 
24 Bernstein and Others v Bester NO and Others 1996 (2) SA 751 (CC)  para 59; Nel v Le Roux NO and 
Others 1996 (3) SA 562 (CC); paras 8-9 and 18; De Lange v Smuts NO and Others 1998 (3) SA 785 (CC) 
para 85; and Investigating Directorate: Serious Economic Offences and Others v Hyundai Motor 
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(a) Suspension of Orders of Invalidity 
 
Section 172(1)(b)(ii) of  the Constitution provides that where a statute has been 
invalidated by reason of inconsistency with the Constitution, the court ‘may make 
an order suspending t he declaration of i nvalidity f or any  per iod o f t ime on any 
conditions, to allow the competent authority to correct the defect’. In Dawood and 
Others v Minister of  Home Affairs25 the appl icants who were non S outh African 
citizens applied t o c ourt t o hav e ce rtain s ections of the Aliens C ontrol A ct 
declared u nconstitutional. T he basi s for t heir co ntention w as that t hey were 
required in terms of the Act to leave the country in order to apply for permanent 
residence permits. They al leged that since they were al ready married to South 
Africans they should not be ordered to leave the country and their spouses. They 
argued t hat t he decision by  t he D irector-General t o r equire that t hey l eave t he 
country infringed their right to undisturbed family life, and in particular, their right 
to human dignity. The Constitutional Court, per O’Regan J, upheld this contention 
and held that the sections complained of violated the right to human dignity of the 
applicants under section 10 of the Constitution. Sections 25 and 28 of the Aliens 
Control Act were thus declared unconstitutional and Parliament was ordered to 
draft n ew pr ovisions which co mplied w ith t he C onstitution.26  The order o f 
invalidity was suspended for 12 months to enable Parliament to comply with the 
court order. 27
                                                                                                                                                 
Distributors (Pty) Ltd and Others: In Re: Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd and Others v Smit NO and 
Others 2001 (1) SA 545 (CC) paras 22-6. 
 
 
25 2000 (8) BCLR 837 (CC). 
 
26 See Ferreira v Levin NO and Others 1996 (4) BCLR 441 (CC) where certain sections of the Companies 
Act were held to be invalid to the extent that they provided that evidence adduced by an examinee under 
section 417 could be used against that examinee in criminal proceedings.  
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(b) Severance  
 
Where a court finds a provision of  a section inconsistent with the Constitution it 
could s ever i t f rom the r est of t he s tatute. The t est for se verance i s now w ell 
established in our law:  
 
‘…where it is possible to separate the good from the bad in a Statute and 
the good is not dependant on the bad, then that part of the Statute which 
is good must be given effect to, provided that what remains carries out the 
main object of the Statute.’ 28
 
 
 From t his it can be  d educed t hat t he t est has two par ts: first, i s it possible t o 
sever the invalid par ts of the legislation? and second, i f so, does what remains 
give effect to the purpose of the legislation? 
 
In Coetzee v Government of the Republic of South Africa29
                                                                                                                                                 
27 See Executive Council, Western Cape Legislature and others v President of the RSA and others 1995 (4) 
SA 877 (CC). In this case the Constitutional Court declared certain amendments to the Local Government 
Transition Act 209 of 1993 unconstitutional. The effect of the order was suspended because an immediate 
application of invalidity would have had disruptive effects on the local elections that had already been 
planned by the government and the Independent Electoral Commission. 
 sections 65A to 65M 
of the Magistrates Courts Act No 32 of 1944 which provided for the imprisonment 
of debtors were challenged on the basis that they infringed the right to freedom 
and security of the person provided for by section 11 of the Interim Constitution. 
In a m ajority judgment written by Kriegler J,  the Constitutional Court found that 
section 65 F-I of t he Magistrates Court A ct was unconstitutional. Having f ound 
that the sections did violate the rights concerned, the court then had to determine 
whether the provision was saved by the limitations clause. It found that there was 
a legitimate purpose served by the statute namely, to ensure that civil judgments 
 
28 Per Centlivres CJ in Johannesburg City Council v Chesterfield House (Pty) Ltd 1952 (3) SA 809 (A) at 
822C-E. See also S v Prefabricated Housing Corporation (Pty) Ltd & Another 1974 (1) SA 535 (A) at 539 
and Kause v Minister of Home Affairs & Others 1994 (3) BCLR 1 (NmH). 
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were complied with, but that the means used did not justify the ends sought to be 
realised. It had b een co ntended dur ing argument t hat the i mmediate st riking 
down of the ent ire provisions would t hrow t he whole d ebt co llection pr ocedure 
into chaos.   A s a result, the court was careful not  to invalidate the sections in 
their entirety. Sections 65F, 65G and 65H were declared invalid to their entirety. 
The following words from section 65A(I) were severed: ‘Why he s hould not be 
committed for co ntempt o f co urt….’ S ections 65A-M r emained i n f orce for al l 
practical purposes save for the severed parts. 
 
(c) Reading In 
 
In so me i nstances, t he co urt may i tself r ead i nto s tatutes provisions that t he 
legislature omitted. In this way the court will be able to achieve a meaning of the 
statute that best su its the stated goals of the Constitution. In National Coalition 
for Gay and Lesbian Equality and others v Minister of Home Affairs and others30
                                                                                                                                                 
29 1995 (4) SA 631(CC). See also Tetrath-Gadoury v Canada (1991) 81 D.L.R. (4th) 358. 
  
the court considered whether the provisions of section 25(5) of the Aliens Control 
Act 96 of 1991 was inconsistent with the Constitution. Section 25 regulates the 
manner i n w hich a n i mmigrant m ay appl y for an  i mmigration permit t o South 
Africa. S ubsection 5 pr ovided for t he i ssuing of  a n i mmigration per mit t o a 
‘spouse or dependant child’ of a person who is lawfully and permanently resident 
in South Africa. The definition of ‘spouse’ was limited to people in heterosexual 
relationships.  I t was contended by the respondents that the word spouse could 
be i nterpreted t o i nclude sa me se x par tners. T he co urt found t hat su ch a  
meaning i f i t w ere t o be g iven w ould fly i n t he face o f t he i ntention o f t he 
legislature. In statutory interpretation one should be faithful to the intention of the 
legislature. The court found t hat t he section v iolated t he r ight t o dignity and t o 
undisturbed family l ife of  s ame se x par tners. T he nex t q uestion that t he co urt 
considered was what the appropriate remedy would be under the circumstances. 
It noted t hat i ts remedial pow ers were co uched w idely by  se ction 17 2 o f t he 
30 2000 (1) BCLR 39 (CC). 
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Constitution. It found that striking down section 25(5) was not appropriate to cure 
the defect in the statute nor was severance desirable. The court then considered 
whether reading in was an appropriate relief in the circumstances. The defect in 
the section could be cured by reading in the words ‘or par tner, in a permanent 
same se x l ife par tnership’ a fter t he w ord ‘ spouse’ t o the t ext o f section 25(5).  
Consequently, the court made an order in those terms. 
 
The r eading i n r emedy i s not  pecu liar t o South A frica. T he S upreme C ourt o f 
Canada has on a number of occasions made use of this remedy. In fact it would 
seem t hat the S outh African model of r eading i n i s largely base d o n si milar 
considerations as those used in Canada. In Miron v Trudel 31 the Court applied 
the reading in remedy to include a common law spouse to insurance benefits in 
terms of t he O ntario’s Insurance A ct. T he e xclusion of  a co mmon l aw sp ouse 
was held t o be i n breach o f the eq uality cl ause i n se ction 1 5 o f the C anadian 
Charter o f R ights and F reedoms. I n Vriend v Alberta32
 
 the C ourt f ound t he 
Individual R ights Protection Act of A lberta to be  unconstitutional because i t did 
not contain sexual orientation as a g round of di scrimination. I nstead o f st riking 
down the entire Act the Court read in ‘sexual orientation’ to the list of grounds of 
discrimination contained in the Act. 
Hogg33
 
 states that this remedy is a twin of severance. Where the constitutional 
deficiency exists not in what the statute included (in which instance one employs 
severance i f t he t est i s met) but  i n w hat i s excluded, r eading i n i s a possi ble 
remedy.   
Reading Down 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
31 [1995] 2 S.C.R. 418. 
 
32 [1998] 1 S.C.R. 493. 
 
33 PW Hogg Constitutional Law of Canada 3ed (Carswell 1992) Rev Service 2000 looseleaf ed 37-14. 
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Where t here ar e two possi ble i nterpretations to a st atute, o ne offending t he 
Constitution a nd t he other no t, t he co urt s hould a dopt t he i nterpretation t hat 
conforms with the Constitution. This process is called ‘reading down’ or ‘reading 
in co nformity’. T he c ourts generally use  t his remedy i n t he ca se o f overbroad 
provisions and it entails giving a restrictive meaning to the provisions of a statute 
without reading in additional words which were not included by the legislature. In 
Case a nd A nother v Minister of  S afety and S ecurity and O thers34
‘Reading down is a narrower remedy than severance: it is appropriate only 
where the language of the provision will fairly bear the restricted reading. 
Otherwise it amounts to naked judicial law-making.’  
 Mokgoro J  
stated: 
 
The us e of t his remedy i s limited to c ases w here t he su ggested m eaning w ill 
promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights while not distorting the 
true m eaning o f t he w ords.35 The S upreme C ourt of  A ppeal i n Govender v  
Minister of  S afety an d S ecurity36
                                                                                                                                                 
 
 considered se ction 4 9(1) o f the C riminal 
Procedure A ct 5 1 o f 1977 ( the C PA). The se ction makes provision f or use o f 
lethal force in preventing a suspect from fleeing. In its finding the court held that 
there w as a ne ed g ive a fresh m eaning t o t he s ection i n the l ight o f t he 
Constitution and the r ights to l ife and to human dignity in particular. I t held that 
the pr e-constitutional i nterpretation of t he section made n o r eference t o the 
requirement o f pr oportionality bet ween t he nature o f t he offence, t he d anger 
(present or future) posed by the fleeing suspect and the means used to effect the 
34 1996 (3) SA 617 (CC) para 76. For instance in Nel v Le Roux NO and Others 1996 (4) BCLR 592 (CC) 
the Constitutional Court stated that sections 189 and 205 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 could 
and ought to be interpreted in a manner that is in conformity with the Bill of Rights.   
 
35 In S v Bhulwana 1995 (12) BCLR 1579 (CC), the Constitutional Court stated that the statute must be 
'reasonably capable' of being read in the manner suggested. In that case the Court, per O’ Regan J was of 
the view that section 21(l) (a) (i) of the Drugs and Drug Trafficking Act 140 of 1992 was not reasonably 
capable of being read in conformity with the Constitution and therefore was declared invalid. See also 
National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Home Affairs 2000 (2) SA 1 (CC) paras 23-
24.  
 
36 2001 (4) SA 273 (SCA). 
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arrest ( ie sh ooting). T his, t he S CA sa id w as now i ncompatible w ith t he new  
Constitution which requires that reasonableness should be used as a benchmark 
in det ermining w hether or  not  l ethal force w as warranted i n ce rtain 
circumstances. I t t herefore held t hat t he se ction sh ould g enerally speaking b e 
interpreted to exclude the use of lethal force in effecting arrest except n ce rtain 
specific circumstances.  
It i s not altogether cl ear w hy r eading dow n i s classified as a r emedy w hich i s 
species of an ' order o f i nvalidity'. R eading dow n i s use d at  t he i nterpretation 
stage and not at a remedy stage. In a sense, there is no ‘finding’ of invalidity. In 
actual fact su ch a finding i s avoided t hrough an i nterpretation t hat ‘ saves’ t he 
statute from invalidity. It could be that such a classification is a misnomer and it 
seems that reading down is more an interpretative tool than a remedy. According 
to H ogg37
 
 reading dow n i s ‘simply a ca non of co nstruction ( or i nterpretation)’ 
which i s based on t he pr esumption of c onstitutionality: t he e nacting l egislative 
body is presumed to have meant to enact provisions which do not transgress the 
limits of its constitutional powers; general language which appears to transgress 
those powers must t herefore be ‘ read down’ so  t hat i t is confined w ithin t hose 
limits. 
5.4 NEW REMEDIES 
 
5.41 Constitutional Damages 
 
The case o f Fose v Minister of  S afety and S ecurity38
                                                 
37 Hogg  (note 33 above) 15.7. 
 dealt w ith t he q uestion 
whether or  not  under t he C onstitution a  p erson ca n cl aim for constitutional 
damages in addition to common law delictual damages. The appellant sued the 
respondent for damages arising out of alleged assaults perpetrated by members 
of t he S outh African Police S ervices. I n his particulars of cl aim t he a ppellant 
 
38 1997 (3) SA 786(CC). 
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(plaintiff in the court a quo) alleged that his right to human dignity, freedom and 
security of  t he per son and pr ivacy had been v iolated. H e al leged t hat su ch 
violations were persistent and widespread in the Vanderbijlpark Police cells. The 
plaintiff cl aimed d amages arising out  of  al leged assa ult for pain a nd su ffering, 
loss of amenities o f l ife, i nsult a nd for p ast and  future medical expenses. In 
addition a s um of R 200 000 w as claimed un der t he h eading ‘ constitutional 
damages’ w hich am ount i ncluded an  el ement of ‘ punitive d amages’. T he 
defendant excepted to the particulars of claim on the grounds that such damages 
did not exist in law and that an order for payment of such damages did not qualify 
as ‘appropriate r elief’ f or t he purposes of se ction 7 ( 4) ( a) o f t he I nterim 
Constitution. The c ourt co nsidered t wo q uestions. The first w as the j udicial 
definition of ‘appropriate relief’ and the second was whether ‘punitive damages’ 
could be claimed under the Constitution in addition to the common law damages.  
The court a quo upheld the exception.  
 
The Constitutional Court concluded that the claim for punitive damages could not 
avail t he plaintiff i n this particular c ase. The d amages that w ere so ught w ere 
constitutional rather than delictual which had as its objective (a) the vindication of 
the fundamental right itself so as to promote the values of the constitution; (b) the 
deterrence and pr evention o f future i nfringements of fundamental r ights by t he 
legislative and executive organs of the state, at all levels of government; (c) the 
punishment of  t hose organs of S tate whose officials had infringed fundamental 
rights in a particularly egregious fashion; and (d) compensation for harm caused 
to the plaintiff i n consequence o f the infringement o f the plaintiff’s f undamental 
rights. 
 
The court made it clear that it did not intend that the scope for the development 
of the law on constitutional damages should be closed by the judgment and that 
there was no reason why an appropriate remedy should not include the award of 
constitutional damages. T he c ourt h eld, how ever, t hat i n t he p articular 
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circumstances of t he ca se t he award o f such dam ages was not desi rable a nd 
that appropriate relief depend on the ci rcumstances of each case.39
‘…an a ppropriate r emedy m ust mean an  e ffective r emedy, for w ithout 
effective r emedies o f breach, t he v alues underlying and t he r ight 
entrenched i n t he c onstitution ca nnot pr operly be uph eld or  enhanced. 
Particularly in a co untry where so  f ew hav e t he m eans to en force t heir 
rights through the courts, it is essential that on those occasions when the 
legal process does establish that an infringement o f an entrenched r ight 
has occurred, i t b e e ffectively vindicated. The c ourts have a p articular 
responsibility in this regard and are obliged to “forge new tools” and shape 
innovative remedies, if needs be, to achieve this goal.’
 The courts 
must be ready to create new remedies where the dictates of the Constitution so 
require. In the South African context: 
40
 
 
 
5.4.2 Preventative Damages 
 
In or der not  only t o r emedy past  v iolations, but  al so t o d eter future v iolations, 
Howard Varney41
                                                 
39 The idea of reparation in damages for infringements of constitutional rights is usefully discussed by M L 
Pilkington in ‘Damages as a Remedy for Infringement of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms’ 
(1984) 62 Canadian Bar Rev 517. In that article the author traces the history of the United States Supreme 
Court in awarding damages for violations of constitutional rights.  She concludes that the Canadian Charter 
of Rights and Freedoms allows the courts of Canada more scope compared to their US counterparts. See 
also the decision of the Supreme Court of India in Rudul Shah v Bihar AIR 1983 SC 1086 where the Court 
per Chandrachud CJ permitted damages to the petitioner who had been unlawfully kept in prison for an 
unacceptably long period of time without being tried. In the South African Constitutional Court case of 
Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security and Another 2001 (10) BCLR 995 (CC) a claim was made for 
an award in damages for loss suffered as a result of omissions by the members of the police and public 
prosecutors. Although the damages claim itself was unsuccessful, the Court agreed with the applicant that 
there was a need to develop the common law of State liability for omissions by its employees in the light of 
the Constitution. It held that the High Court and the Supreme Court of Appeal were wrong in not  applying 
the Constitution when deciding the case. The Court overturned an earlier finding of the Supreme Court of 
Appeal absolving the defendant from the instance and remitted the case back to the High Court for the trial 
to continue on the basis that the plaintiff had made a prima facie case.   
 suggests that the courts consider preventative damages rather 
  
40 Fose (note 38 above) para 69 per Ackerman J. See also the comments of Ngcobo J in Hoffman (note 19 
above) para 45 and the case of Mbanga v MEC for Welfare and Another 2001 (8) BCLR 821 (E). In 
Mahambehlala v MEC for Welfare and Another 2001 (9) BCLR 890 (SE) 910, Leach J suggested that the 
applicant should be entitled to what he loosely referred to as a ‘constitutional relief’ where common law 
relief of an award of damages will be insufficient to remedy the effects of the violation of the right (in casu, 
the unreasonable delay in the processing of the applicant’s application for a social grant by the Department 
of Welfare.) 
 
41 H Varney 'Forging New Tools: A Note on Fose v Minister of Safety and Security' (1989) 14 SAJHR 336, 
343.   
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than punitive damages. Punitive damages were rejected by the court in the case 
of Fose on the basis that there was no reason to believe that the plaintiff would 
not be su fficiently co mpensated by  del ictual dam ages and t hat t he sca rce 
resources which were at the disposal of the state would rather be ut ilised more 
effectively el sewhere t han i n c ompensating t he pl aintiff. The aw ard o f 
preventative damages should not  nec essarily be gi ven t o t he i ndividual 
concerned but to organisations and bodies capable of monitoring the violations of 
human rights. Organisations like the Legal Resources Centre42 and Lawyers for 
Human Rights, which have championed the defence of human rights both under 
the old and t he new g overnments are ex amples o f su ch hu man r ights 
organisations. This may encourage such human r ights organisations to step up 
their w ork. P reventative dam ages would be more ap propriate w here t he 
organisation concerned has joined in the l itigation as an amicus curiae. This is 
because such an organisation has a better understanding of the issues involved 
in t he su it and t herefore w ill be b etter placed t o ut ilise t he money r eceived a s 
damages in its monitoring work. Trengove43
 
 supports this idea and adds that the 
order o f co mpensatory dam ages only deal s with past  v iolations and does no t 
address the threat of continuous and future violations. An order of preventative 
damages, on t he other hand, recognises and addresses the existing threat and 
seeks to prevent future violations rather than give solace to victims.  
Such organisations need not onl y be  n on governmental or ganisations but may 
also be st ate i nstitutions which ar e su fficiently i ndependent from g overnment. 
The S outh A frican Human R ights Commission co uld b e a su itable ex ample. 
                                                 
 
42 See A Chaskalson ‘The Past Ten Years: a Balance Sheet and Some Indicators for the Future’ (1989) 106 
SALJ 293, where Chaskalson recounts on the work and the vision of the Legal Resources Centre as it was 
at the time. He says: ‘The stated aim of the Legal Resources Centre was to encourage belief in the value of 
law as an instrument of justice, and to achieve its goal by practical demonstration through provisions of 
legal and educational services in the public interest’. 
 
43 W Trengove ‘Judicial Remedies For Violations of Socio-Economic Rights’ (1999) 1 ESR Rev.  8. 
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There may be o ther organisations like the C ommission on G ender E quality, 
Independent Complaints Directorate and the Public Protector.44
 
   
 
5.4.3 Reparation in Kind 
 
Trengove45 suggests that the courts should develop a new award of reparation in 
kind. The award o f compensatory damages seeks to compensate the v ictim of  
the i njustice i n ca sh for t he har m ca used t o hi m or  her . B ut i n t he co ntext o f 
socio-economic rights the si tuation may be di fferent. S ocial j ustice m ay not  be 
achieved by ca sh l ump su ms to all i ndividuals who are party t o t he lis. This 
situation is illustrated by means of the right to education. If many people establish 
that t heir r ight t o ed ucation ( and t o eq uality) has been v iolated because they 
have received education inferior to that provided to other people the court may 
compensate each person by awarding damages in cash. But it may be difficult to 
quantify and prove damages caused by the violation. Secondly the compensation 
may not  be an e ffective r emedy and t herefore no t an ap propriate r emedy 
because i t does not a ddress the pl ight of  v ictims of i nferior ed ucation t hrough 
providing skills and training. In order for the court to grant an effective remedy it 
may have to look at providing better facilities for education to al l those affected 
by the violation. The state may be ordered to make remedial education available 
to the victims of past discrimination.46
 
  
5.4.4 Supervisory Jurisdiction 
 
                                                 
 
44 See Esack NO and Another v Commission  for Gender Equality 2000 (7) BCLR 737 (W) on the 
relationship between ‘state' and the ‘state institutions supporting constitutional democracy’ as established in 
terms of section 181 of the Constitution. 
 
45 Note 42 above. 
 
46 See for instance the decision in the United States Supreme Court case of Milliken v Bradley II 433 US 
267 (1977) in the context of race discrimination in the United States schooling system.  
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Sometimes it i s essential that in order for the courts to e ffectively vindicate the 
rule o f l aw, t hey m ust m ake or ders with an  e ffective en forcement m echanism. 
The practical reason for this is that sometimes the form of violation that the court 
is dealing with may just be too wide to put an end to it with a single court order. It 
may be nec essary to order in some instances that steps be taken and t hat the 
court monitors the i mplementation t hereof. I n Sheela B arse v State o f 
Maharashtra47
 
  a writ petition complaining about the lack of protection for women 
in p olice cu stody w as br ought. T he S upreme C ourt o f I ndia g ranted v arious 
orders, which required the v iolations by pol ice to stop. A woman judicial o fficer 
was appointed to visit the police lock ups to ensure that the directives were being 
carried out. The court also ordered that she reports periodically to the court about 
the extent to which the prison officials were implementing the order.  
The co urt i s not al ways able, on i ts own, t o m onitor i ts orders prohibiting 
violations of r ights, as i ts orders are not self executing.48 In t he co ntext of  the 
delivery of social security to deserving pensioners in the rural areas, for instance, 
the court may in addition to making an order appoint a community leader who will 
report to court on whether the grants have been paid out or not. But without the 
cooperation o f other br anches of g overnment, t here m ay be di fficulties in t he 
implementation of su ch or ders. The ca se o f Uppendra B axi v  S tate of U ttar 
Pradesh49
                                                 
47 1983 SCC 96. See also Grootboom v Oostenberg  Municipality 2000 (3) BCLR 277 (C ) where Davis J 
required the Municipality to report to the court on the steps that it has taken to make provision for shelter to 
the applicants and their children. 
 illustrates such difficulties. In that case after the court had spent f ive 
years in supervising improvements to the Agra Protective Home for women, the 
provincial government, w ithout no tice to the court, moved the home to another 
location which was every bi t as bad as  t he original home ever was. When the 
 
48 This is probably one of the reasons behind the injunction in section 165(4) of the Constitution which 
requires other organs of state to assist the courts to ensure that courts are independent, impartial and 
effective. 
 
49 1986 (4) SCC 106 
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matter was brought before t he Supreme Court of I ndia B hagwati J was clearly 
upset. This is what he said: 
‘It i s obvious that w hat h as been done h as the e ffect o f su bverting t he 
authority of this court and unl ess proper and adeq uate ex pression o f 
regret i s forthcoming f rom t he co ncerned o fficials, w e m ay hav e t o 
consider w hether w e sh ould ad opt ap propriate proceedings against t he 
erring of ficials …. D espite o ur ang uish at shifting t he Protective H ome 
from the old building to the new building, we cannot do any thing about it 
…and the best that can be done is to start the process all over again and 
commence giving directions for improving the living conditions in the new 
building.’50
 
  
The co urt st ill w ent ahe ad w ith i ts supervision of  t he process desp ite t he 
governmental ac tion. An order was made to restart t he process of bui lding the 
Agra P rotective H ome. T he D istrict Ju dge o f A gra was appointed t o v isit t he 
Protective H ome ev ery m onth an d t o su bmit m onthly i nspection r eports to t he 
court.51
 
 The co urt r etained a su pervisory role ov er t he i mplementation o f i ts 
order.  
In order to avoid such situations as in the above case, it may be necessary that 
monitoring be do ne by st atutory bodi es like t he H uman R ights Commission 
especially i n t he S outh A frican c ontext. T his is because t he H uman R ights 
Commission is empowered by the Constitution to monitor the implementation of 
social an d eco nomic rights.52 Secondly, t he Human R ights Commission has  
powers under t he H uman R ights Commission A ct t o i nvestigate hum an r ights 
violations and provide appropriate redress where it finds violations.53
                                                 
50 Ibid 115.   
   
 
51 Ibid 115-116. See also Chayes (note 1 above) 1302-1303. There are a numerous other cases where the 
Supreme Court of India used its supervisory jurisdiction to monitor the implementation of its orders. In a 
case involving bonded labour, the court appointed a government minister to visit the quarries where bonded 
labour occurred to ensure its discontinuance.(Bandhu Murkti Morcha v Union of India 1984 AIR 802 
(SC)). In another case involving environmental pollution caused by a gas leak from a chemical plant, the 
court appointed a technical team to retrain staff in the plant, to allocate them specified safety functions 
within the plant and to monitor the plant regularly with both planned and surprise visits. (Mehta v India 
(1986) 2 SCC 176. 
 
52 See section 184 of the Constitution. 
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Supervisory j urisdiction54 is also a r emedy t hat i s used i n N orth A merica 
particularly in the United States. Its foundations can be traced from the Supreme 
Court ca se o f Brown v Board of  E ducation55 where the C ourt hel d t hat r acial 
discrimination i n sch ools was unconstitutional an d ordered t he g overnment t o 
implement measures to eradicate racial di scrimination in the schooling system. 
The co urt i n i ts order st ated that dur ing t he p eriod o f transition w hen the 
government w as putting i nto e ffect t he t erms of t he or der i t would r etain 
jurisdiction and would require the government to report to it on the steps taken.56
 
 
Rufo v Inmates of Suffolk County Jail57
                                                                                                                                                 
53 See section 7 of the Human Rights Commission Act 54 of 1994. 
 was another case where the supervisory 
jurisdiction was used by the Court. This case dealt with a co mplaint that pr ison 
conditions for pre t rial i nmates in t he S uffolk County o f M assachusetts were 
constitutionally deficient because of overcrowding and other poor conditions. An 
agreement had been reached between the applicants and the respondents in the 
court below that steps would be taken to improve such conditions. The applicant 
applied t o t he S upreme C ourt t o hav e t he t erms of t hat ag reement ch anged 
because t he pr ison population had i ncreased. I n par ticular the g overnment 
wanted to renege on the agreement of putting male inmates in single ce lls into 
double cells. The Supreme Court per White J held that in exercising supervisory 
 
54 In the United States this remedy is called ‘structural injuction’. Supervisory jurisdiction there refers to 
the supervisory role of the Supreme Court over all other lower courts. For the present purposes I will use 
the term supervisory jurisdiction when dealing with this remedy. 
   
55 349 U.S. 294 (1955). 
 
56 Id 300-301. The factors that the court should consider in formulating the remedy were dealt with in 
Milliken v Bradley (note 46 above) which case dealt with discrimination in the Detroit’s schooling system. 
The Court held that in applying the principles set out in Brown v Board of Education (note 55 above) it had 
to be guided by the ‘equitable principles’. Such principles may require that there must be proof that the 
conduct in question offends the constitution, secondly the remedy should be designed to restore the victims 
of discrimination to the position they would have been in had there been no violation and thirdly the court 
should take into account the interests of the state as well as the local community which is likely to be 
affected by the remedy. (280-281). 
 
57 502 U.S. 367 (1992). 
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jurisdiction, a co urt should adopt a flexible approach that takes into account the 
changing ci rcumstances in which government f unctions. I n this case, however, 
there was no need to change the terms of the agreement. The Court refused to 
change such terms and ordered the government to comply with such terms and 
to report to the Court on the steps that it was taking. 
 
There have also been other cases where the United States Supreme Court has 
utilised its supervisory jurisdiction58 and in some instances the state departments 
have shown some reluctance in implementing court orders aimed at restructuring 
some of t he g overnmental pr ogrammes.59 In t he final a nalysis though t his 
remedy is now well settled in the United States legal system.60
 
  
5.5 NON-COMPLIANCE WITH JUDICIAL DECISIONS 
 
An unfortunate reality is that judicial orders are not always properly and timeously 
complied with. History is replete with examples where parties have had t o seek 
coercive m easures to ensu re t he i mplementation o f an order o f court. C ourts 
therefore do not only have to grant orders but also have to ensure, from time to 
time, t hat su ch or ders ar e put  i nto effect. The si mple r eason f or t his is that i n 
order for the institution of the courts to be t aken seriously i t must safeguard i ts 
own process by ensuring that i ts decisions are implemented. If the decisions of 
the co urt ar e n ot i mplemented t hat w ould m ake t he pe ople l ose f aith i n t he 
judicial sy stem an d ultimately, l ose r espect f or t he C onstitution i tself. I t i s 
therefore necessary to ensure that not only do t he people have access to court 
                                                 
58 Most of these cases dealt with discrimination in the schooling system. See for instance Green v County 
School Board of New Kent County 391 U.S. 430 (1968), Swann v Charlote-Mecklenburg Board of 
Education 402 U.S. 1 (1971),  Keyes v School District No. 1, Denver 413 U.S. 189 (1973), Board of 
Education of Oklahoma City Public Schools v Dowell 498 U.S. 237 (1991). 
 
59 See for instance Missouri v Jenkins 495 U.S. 33 (1955). 
 
60 See an interesting critique on the ability of the courts to monitor the reforms they initiate as a result of 
their orders in M Schlanger ‘Beyond the Hero Judge: Institutional reform litigation as Litigation’ (1999) 97 
Michigan LRev 1994. See also R Katzmann ‘Judicial Intervention and Organization Theory: Changing 
Bureaucratic Behavior and Policy’ (1980) 89 Yale LJ 513.  
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but also that their rights are properly and effectively vindicated when a remedy is 
granted. An effective j udicial sy stem, w here t here i s respect f or l aw, i s a 
necessary i ngredient for a j ust a nd democratic society. This was put  ap tly by 
Mokgoro J when she said: 
‘ The r ight of access to court is indeed foundational to the stability of an 
orderly so ciety. I t ens ures the pe aceful, r egulated a nd i nstitutionalised 
mechanisms to resolve disputes without resorting to self-help. The right of 
access to court is a bulwark against vigilantism, and chaos and anarchy, 
which i t ca uses. C onstrued i n t his context of  t he r ule of l aw and t he 
principle ag ainst se lf hel p i n particular, a ccess to co urt i s indeed of 
cardinal importance.’ 61
 
  
The r ight t herefore o f t he su ccessful party t o a lis to have hi s/her or der 
implemented constitutes an essential element of the right of access to court. For 
without i mplementation of  j udicial or ders the f unction o f t he co urts will be 
significantly undermined. 
 
5.5.1 Inability to Comply 
 
A di stinction h as to b e dr awn bet ween i nstances where t he st ate i s unable t o 
comply with the order and where it is unwilling to implement the order. Whereas it 
is unlikely that a court will grant an order that cannot be implemented, cases may 
arise where a party to litigation does not understand what the terms of the order 
require it to do. If a person can demonstrate that he acted in good faith but was 
just una ble t o co mply with t he or der, h e ca n br ing a v alid def ence ag ainst a 
charge of contempt of court: that he lacked mens rea. Courts generally will not 
punish parties who can demonstrate that i t was not possible to comply with the 
order and also that they did everything within their power to comply with such an 
order.62
                                                                                                                                                 
 
 
 
61 Chief Lesapo v North West Agricultural Bank and Another 2000 (1) SA 409 (CC) para 22. 
 
62 Experience from other countries shows that courts do not take kindly to excuses for non compliance with 
their orders. In the Zimbabwean case of Commissioner of Police v Commercial Farmers' Union 2000 (9) 
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5.5.2 Unwillingness to Comply 
 
Deliberate refusal to obey court orders is viewed in a very serious light by courts. 
This is par ticularly t he ca se w hen i t i s do ne by  p ublic officials. I n State of  
Himachal Pradesh v Sharma63
‘The H igh C ourt m ay not  t ake further act ion a nd must l eave i t t o t he 
judgment of t he pr iorities and i nitiative bot h o f t he executive and t he 
legislature t o p ursue this matter. The H igh C ourt has served i ts high 
purpose o f dr awing at tention t o a p ublic need an d i ndicated a feasible 
course o f act ion. N o f urther nee d be do ne by  t he H igh C ourt i n t his 
matter.’ 
 after several unsuccessful at tempts by the court 
to compel the provincial government to construct a road for citizens of Bukkho, a 
hilly ar ea, t he I ndian Supreme C ourt b ecame frustrated at  the attitude o f t he 
government. It expressed this frustration in this way: 
 
The following section examines the range of measures that a c ourt may use to 
deal w ith w illful di sobedience w ith i ts decisions. F rom t he o utset i t has to b e 
stressed t hat part of co nstructing a fair a nd j ust s ociety sh ould enc ompass 
respect f or judicial decisions. F or t his reason, i t i s generally und esirable for a 
court t o be forced t o r esort t o t hese m easures because a per son has not 
complied with an order of court. 
  
 
5.6 PERSONAL L IABILITY OF  P UBLIC O FFICIALS F OR D ERELICTION O F 
DUTY 
 
In E ngland as e arly as 1922 t he courts made use o f t he procedure t o commit 
public officials for contempt of court for deliberate disobediance of judicial orders. 
In the case of R v The Council of the Metropolitan Borough of Poplar. Ex Parte 
                                                                                                                                                 
BCLR 956 (Z), Chinhengo J held that the lack of resources could not be used as a justification by the police 
for their failure to stop unlawful occupation of farms belonging to white farmers by the ‘war veterans’.  
 
63 1986 (2) SCC 68. 
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The Lon don C ity Council.64 the co urt hel d t hat i ndividual m embers of t he 
municipal co uncil must be  at tached for c ontempt o f co urt. I n t hat ca se a  
mandamus was obtained against t he local municipal council r equiring i t t o pay  
certain su ms or t o l evy rates for t hat pur pose. T he aut horities did not  per form 
according to the terms of the writ. Another application was made again to court to 
compel performance w ith the terms of the m andamus or to f ace committal f or 
contempt. The a pplication w as not o nly br ought ag ainst t he m unicipality as a 
corporate entity but also against every member of the council. The members of 
the council made an affidavit to court stating the reasons why they did not comply 
and indicating that they were also not willing to comply. The court directed that a 
writ o f a ttachment be issued against the council and al l i ts individual members. 
This decision was appealed against and on appeal i t was held t hat t he writ of  
attachment could not  be upheld against t he council i n t he co rporate sense bu t 
should b e uph eld ag ainst t he i ndividual m embers who were responsible t o 
implement t he decision o f t he c ourt. L ord S terndale65
‘Now t he co ntempt so  br ought home t o t he app ellants, r egarded as we 
must alone regard i t, taking no acco unt o f outside conditions at all, i s, I  
 held t hat a c orporate or  
notional b ody co uld n ot be  at tached a nd put i n pr ison.  The co urt st ated t hat 
where an order has been made and the respondent clearly understood what was 
expected o f i t but  nonetheless decided not  to implement the court order, t here 
was nothing prohibiting the court from holding the erring official personally liable 
for such an action. The court set out some conditions that were required to be 
present f or an appl ication o f this kind to be successful. The requirements o f 
natural justice had to be fulfilled where the liberty of the individual was interfered 
with. The application must specify the nature o f the contempt, for which i t was 
proposed t o attach an erring o fficial who m ust have d emonstrated a n 
unwillingness to comply and,  w ith f ull ap preciation of t he consequences of t he 
disobedience, must have deci ded n ot t o c omply. S tressing t he i mportance o f 
compliance with court orders by public officials, Lord Younger stated: 
                                                 
64 [1922] 1 KB 95. 
 
65 Ibid 110. 
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think, a v ery glaring and flagrant o ne. I t i s a r easoned an d de liberate 
flouting of the Court’s order. That is to say, it is a disobediance to the law 
of t he l and as declared by  t he K ing’ C ourts set up t o declare i t; i t has  
moreover been  co mmitted by  per sons exercising publ ic functions 
regardless of their duty faithfully to discharge them. They are by law left 
with no discretion as to their action in this matter; the responsibility for this 
rate that they were directed but have refused to levy is not theirs. […] if the 
appellants will not carry out the duties they have undertaken by accepting 
election t o t his body, i t i s their dut y t o m ake w ay f or ot hers who w ill. 
Deliberate di sobediance o f t his order ca nnot, i n m y j udgment b e 
overlooked.’66
 
  
The learned judge went on to add: 
‘I cannot help but think that the reluctance which they feel in making this 
rate i s because temporarily t hey have unduly magnified this subordinate 
office of theirs, and in a sphere in which it is their duty to obey they have 
arrogated to themselves the right to rule.’67
 
  
In Mjeni v Minister of  H ealth and Welfare, Eastern C ape68 an ap plication w as 
made to commit the MEC for Welfare for contempt of court after the Department 
of Welfare had failed to comply with a co urt order to pay costs of the appl icant 
arising f rom a se ttlement ag reement. The ag reement w as reached a fter t he 
appellant had launched an application for the reinstatement of his disability grant 
and t he r espondent had ag reed t o r einstate t he g rant. T he a pplication for 
committal w as opposed o n t he g rounds that no t ev ery or der of  co urt ca n be 
enforced through committal for contempt. The respondent argued that the order 
sought by  t he applicants was for pay ment of m oney and t hat i t could n ot be 
enforced by  a co mmittal for contempt.69
                                                 
66 Ibid 122. 
 The di fficulty that f aced the court was 
that t he respondent w as a state f unctionary and t herefore enjoyed pr otection 
 
67 Ibid. See also the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Roncarelli v Duplessis 16 D.L.R. (2d) 689 
where the Court awarded damages personally against Premier Duplessis for instigating the Quebec Liquor 
Commission to cancel the licence of Jehovah’s Witness. 
 
68 2000 (4) SA 446 (Tk ). 
69 See Cape Times Ltd v Union Trades Direcotorates (Pty) Ltd and Others 1956 (1) SA 105 (N), BJBS 
Contractors (Pty) Ltd v Lategan 1975 (2) SA 590 (C), Naidu and Others v Naidu and Another 1993 (4) SA 
542 (D). 
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from attachment o f p roperty i n ex ecution of t he order i n t erms o f the S tate 
Liability Act.70
 
 
The co urt h eld i n favour o f t he a pplicant holding t hat t he r espondent had t o 
appear in court to show cause why she should not be committed for contempt of 
court. I n c oming t o t his conclusion t he co urt co nsidered t hat t he st ate, i n ci vil 
litigation is different to pr ivate individuals. The state has a constitutional duty to 
assist persons to enforce their rights which duty is extra-ordinary.71 A deliberate 
refusal by an organ of state to implement an order of court amounts to a breach 
of that constitutional duty. The court also emphasised the need for not  only an 
independent, but  al so an e ffective, j udiciary: t he abse nce o f w hich ‘ …would 
render m eaningless the w hole pr ocess of t aking di sputes to co urts for 
adjudication and that is a recipe for chaos and disaster.’72
 
  
In dealing with the protection afforded to the state by s 3 of the State Liability Act, 
the court f ound t hat ‘ arrest for contempt’ could n ot b e co nstrued t o mean 
‘attachment’ for the purposes of the section. The denial to the applicant’s right to 
hold public officials l iable for t heir failure t o co mply w ith co urt orders would 
amount to a denial o f j ustice to l itigants involved in justiciable disputes against 
the state. This could not have been intended by the Constitution. The court found 
the relief sought by the applicants  to declare that the Member of the Executive 
Council concerned was in contempt of the court order and that she had to show 
cause why she should not be committed for contempt  was competent. There 
are two possible penalties where a person is found guilty of contempt, namely a 
fine or  i mprisonment. I t i s left t o t he di scretion o f t he co urt t o decide w hich 
penalty is appropriate. A  sentence of imprisonment can in certain instances be 
suspended. 
                                                 
70 Section 3 of the State Liability Act 20 of 1957.  
 
71 Note 68 above 452C-G. See also De Lange v Smuts NO and Others 1998 (3) SA 785 (CC) para 31; 
Bernstein and Others v Bester and others NNO 1996  (2) SA 751 (CC)  para 105. 
 
72 Note 68  above 458B-C. 
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The pr ecedent t hat t his decision se ts is that a p ublic official can be h eld 
personally l iable f or del iberate failure t o co mply with a co urt or der ag ainst t he 
government department.73
 
  
Plasket74 suggests that t he co urts sh ould consider t he option o f p unitive co sts 
orders against p ublic officials not i n t heir p ublic capacity but  i n t heir per sonal 
capacity. He says that this type of costs orders is best suited for the vindication of 
constitutional r ights where t he p ublic interest i n t his relief i s either app arent or 
obvious.  It is also suited where the unconstitutional conduct of the administrative 
functionary does not only har m t he i ndividual t o w hom i t i s directed b ut also 
impedes the realisation of our constitutional promise. Indeed it our constitutional 
promise t hat t he pu blic be se rved by  an ef ficient, r esponsive and  acco untable 
public administration.75
 
 If an administrative official acts in a manner that discloses 
bad faith of a sufficiently gross degree, then it may be appropriate for the court to 
order t hat t he o fficial concerned must r epay t he st ate for t he costs incurred i n 
defending hi s or her  del iberate flouting o f his or her  obl igations in addi tion t o 
paying t he individual w hose co nstitutional r ight was infringed by t he o fficial’s 
conduct. These costs ought to be paid directly from his pocket and not from the 
public purse. 
                                                 
 
73 In the Eastern Cape, the Legal Resources Centre has used this measure on behalf of its clients to compel 
the Welfare Department to comply with judicial orders. Most of these applications for committal for 
contempt of court have in fact been helpful although they have been settled out of court. In the case of 
Njongo Booi  and Others v Nomsa Jajula and Others ECD Case No 431 &433/99, the Member of 
Executive Council for Welfare was cited personally as a respondent in the contempt application along with 
her Permanent Secretary and two other officials. This prompted an urgent response from the Department, 
which led to the settlement of the orders, which had been outstanding for  about 14 months.   
 
74 C Plasket ‘Protecting the Public Purse: Appropriate Relief and Costs Orders Against Officials’ (2000) 
117 SALJ 151. He argues that this type of costs order although it has not been used in the South African 
scene is not novel. It was applied in the Canadian case of Re West Nissouri Continuation Board (1917) 38 
Ontario Law Reports 207.  
 
75 See section 195(1) of the Constitution. 
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This approach may play a significant role in ensuring that public officials carry out 
their duties with honesty and diligence as required of them by the Constitution. In 
such an ap plication, t he ap plicant must d emonstrate that he or she has  a 
constitutional r ight w hose v indication de pended o n t he action by  t he o fficial. 
Secondly the applicant must show that he or she could not exercise such a right 
because of the act ion or inaction by the official. The official must have acted in 
bad faith and without any lawful justification. In Ngxuza and Others v Permanent 
Secretary, Department of W elfare, E astern C ape P rovincial Government76
 
 the 
court or dered t hat r espondents appoint a sp ecific official w ho w ould b e 
responsible and account to the court for the implementation of the order. This is 
an e ffective st rategy of  avoiding potential non-compliance with the order o f the 
court and perhaps litigants themselves could in appropriate cases ask the court 
to make an order requiring the state department concerned to appoint such an 
official.   
One has to add a word of caution against the overzealous use of this measure of 
holding public officials personally accountable for breaches of public duty. By its 
very nat ure t his measure i s punitive an d t herefore s hould b e r eserved f or t he 
most deserving cases. Governance is a complex process sometimes requiring a 
careful balancing of conflicting interests. Government officials often have to make 
quick decisions on complicated matters depending on the exigencies of the case 
in hand. A court has to be sensitive to these factors and its orders should not in 
effect l eave of ficials feeling v ulnerable an d co nsequently r eluctant t o t ake 
decisions at all.77
  
  
                                                 
 
76 Note 1 above. 
 
77 Compare for instance (albeit in a different context) the remarks made by O’Regan J in Premier, 
Mpumalanga, and Another v Executive Committee, Association of State Aided Schools, Eastern Transvaal  
1999 (2) BCLR 151 (CC) para 41 (‘[in] determining what constitutes procedural fairness in a given case, a 
court should be slow to impose obligations upon government which will inhibit its ability to make and 
implement policy effectively…’). See also Minister of Public Works and Others v Kyalami Ridge 
Environmental Association and Others 2000 (7) BCLR 652 (CC) para 102.   
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5.7 LIMITATIONS TO JUDICIAL REMEDIES 
 
5.7.1 Section 3 of the State Liability Act 
 
Where a party succeeds in a civil action against the state, the expectation is that 
the organ of the state will implement the terms of the order. In situations where 
the state is not a defendant the plaintiff may execute against the property of the 
defendant i n or der t o sa tisfy t he j udgment d ebt. B ut pr operty bel onging t o t he 
state is protected by section 3 of the State Liability Act. The section provides: 
‘No ex ecution, attachment or  l ike pr ocess shall be i ssued against t he 
defendant in any such action or proceedings or against any property of the 
State, but  t he am ount, i f a ny which m ay be r equired t o sa tisfy any  
judgment or  or der g iven or  m ade ag ainst t he no minal d efendant or  
respondent in any action or proceedings may be pai d out of the National 
Revenue Fund or a Provincial Revenue Fund as the case may be.’ 
 
The section effectively means that the ordinary procedure of an application for a 
warrant of execution does not apply in cases where the state is the defendant. A 
successful l itigant against t he state cannot attach state assets where the s tate 
fails to h onour t he j udgment de bt. I n t urn the st ate g uarantees to pay  al l i ts 
debts.57
‘The di fficulty I  w as faced w ith w as compounded by t he fact t hat I  w as 
unable to find decisions dealing with the issue despite a diligent search for 
them, nor were we referred to any by counsel. The fact that this issue only 
now came before the courts for decision may i ndicate t hat until r ecently 
government de partments complied w ith or ders issued by  co urts of l aw. 
Therefore i t has not become necessary f or t he co urts to deal with t he 
matter. However the attitudes of state departments towards court orders 
have ch anged l ately. The n umber o f si milar appl ications brought be fore 
this court has arisen at an alarming rate and regrettably that is a cause for 
concern.’
 But of late there is a growing trend by the government to disobey court 
orders. Jafta J in the course of expressing his displeasure at this trend  in Mjeni’s 
case said: 
78
                                                 
57 See Treasury Instructions issued in terms of the Provincial Exchequer Acts. In the Eastern Cape the 
Treasury Instructions are made in terms of section 35(1) of the Provincial Exchequer Act 1994. See also 
section 213 of the Constitution. 
  
 
78 Note 68 above 452 A-C. 
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State functionaries should not be allowed to believe that they may ignore orders 
of court until they are forced to comply. The prompt and timely implementation of 
court orders constitutes an essential component of the duty to uphold the values 
in the Constitution.79
 
 
5.7.2 The Duty to Exhaust Internal Remedies 
 
The pu blic has meaningful acc ess to most so cio-economic rights like so cial 
security, hous ing and  ot her b enefits through t he st ate ad ministration.80
 
 For 
instance, it is the state administration that administers and pays out cheques for 
pensions and g ives instructions for t he b uilding of  r oads and h ouses. I n t his 
sense the principles of administrative law play an i mportant role in dealing with 
access to those benefits. P rovision o f access to t hese benefits is governed by  
various statutes, like the Social Assistance Act, of 1992 which make provision for 
the granting of pensions and grants and the circumstances under which it will be 
permissible for a person to be deprived of a pension or grant. 
The Social Assistance Act  creates an internal appeal procedure where persons 
who are aggrieved by the decisions of the Director General to either suspend or 
decrease the amount of their grant can lodge an appeal in writing.81 In Maluleke 
v MEC f or H ealth a nd Welfare ( Northern Province)82
                                                                                                                                                 
 
 the court f ound that t he 
79 See the Principles of Public Administration in section 195 of the Constitution. 
 
80 See C Plasket ‘Accessibility Through Public Interest Litigation’ in Corder & Maluwa (eds) 
Administrative Justice In Southern Africa (Department of Public Law: UCT, Cape Town 1997) 119. 
 
81 Section 10 (1) of the Social Assistance Act 59 of 1992 reads: ‘If an applicant is aggrieved by a decision 
of the Director General in the administration of this Act, such applicant may within 90 days after the date 
on which he was notified of the decision appeal in writing against such decision to the Minister, who may 
confirm, vary or set aside that decision’. See too DM Pretorious 'The Wisdom of Solomon: The Obligation 
to Exhaust Domestic Remedies in South African Administrative Law' (1999) 116 SALJ 113 
 
 
82 Maluleke v MEC, Health and Welfare, Northern Province 1999 (4) SA 367 (T) 372G-H. 
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existence o f t he r ight to an i nternal appeal did not preclude t he applicant from 
seeking judicial intervention. 
 
Section 7(2)(a) of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act83 provides that the 
court shall not entertain an application for judicial review unless the applicant has 
exhausted all internal remedies. But the Act also states that such a requirement 
for exhaustion o f domestic remedies may be waived i f the applicant makes an 
application to this effect and shows that ‘exceptional circumstances’ exist and the 
interests o f j ustice so  require. E ffectively t his means t hat a person i s debarred 
from go ing t o co urt a nd he nce from obt aining j udicial r elief unl ess he/she has 
exhausted i nternal r emedies. H e or  sh e c an ap proach a co urt only af ter t he 
functionary has made a decision and he or she is still aggrieved by the decision. 
The A ct do es not de fine ex ceptional ci rcumstances nor does it sp ell out  t he 
factors to be taken into account when considering an application for condonation. 
This is presumably left to the courts to give content to. Poor people by and large 
depend upon the administration to facilitate access to socio-economic rights. The 
rich ar e i n a  posi tion t o t ake c are of t hemselves and m ay not  need the 
administration t o pr ovide t hese basi c services to t hem. The se ction pl aces an 
onerous burden on poor people who want to vindicate their rights using the legal 
process. The co urts in deal ing w ith ca ses of t his nature w ill have  t o t ake t he 
socio-economic realities of the country into consideration. Didcott J in the case of 
Mohlomi v  Minister of  D efence84
‘… the state of affairs prevailing in South Africa, a land where poverty and 
illiteracy abound an d t he di fferences of cu lture an d l anguage ar e 
pronounced, w here su ch co nditions isolate t he pe ople w hom t hey 
handicap from the mainstream of the law, where most persons who have 
been i njured ar e ei ther unaw are of  or  po orly informed abo ut t heir l egal 
rights and w hat t hey sh ould do i n or der t o e nforce t hose, an d w here 
access to the professional advice and assistance that they need so sorely 
is often difficult for financial or geographic reasons.’  
 stated t he need f or t he co urts to t ake i nto 
account these circumstances in the following language: 
                                                 
83 Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000. 
 
84 Mohlomi v Minister of Defence 1997 (1) SA 124 (CC) para 14. 
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In m any i nstances, i t will be di fficult i f not  i mpossible t o pr ove t hat t here ar e 
exceptional circumstances and the interests of justice favour an a pplicant.  T his 
will be esp ecially so  w hen a per son does not have t he b enefit o f l egal 
representation. Thus the requirement may in certain instances effectively deny a 
person the right of access to court. 
  
5.7.3 Standing 
 
Standing is another l imitation to judicial remedies. In terms of the common law, 
an applicant, to have standing was required to demonstrate that he or she had a 
direct and substantial interest in the subject matter of the dispute. If the applicant 
failed to establish this, the court would deny him or her standing and the matter 
would not be entertained. The Constitution has broadened the test for standing in 
the ad ministrative l aw co ntext and,  i ndeed, w henever i t i s alleged t hat 
fundamental r ights have been i nfringed or  threatened. A  broader ca tegory of  
persons can now litigate either as members of a class or in the public interest.85
 
  
The Constitution and the proposed legislation on class actions and public interest 
suits is no universal solution to problems of access to courts. The courts may still 
deny standing to an applicant for judicial review under certain circumstances. It is 
however, clear that the new mode of thinking directs that the courts should adopt 
a f lexible appr oach t o st anding i n ca ses involving violations of co nstitutional 
rights.86
 
  
5.7.4 Prescriptive Periods 
 
                                                 
85 See section 38 of the Constitution. 
 
86 See Chapter 4 above for a detailed discussion on standing. 
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Where there are t ime l imits set for the institution of an act ion, and the claimant 
fails to sue within that period the claimant is ipso facto barred from instituting the 
claim. Our common law has always recognised this limitation.87
 
 The object of this 
limitation is to ensure that claims are instituted in good time when evidence is still 
fresh and witnesses, if there are any, can recall the events clearly. There is also 
a broader issue that is in the public interest which is that cases should be brought 
to finality and cannot be left open perpetually.    
In South Africa, there is plethora of pre-constitutional statutes designed to protect 
the state through the imposition of prescriptive periods which are shorter than the 
ordinary prescriptive period of three years.88  The purpose of such provisions as 
recently se t out  by  M arais JA i n Abrahamse v East Lon don M unicipality and 
Another; East London Municipality v Abrahamse89
‘… to protect a l ocal authority against precipitate citation of it in a l awsuit 
by a litigant seeking to obtain payment of a debt allegedly due by the local 
authority. I t i s aimed at providing a l ocal authority w ith an opportunity o f 
investigating the matter sooner rather than later when investigations might 
prove m ore di fficult, of co nsidering i ts position, and , i f so  a dvised, o f 
paying or  co mpromising t he debt  b efore being em broiled i n a  co stly 
litigation.’ 
 is  
 
Since the enactment of the Constitution legislation of this kind has been subject 
to attack primarily because of the limitations it places on the exercise of the right 
of acce ss to co urts. I n Mohlomi for i nstance, t he si x-month l imitation p eriod 
                                                 
87 Save for specific exceptions that are contained in the Prescription Act 68 of 1969, a money debt arising 
out of a civil claim prescribes after three years in terms of section 11(d) of the Act. 
 
88 For instance section 343(1) of the Merchant Shipping Act, 57 of 1951; section 90(2) of the Correctional 
Services Act, 8 of 1959; section 96(1) of the Customs and Excise Act, 91 of 1964; section 2(1)(a) of the 
Limitation of Legal Proceedings (Provincial and Local Authorities) Act, 94 of 1970; section 25(1)(a) of the 
National Roads Act, 54 of 1971; and section 57(2) of the South African Police Service Act, 68 of 1995. 
 
89 1997 (4) SA 613 (SCA)  624D-E. An investigative report of the South African Law Commission said in 
1985: ‘The circumstances under which the State can incur liability are legion. Because of the State’s large 
and fluctuating work force and the extent of its activities, it is impossible to investigate an incident properly 
long after it has taken place….’ Further the report states: ‘The State acts in the public interest and not for 
gain….Because public funds are involved the State must guard against unfounded claims….[T]he State is 
an attractive target for unfounded claims.’ Report: Project 42; Investigation into Time Limits for the 
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contained i n se ction 113(1) of t he D efence A ct 44 of 1957 w as declared 
unconstitutional. In Moise v Transitional Local Council of Greater Germiston and 
Others90 the three-month period within which to serve a written notice was also 
considered ‘a real impediment to the prospective claimant’s access to a court.’91 
The C ourt s truck down se ction 2( 1)(a) o f t he Li mitation o f L egal P roceedings 
(Provincial and Loc al Authorities) Act92
 
 despite the fact that the unfair impact of 
the section i s attenuated by section 4  o f t he A ct which provides that a plaintiff 
may apply to court to condone his or her non compliance with the three month 
notice period and the court will if its in the interests of justice condone such non-
compliance with the time period. 
Section 5 o f t he P romotion o f A dministrative Ju stice A ct pr ovides that a party 
seeking r easons for a par ticular ad ministrative act ion m ay r equest w ritten 
reasons from the functionary concerned within a period of three months from the 
date the administrative act ion was taken. Section 7(1) o f t he A ct provides that 
proceedings for judicial review must be i nstituted within six months of the cause 
of action. Under section 9 both periods (ie 90 or 180 days) may be extended by 
agreement of the parties to a fixed period. If there is no such agreement between 
the parties, i t m ay b e ex tended by a co urt o f l aw a fter an application i f t he 
interests of justice so require. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
Institution of Actions Against the State. The report can be accessed at 
www.law.wits.ac.za/salc/disussn/discussn/html  
 
90 2001 (8) BCLR 765(CC). Another relevant Constitutional Court decision is Potgieter v Die Lid Van Die 
Uitvoerende Raad: Gesondheid, Provinsiale Regering Gauteng En Ander Case No CCT 26/01 delivered on 
8 October 2001 (unreported) where section 68(4) of the Mental Health Act 18 of  1973 was declared 
unconstitutional because it violates section 34 of the Constitution.  This section limited the period within 
which a person who had been detained in a mental institution could sue for damages suffered to three 
months after their release. 
 
91 Moise (note 90 above) para 13. In this case, it must be noted that the State did not put up argument in 
justification of its legislation in terms of s 36(1) of the Constitution. Had that occurred, it is clear from the 
language of the judgment that a different approach to the balancing process under section 36(1) would have 
occurred. Whether that would have resulted in a different conclusion is of course a different matter. 
 
92 Act 94 of 1970. 
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From the text of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act it is not stated what 
purpose t hese t ime l imits seek to ach ieve. I t ca n be assumed that t he sa me 
purpose highlighted in the Abrahamse case is applicable. Ordinarily any time limit 
has the effect of limiting a person’s right of access to a court. But that on its own 
does not make t he t ime l imit u nconstitutional. The t ime l imits imposed by  t he 
Promotion o f A dministrative Ju stice A ct hav e an af fect o f si gnificantly 
encroaching upon a person’s rights of access to court.  This is probably more so 
in the case of illiterate and poor people. They are first required to request written 
reasons of an action that they might not even been aware that it has been taken. 
Secondly, they are required to make that request within a relatively short period 
of t ime. Further, they are expected to institute the action within six months after 
exhausting the internal remedies or a fter t he cause of ac tion arose. These are 
significant i mpediments to a per son’s exercise o f t he r ight of  access to co urt. 
Such a l imitation o n t he r ight i s attenuated by  t he fact that t he period c an be 
extended by agreement (a process that I think will hardly work in litigation against 
the S tate)93 or by  appl ication t o co urt. This is the o nly m itigating f actor i n t he 
statute. It may well be t hat although the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 
imposes such a l imitation, i t i s nevertheless a j ustifiable l imitation esp ecially i f 
regard i s had t o t he fact t hat firstly, t here i s a l egitimate pur pose t hat t he A ct 
seeks to achieve and the period may if it is in the interests of justice be extended 
by a court of law.94
 
  
 
5.8 CONCLUSION 
 
Democracy can only be st rengthened when the ordinary people know that they 
can resort to courts to complain about infringements of their constitutional rights. 
Otherwise t hey r esort t o se lf-help, a r ecipe f or ch aos. S econdly, i t i s when 
                                                 
93 See the remarks of Cameron JA in Permanent Secretary, Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape 
Provincial Government and Another v Ngxuza and others (note 2 above) paras 14 and 15. 
 
94 See the remarks of Somyalo AJ in Moise (note 90 above) para 19. 
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government d epartments are aware t hat t hey w ill be hel d accountable for 
dereliction of their public duty that they will execute their functions properly. But 
the i mportance o f t he r ole of  co urts should not  be ov er-emphasised. T he 
existence of judicial remedies should not be a su bstitute for government not to 
deliver on their constitutional obligations.95
 
  
Respect f or the rule o f law on t he par t o f g overnment de partments means 
respect for t he co urts as the onl y i nstitutions charged w ith t he dut y of  
interpretation of Constitution. Disrespect f or t he deci sions made b y the courts 
demonstrates not only di srespect f or t he co urts as institutions, b ut a lso 
disrespect for the Constitution as the fundamental law of the country. It is reason 
enough f or co ncern when g overnment de partments deliberately di sobey co urt 
orders. Justice Brandeis of the Supreme Court of the United States of America 
made this point even more eloquently when he said: 
‘In a government of laws, existence of the government will be imperiled if it 
fails to obse rve t he l aw scr upulously. . .. G overnment i s the p otent, t he 
omnipresent teacher.  For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its 
example.  Crime is contagious. If the government becomes a lawbreaker, 
it breeds contempt for the law; it invites every man to become a law unto 
himself; it invites anarchy.’96
 
 
Experience elsewhere has shown that when the executive arm of the state fails 
in i ts duty to respect the rule of law, a co untry can be t orn apart. Anarchy and 
chaos is bound to erupt.97
                                                                                                                                                 
 
 The state and its institutions should act as role models 
for or dinary ci tizens. They sh ould be t he first t o dem onstrate co ncern f or the 
poor, t he un derprivileged and t he w eaker cl asses of so ciety. T hey sh ould no t 
95 See Chaskalson A ‘Dignity as a Foundational Value of our Constitutional Order’ (2000) 16 SAJHR  194, 
204-205(italics mine). 
 
96 Olmstead v United States 277 US 438, 484-485. 
 
97 See the comments of Chinhengo J on the refusal of the Zimbabwean Police to enforce a court order to 
evict illegal farm occupiers in Commissioner of Police v Commercial Farmer’s Union (note 61 above) at  
964-967 and Chavunduka and Another v Commissioner of Police and Another 2000 (9) BCLR 949 (ZS). 
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only develop pol icies which display this concern, but must act in a m anner that 
demonstrates respect for the views of the voiceless in society.  
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CHAPTER 6 
 
NON-JUDICIAL REMEDIES 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter de als with non j udicial r emedies that ar e av ailable t o ena ble 
everyone t o hav e acc ess to their so cial and eco nomic rights. T wo i nstitutions 
created by  t he C onstitution ar e used as examples. Those i nstitutions are the 
South A frican H uman R ights Commission (the C ommission) a nd t he P ublic 
Protector. T hese i nstitutions are p art o f a cl uster o f i nstitutions created by  t he 
Constitution to safeguard constitutional democracy. Collectively these institutions 
are referred to as State Institutions Supporting Constitutional Democracy. In this 
chapter t he r ole o f t he P ublic Protector an d t he H uman R ights Commission i s 
assessed in the context of the implementation of social and economic rights. It is 
observed t hat bot h t hese i nstitutions have w eaknesses which co uld pot entially 
undermine their effectiveness in upholding human rights. These weaknesses, it is 
argued ar e not  i nsurmountable. I n fact t hey ca n be ov ercome t hrough pr oper 
planning and effective ut ilization of resources. To achieve the most impact, i t is 
suggested that these institutions should consider ways of cooperating with each 
other.  
 
6.2 THE SOUTH AFRICAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION 
 
Under t he C onstitution v arious institutions ar e cr eated for the pu rposes of 
supporting constitutional democracy.1
                                                 
1 Section 181 of the Constitution provides for the creation of State Institutions Supporting Constitutional 
Democracy. These are: the Human Rights Commission, the Public Protector, the Commission for the 
Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Cultural, Religious and Linguistic Communities, the 
Commission for Gender Equality, the Auditor General, and the Electoral Commission. 
 The Human Rights Commission is the only 
institution whose role is specifically to monitor the performance of government in 
the provision of socio-economic rights.  
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This role is only part of the general constitutional mandate of the Commission to 
promote, monitor and assess the observance of human r ights in South Africa.2 
The Commission in discharging the mandate is given wide powers to investigate 
and to report on the observance of human rights and furthermore to take steps to 
secure appropriate redress where human rights have been violated.3
 
  
The first part o f chapter examines t he role of t he Commission as a monitoring 
institution in the delivery of  socio-economic rights under the Constitution. I n so 
doing r egard w ill be had t o t he w ay i n which t he C ommission m onitors and 
reports on the performance o f g overnment i n t he pr ovision o f s ocio-economic 
rights. We shall also look at how the people can access the Commission to report 
rights violations. Lastly, we shall also deal with how the Commission has played 
its role under  t he C onstitution i n pr omoting hum an r ights generally and so cio-
economic rights in particular. 
 
6.2.1 The Constitutional Provisions 
 
Section 184(3) of the Constitution states: 
 
‘Each year, the Human Rights Commission must require relevant organs 
of state to provide the Commission with information on the measures that 
they have taken towards the realisation of the r ights in the B ill o f R ights 
concerning h ousing, health c are, food, w ater, so cial se curity, edu cation 
and the environment.’ 
 
 
Section 184(2) contemplates the enactment of an A ct of Parliament to regulate 
the powers of the Commission as contained in section 184(1) of the Constitution. 
The section provides: 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
2 Section 184(1) of the Constitution. 
 
3 Section 184(2) of the Constitution. 
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‘The Human Rights Commission has the powers, as regulated by national 
legislation, necessary to perform its functions, including the power – 
(a) to investigate and to report on the observance of human rights; 
(b) to take steps to secure appropriate redress where human rights 
have been violated; 
(c) to carry out research; and 
(d) to educate.’ 
    
6.2.2 The Human Rights Commission Act4
 
 
The powers and functions of the Commission are contained in the Human Rights 
Commission Act, a statute which establishes the Commission. The statute makes 
provision for powers and appropriate measures that the Commission may employ 
where rights have been v iolated and under the Act it has powers to redress the 
violations. Its preamble provides: 
‘…the H uman R ights Commission sh all, i nter al ia, be co mpetent an d 
obliged to promote the observance of, and respect for and the protection 
of fundamental r ights; t o dev elop a n aw areness of fundamental r ights 
among all people of the Republic; to make recommendations to organs of 
state at all levels of government where it considers such action advisable 
for the adoption of progressive measures for the promotion of fundamental 
rights within the f ramework of the law and t he Constitution; to undertake 
such studies for report on or relating to fundamental rights as it considers 
advisable in the performance of its functions; to request any organ of state 
to su pply i t with i nformation on a ny l egislative or  e xecutive m easures 
adopted by it relating to fundamental rights; and to investigate any alleged 
violation of fundamental rights and to assist any person adversely affected 
thereby to secure redress;…’ 
 
The pr eamble o f t he A ct t hus sets the t one f or t he w ide nat ure o f t he p owers 
vested in the Commission to monitor the observance of human rights in general 
and socio-economic rights in particular. The Commission has to ensure that there 
is public awareness about h uman r ights and t hat s tate organs carry out  t heir 
duties according to the Constitution. The powers of the Commission to monitor 
the respect of fundamental rights must be read in the light of the provisions of the 
                                                 
4 Act No 54 of 1994 (the HRC Act or the Act). 
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Constitution, which enjoins the state to respect, protect and to promote and fulfil 
fundamental rights.5
 
  
The m embers of t he Commission m ust se rve t he C ommission i mpartially and 
independently. They must per form t heir d uties and functions in g ood f aith and 
without fear, favour, bias, or  prejudice and subject only to the Constitution and 
the law.6 The members of the Commission are in this sense placed in a si milar 
degree of trust to the courts of law. They must serve the public and in so doing 
should i nstill co nfidence i n t he p ublic that t hey ar e ca rrying out  t heir m andate 
consistently with the Constitution. In order for this task to be sufficiently carried 
out and public confidence gained by the Commission, i t is necessary that state 
organs assist t he C ommission t o c arry out  i ts functions. They sh ould offer 
support for the Commission and should not unduly interfere with the work of the 
Commission.7
 
  
Section 7 o f t he Act confers powers to t he C ommission t o r eceive views and 
recommendations from t he pu blic, co ncerning f undamental r ights. This is 
important as a means to ensure that t he Commission i s accessible to ordinary 
people and it understands their concerns. The Commission, is in the same spirit, 
authorised t o o btain reports from or gans of st ate a bout t heir obse rvance of 
fundamental rights as enshrined in the Constitution. 
 
6.2.3 Investigative Role of the Commission 
 
                                                 
5 Section 7 (2) of the Constitution. The specific role of the Commission in relation to the section 7(2) 
responsibilities of the State is usefully analysed by S Liebernberg in Identifying Violations of Socio 
Economic Rights Under the South African Constitution –The Role of the South African Human Rights 
Commission (University of Western Cape: Cape Town 1997). For our purposes the section 7(2) obligations 
of the State are discussed in Chapter 2 above. Accordingly, it serves no useful purpose to traverse those 
issues again.  
 
6 Section 4(1) of the HRC Act. 
 
7 Section 4(2) of the HRC Act. 
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Perhaps, t he m ost si gnificant pow ers conferred up on t he C ommission ar e i n 
terms of s ection 9.  The C ommission may i n t erms of t his section co nduct or  
cause t o b e co nducted any  i nvestigation which i s nece ssary t o enabl e t he 
Commission t o ca rry out  i ts duties and f unctions. T he C ommission m ay 
subpoena any person whose presence will f acilitate i ts i nvestigation and in the 
subpoena i t m ust ex plain w hy su ch a per son’s presence i s necessary.8 Any 
person who is subpoenaed in this manner is required to answer any questions 
that are put to him by the Commission.9
 
 
The A ct m akes i t a n o ffence for anyone t o r efuse t o c o-operate w ith t he 
Commission w ithout g ood c ause. A  person who i s convicted o f t his offence i s 
liable t o a fine or  t o be i mprisoned for a  per iod n ot ex ceeding six  m onths. 
Members of the state also commit this offence if they fail to co-operate with the 
Commission under the Act.10
 
  
6.3 THE MONITORING ROLE OF THE COMMISSION 
 
The Commission is mandated by the Constitution to monitor the measures taken 
by state departments to implement social and economic rights. The Commission 
has developed a m onitoring system to enable i t to carry out this mandate. This 
system has been in place since 1997.11
• Policy measures 
 The system involves the development of 
protocols which are sent to various government departments for their reply. The 
government departments have to report on these areas:  
• Legislative measures 
• Outcomes measures 
                                                 
8 Section 9(1) (c) of the HRC Act. 
 
9 Section 9(2) (a)(i) of the HRC Act. 
 
10 Section 18 of the HRC Act. 
 
11 See the Third Annual Report on Economic and Social Rights 1999/2000 of the Commission which can 
be accessed at www.sahrc.org.za .  
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• National action plan 
• Monitoring 
• Additional information 
 
Specific questions are then addressed to the departments in relation to measures 
adopted to a ddress the pl ight o f s ocially and eco nomically v ulnerable g roups. 
These groups include: 
• Persons in rural areas 
• Persons in informal settlements 
• Homeless persons 
• Female-headed households 
• Women 
• Children 
• Persons with disabilities 
• Older persons 
• Persons living with HIV/Aids12
• Previously disadvantaged racial groupings including indigenous groups 
 
 
Where departments fail t o r espond t o t he pr otocols sent t o them w ithout 
justification, the Commission h as power t o su bpoena t he various departments. 
Indeed in the third monitoring cycle of the Commission it has used these powers. 
Some de partments including t he D epartments of H ealth a nd E ducation o f t he 
Eastern C ape w ere s ubpoenaed t o a ppear be fore t he C ommission t o answer 
                                                 
12 Section 34 (1) of the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000 
provides: 
‘In view of the overwhelming evidence of the importance, impact on society and link to systematic 
disadvantage and discrimination on the grounds of HIV/AIDS status, socio-economic status, 
nationality, family responsibility and family status— 
(a) special consideration must be given to the inclusion of these grounds (in the definition of 
“prohibited grounds”)’.  
HIV status is presently not included in the listed grounds in section 9 of the Constitution. In Hoffman v 
South African Airways 2000 (11) BCLR 1211 (CC), however, the Constitutional Court held that the refusal 
by the South African Airways to employ a person to a position of cabin attendant on the grounds that he 
was HIV positive amounted to unfair discrimination in terms of s9 of the Constitution. 
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charges of failing to report to the Commission on their section 7(2) obl igations. 
The Commission reported13
 
 that the process of hauling these departments before 
it is effective as most submitted their reports before the scheduled dates of the 
hearings. After receiving reports the Commission then makes an analysis of the 
reports and co mpiles its own r eport for su bmission to the President or  
Parliament. 
6.4 S ECURING A PPROPRIATE RE DRESS F OR V IOLATIONS O F S OCIO-
ECONOMIC RIGHTS 
 
The H uman R ights Commission Act g ives the C ommission pow ers to obtain 
information from a ny per son i n t he performance of i ts functions. The A ct al so 
makes it an offence for anyone to willfully and w ithout proper justification refuse 
to co-operate with the Commission when i t is carrying out i ts duties both under 
the Constitution and under the Act.  
 
The experience of the Commission, however, shows that in some instances it will 
be di fficult to deal  w ith the state ad ministration. T he problems that the 
Commission faced in dealing with the arbitrary suspensions of disability grants in 
the Eastern Cape is a case in point. The Chairperson of the Commission detailed 
in an affidavit filed in support of the applicants in the case of Ngxuza14
 
 how it had 
warned the Department of Welfare that grants should not be suspended without 
notification a nd a proper h earing t o t he bene ficiary. H e st ated t hat t he 
Department’s r esponse w as most un helpful a nd he c oncluded that t he 
Commission had failed in i ts efforts. An unco-operative state administration will 
undoubtedly seriously impede the work of the Commission. 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
13 In its Third Annual Report (note 11 above) 11. 
 
14 Ngxuza and others v Secretary Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape and another 2000 (12) BCLR 1322 
(E) 1326E-F. 
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In order for the Commission to deal with this problem it is necessary that it works 
in par tnership w ith non -governmental or ganisations (NGO’s) an d ot her st ate 
institutions.  T his has an e ffect o f broadening t he challenge t o the state which 
puts pressure on the government to respond to the problems before it. Secondly, 
the advantage of this cooperation is that the resources of the Commission may 
be co mplemented by  r esources from N GO’s thus easing t he strain on t he 
Commission’s resources. Thirdly, t he C ommission as  an organ o f st ate i s 
precluded from suing other organs of state without trying other measures first.15
 
 
The w ork of t he C ommission sh ould n ot b e l imited t o l itigation. I t oug ht t o b e 
broader than that. The Commission ought to raise public awareness about what 
socio-economic rights are and how the public can gain access these rights. In so 
doing, t he C ommission m ay al so i nclude g overnment de partments in i ts 
educational programmes. The benefit of such a programme is two-fold. Firstly, it 
will reduce the level of ignorance with which officials approach the whole notion 
of r ights. S econdly, i f t hey ar e aware o f t he r ights of everyone and w hy t hey 
should be respected they are likely to deal with the public more humanely and in 
a ‘ rights oriented’ w ay. T his will go a l ong way in i nculcating a r ights based 
culture among government employees thus creating a society which lives by the 
rule o f l aw and  w hich i s firmly g overned by t he principles of constitutional 
democracy.   
 
On funding, it is suggested that perhaps the Commission should not depend on 
the al location f rom g overnment only. I t sh ould al so se ek funding f rom 
international donors.  
 
One sh ould also a dd t hat t he r eporting p rocess of t he C ommission i s not 
altogether sa tisfactory. A fter going through t he Commission’s 1999/2000 report 
                                                 
 
15 Section 41 (1) (h) (vi) of the Constitution provides: ‘All spheres of government and all organs of state 
within each sphere must co-operate with one another in mutual trust and good faith by avoiding legal 
proceedings against one another.’ See also s 41(3) of the Constitution.  
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on so cio-economic rights one i s l eft w ith t he i mpression t hat t he r eports from 
state departments are collected merely in order for the Commission to make its 
own report to Parliament. There seems to be no cr itical analysis of the concrete 
measures that t he g overnment h as put i n place. There al so seems to be n o 
analysis of the effects of such measures on poverty alleviation. The Commission 
seems also to have relied only on information from the state departments. In my 
view t he pr ocess could al so benefit from i nputs from N GO’s. The C ommission 
should take active steps to encourage NGO’s to submit their own assessment of 
the impact of the measures put in place by the government departments. 
 
These are problems that could be addressed. In the final analysis the inclusion of 
an i nstitution l ike t he H uman R ights Commission i n t he C onstitution i s an 
important development i n our co nstitutional de mocracy. A lready i t pl ays a 
significant role not only in relation to socio-economic rights but also with regards 
to i ssues like elimination o f x enophobia an d r acism in our  society. T he 
Commission sh ould b e assi sted t o ca rry o ut i ts functions independently and  
without und ue pressure and  cr iticism from t he Executive. T he C ommission 
should itself jealously guard its own independence and impartiality. This is how it 
can win and maintain public confidence.  
 
6.5 THE PUBLIC PROTECTOR  
 
The Public Protector came into existence through the Interim Constitution16
‘The Public Protector has the power, as regulated by national legislation- 
 and 
was given permanence by  section 182 o f the final Constitution. Section 182 of 
the Constitution reads: 
                                                 
 
16 The establishment of the office of the Public Protector was provided for by section 110 of the interim 
Constitution.  
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(a) to investigate any conduct in state affairs, or in the public administration in 
any sphere of government, that is alleged or suspected to be improper or 
to result in any impropriety or prejudice; 
(b) to report that conduct; and  
to take appropriate remedial action’. 
 
The P ublic Protector i s one o f the i nstitutions supporting co nstitutional 
democracy. I t h as a general m andate to i nvestigate and r eport on i mproper 
exercise of public power and can take ‘appropriate remedial action’ where there 
has been improper exercise o f such power. Public power i s exercised in many 
ways and improper exercises also manifest themselves in various ways. It is not 
the focus of this study to discuss those ways. Access to many if not most of the 
rights categorised as socio-economic rights like, f or i nstance, t he pay ment o f 
social g rants, i s regulated t hrough t he exercise of  p ublic power. I n so me 
instances the people who are unlawfully denied access to these r ights may not 
have access to judicial remedies.  This is where the role of institutions like the 
Public Protector is important: to provide appropriate redress for such people.  
 
6.5.1 The Public Protector Act  
 
In terms of the Public Protector Act 23 of 1994 the office of the Public Protector is 
established to: 
‘investigate m atters and t o pr otect the pu blic against m atters such as  
maladministration in connection with the a ffairs of government, improper 
conduct by  any  per son per forming a public f unction, i mproper ac ts with 
respect t o pu blic money, i mproper or  unlawful enr ichment o f a person 
performing a publ ic function an d an act or  om ission by a per son 
performing a pu blic function r esulting i n i mproper pr ejudice t o another 
person.’17
 
 
The general public ought to have access to the office of the Public Protector. A 
person may approach the office of the Public Protector by means of a written or 
oral declaration under oath or affirmation specifying (i) the nature of the matter in 
question; ( ii) t he g rounds upon w hich he/ she b elieves that the i nvestigation i s 
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necessary; and ( iii) a ny ot her i nformation that i s known t o hi m or her  t hat i s 
relevant to the investigation.  T he office of the Public Protector may devise any 
means that are reasonable in order to enhance the accessibility of the office to 
the public.18
 
  
The P ublic Protector has powers to i nvestigate abuse, unjustifiable exercise of 
power or  un fair, ca pricious, di scourteous, o r ot her i mproper co nduct or  u ndue 
delay by a per son performing a function connected with his or her employment 
by the S tate.19
 
 In this way, t he Act creates a mechanism for remedial act ion i f 
public officials do not ca rry out  t heir du ties diligently and w ithout del ay. A n 
investigation and a finding by  t he P ublic Protector t hat a p ublic official h as 
conducted him/herself improperly may result in the employee facing disciplinary 
action and a possible dismissal.  
The Public Protector has powers to direct any person who is being investigated 
to appear in person before the Public Protector to answer al legations placed to 
him or  her. A ny per son w ho w ithout j ust ca use r efuses to co -operate w ith t he 
Public Protector in his investigation commits an o ffence and may be se ntenced 
or fined upon conviction.20
 
  
6.5.2 The Public Protector at Work 
 
6.5.2 (a) The Case of Social Grants in the Eastern Cape    
 
The office of the Public Protector functions through a system of referrals. When a 
complaint i s sent to t he office i t i s acknowledged an d a c ommitment t o 
investigate is made. Thereafter, the Public Protector determines whether the law 
                                                                                                                                                 
17 The Preamble of the Act. 
 
18 Section 6 (1)(a)(i)-(iii) and (b). 
 
19 Section 6(4)(b). 
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allows his office to investigate the matter. It is only after such a determination has 
been m ade t hat t he Public Protector co mmunicates in w riting t o t he per son 
against whom the complaint has been made.  
 
In the Ngxuza case21 one of the applicants’ legal representatives chronicled how 
the applicants’ lawyers had at tempted to seek redress through the office of the 
Public Protector w ithout su ccess. I t w as alleged t hat w hen di sability grants of  
some members of the class were suspended, this was brought to the attention of 
the P ublic Protector. Some o f t he co mplaints had be en w ith t he o ffice o f the 
Public Protector for a period well in excess of two years and not much was done 
except a l etter acknowledging receipt of the said complaints. This prompted the 
applicants’ l awyers to ar range a m eeting w ith t he P ublic Protector t o d eal 
specifically with the problem of delays in the processing of applications for social 
grants in the Eastern Cape. This meeting was not productive as many problems 
relating to p ensions were l eft unresolved. S ome i f not m ost o f the pe nsion 
problems were not  on ly r eferred to the Public Protector’s office but al so t o the 
South African Human Rights Commission and not much could be done to solve 
them.22
 
 
The so cial g rant problems in t he E astern C ape and t he f act t hat the Public 
Protector’s office could not come to the aid of the disabled in the wake of gross 
abuse of public power, raises pertinent questions about the effectiveness of the 
Public Protector. The first i ssue that i t raises is the ex tent o f public awareness 
about the existence of the office of the Public Protector and the related issue of 
accessibility t o the office by  t he public. S econdly, i t r aises questions about the 
                                                                                                                                                 
20 Section 11. 
 
21 Ngxuza (note 14 above). 
 
 
22 In fact the Chairperson of the Commission, Dr Barney Pityana, filed an affidavit stating that the 
Commission had done everything in its power to encourage the Welfare Department to follow a fair 
process in canceling grants but these efforts could not achieve the desired results. See Ngxuza (note 14 
above) 1326E-F. 
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effectiveness of t he Public Protector i n r emedying problems that hav e been  
channeled to him. Thirdly, i t raises the importance of co-operation between the 
section 181 institutions. These matters will receive attention in the discussion that 
follows and suggestions will be made in appropriate cases. 
 
6.5.2 (b) Accessibility and Effectiveness 
 
The o ffice o f the P ublic Protector m ust be acce ssible t o as many peopl e as  
possible. It must be accessible especially to poor people because often they do 
not have immediate access to lawyers. They also are often at the receiving end 
of governmental abuse of power. The bureaucracy that is supposed to facilitate 
access t o so cio-economic rights in many i nstances does the opposite. The 
experiences of the grant beneficiaries in provinces like the Eastern Cape is that 
without the intervention of lawyers or other institutions it is most unlikely that their 
problems will be resolved by the state administration in a satisfactory manner.   
 
For this reason alone, if an institution like the Public Protector is to be made more 
accessible to many people it would assist the people themselves and would lead 
to a more e ffective ad ministration. The es tablishment of r egional offices of t he 
Public Protector is a step in the right direction. It is important, however, that these 
offices should make their services known and accessible.  
 
Access to t he office o f t he Public Protector i s related t o t he q uestion of 
effectiveness o f the r emedies that pe ople may g et from t he o ffice. The P ublic 
Protector has  pow ers both u nder the C onstitution an d i ts own st atute. If t he 
public is to have confidence in the institution, the Public Protector must use i ts 
powers to secure appropriate redress when public power is abused. If it does not, 
the public is likely to lose confidence in the office and i t may not serve the role 
that the Constitution envisages it must play. Plasket23
                                                 
 
 suggests that the office of 
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the P ublic Protector s hould co nsider co -operating with l awyers and par a-legal 
advice offices in resolving cases where appropriate. It submitted that this system 
helps in many ways. Firstly, where lawyers and advice offices are involved, they 
are likely to know that a par ticular complaint does not fall within the mandate of 
the Public Protector and therefore channel the case elsewhere. This reduces the 
time the Public Protector spends informing the public that their cases cannot be 
handled by it. In carrying out its constitutional function, the Public Protector ought 
to assert its independence and execute its task without bias, fear nor prejudice. 
 
6.5.3 C o-operation with O ther I nstitutions S upporting C onstitutional 
Democracy 
 
The role of the Public Protector under the Constitution is in essence to control the 
exercise of  public power and t o protect the publ ic against improper exercise of 
such power. On the other hand the function of the Human Rights Commission is 
to monitor t he implementation of human r ights. In the arena o f socio-economic 
rights, t here i s a p otential ov erlap o f r oles. T he example, for i nstance, o f t he 
suspension o f a person’s pension without f ollowing f air pr ocedure i s a ca se i n 
point. This is a v iolation o f the constitutional obl igation o n t he state t o r espect 
socio-economic r ights. A t the same time i t amounts to an improper exercise o f 
public power.  
 
 In these instances, members of the public are likely to refer their complaints to 
both i nstitutions for a r emedy. T hese i nstitutions sh ould develop a sy stematic 
way of  dealing w ith s uch cases without compromising t heir separate i dentities. 
They would sh are experiences and d evelop more cr eative r emedies geared a t 
improving each  ot her’s work and thus d elivering pr oper r emedial act ion. They 
should also refer appropriate cases to each other. I t is not suggested that such 
                                                                                                                                                 
23 See C Plasket ‘Accessibility Through Public Interest Litigation’ in Corder & Maluwa (eds) 
Administrative Justice In Southern Africa (Department of Public Law: UCT, Cape Town 1997) 119, 
124. See also G Budlender 'The Accessibility of Administrative Justice' (1993) Acta Juridica 128. 
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co-operation sh ould only be l imited t o t he o ffices of t he H uman R ights 
Commission and the Public Protector. Other institutions like the Commission for 
Gender Equality could also be a valuable source of information on certain issues. 
 
6.6 CONCLUSION  
 
The est ablishment o f t he o ffice o f t he P ublic Protector, t he H uman R ights 
Commission a nd a ll t he C hapter 9 i nstitutions was an i mportant st ep i n t he 
attempt t o cr eate a s table and de mocratic society. T here i s a possibility t hat 
these institutions might fail in performing their constitutional duties and thus fail to 
help the public. The sorry state of affairs concerning social grants in the Eastern 
Cape is a case in point. It demonstrated the difficulties that poor people face on a 
day to day basis as they try to assert their constitutional rights and the failure of 
the Public Protector and the Human Rights Commission to remedy the situation. 
It i s therefore i mportant t hat t hese i nstitutions take st eps to be o f g reater 
assistance to people who are victims of abuse of public power. These bodies can 
do t his not onl y, by  m eans of a n i ncrease i n t heir annual bu dgets but al so 
through carefully crafted work-plans. They should organise their work properly so 
as to ensure that their work achieves an impact. In so doing it is critical that they 
establish and maintain l inks with non -governmental human r ights organisations 
like t he Leg al R esources Centre. This will help bo ost t heir publ ic profile a nd 
make them more effective in strengthening constitutional democracy.   
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CHAPTER 7 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
The pur pose o f this study w as to i nvestigate h ow t he j udicial pr ocess can 
contribute t o t he v ision o f at taining so cial j ustice, as articulated i n t he 
Constitution. The st udy ex amined t he pr ovisions dealing w ith so cio-economic 
rights in the Constitution and how the courts should give effect to those rights in a 
given si tuation. I t w as also about how t he C onstitution ca n b e use d as an 
instrument for the eradication of poverty, a scourge which if not addressed may 
be a threat to national cohesion and democracy.  
 
The second chapter dealt with historical recognition of socio-economic rights as 
legal r ights. Throughout, the world there has been a debate on w hether or  not 
socio-economic rights qualify t o be c alled ‘ rights’. Some countries contend that 
because so cio-economic rights require e xpenditure o f p ublic resources and 
require t he st ate to take positive m easures on a  pr ogressive b asis for their 
implementation, they are not legally enforceable. Owing to their unenforceability 
through the courts, so the logic goes, they are not rights per se but social goals 
of the state. In South Africa, these r ights are recognised as legally enforceable 
rights. The Constitutional Court has stated that all the objections to enforceability 
of socio-economic rights do not detract from the fact that these are rights, which 
can be enforced through the courts. Central to the recognition of these rights as 
rights is the nee d t o r espect t he i nherent hum an dignity of  e veryone. T he 
Universal Declaration of  H uman R ights and ot her hum an r ights instruments 
which came after i t declare human dignity as being of  fundamental importance. 
Courts in some democratic countries have also been using human dignity as a 
central interpretative tool of their constitutions.1
                                                 
1The German Constitutional Court in dealing with the importance of dignity said:  
  The South African Constitution 
‘It is contrary to human dignity to make the individual the mere tool of the state. The principle that 
“each person must always be an end in himself” applies unreservedly to all areas of the law; the 
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expressly recognises social and economic rights as justiciable r ights. T hese 
rights impose both negative and posi tive obl igations on the state. They have to 
be met and therefore cannot be said to exist only on paper. The state has a duty 
to work towards the realisation of these rights. 
 
In t he t hird c hapter, the di scussion focused on the meaning o f t he co ncept 
‘progressive realisation’. The concept of progressive realisation as expressed in 
sections 26(2) and 27(2) is directly imported from the International Covenant on 
Economic, S ocial and  C ultural R ights2(the I CESCR). In  i ts interpretation, th e 
United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has said that 
it is essential that all the State parties strive towards the fulfillment of a minimum 
core obligation by ensuring the satisfaction of a minimum essential level of social 
and eco nomic rights.3 What i s ‘minimal’ for everyone de pends on t he 
circumstances of each individual case and on the resources available on the part 
of the state.4
                                                                                                                                                 
intrinsic dignity of the person consists in acknowledging him as an independent personality.’ 45 
BverfGE 187, (1977) 228 (Life Imprisonment case). 
 The Constitutional Court has noted that it may be undesirable for a 
In Olga Tellis and Others v Bombay Municipal Corporation and Others (1985) 3 SCC 545 
para 47, the Supreme Court of India stated that the actions of the Municipal Corporation of Bombay in 
evicting homeless squatters without providing them with alternative accommodation and without affording 
them an opportunity to be heard was inimical to a society which considers human dignity as paramount. In 
Law v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) [1999] 170 D.L.R. (4th) 1 (SCC)  para 53 the 
Supreme Court of Canada commented:  
‘[Human dignity] is concerned with physical and psychological integrity and empowerment. 
Human dignity is harmed by unfair treatment premised upon personal traits or circumstances 
which do not relate to individual needs, capacities or merits. It is enhanced by laws which are 
sensitive to the needs, capacities and merits of different individuals, taking into account the 
context underlying their differences. Human dignity is harmed when individuals and groups are 
marginalized, ignored, or devalued, and is enhanced when laws recognize the full place of all 
individuals and groups within Canadian society.’  
The centrality of human dignity was also expressed by Yacoob J of the South African Constitutional Court 
when he stated: ‘There can be no doubt that human dignity, …[is] denied those who have no food, clothing 
or shelter.’  In Government of the RSA and Others v Grootboom and Others 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC) 
para 23. 
 
2 In particular Article 2(1) of the ICESCR. 
 
3 General Comment No 3 Issued in 1990. 
 
4 Grootboom (note 1 above) para 46. See also Van Biljon v Minister of Correctional Services 1997 (4) SA 
441 (C) para 43. 
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court t o d etermine w hat t he minimum co re i s in t he i nitial i nstance w ithout 
evidence on statistics and spending priorities to that effect.5
 
 What is minimum in 
any given situation is better left to the executive in the initial instance. The court 
will intervene when there is evidence that the state has failed to take reasonable 
legislative and other measures to achieve the progressive realisation of the right 
in question. The government must adopt policies and programmes to give effect 
to these rights. They have to be rational policies and there should be reasonable 
measures aimed at t heir i mplementation. P rogressive r ealisation i s also abo ut 
planning. In planning, the state has to pr ioritise the needs of those people who 
are marginalised and vulnerable because of their socio-economic conditions. 
In order to achieve social justice, there is a need to enhance access to justice. 
One of the important elements of achieving access to justice is that courts have 
to be m ade acce ssible t o m any peopl e es pecially poor  peopl e. C hapter f our 
discussed the relaxation of the standing rules and i ts significance in enhancing 
access to courts and thereby access to justice for everyone. It was noted that in 
the past b ecause o f t he r estrictive i nterpretation o f st anding many p eople, 
especially t he poor , c ould no t hav e t heir l egitimate co ncerns articulated an d 
adjudicated u pon by  impartial co urts of l aw. S ection 38 of  t he C onstitution 
expands the scope of people who can sue for the enforcement of constitutional 
rights. I t provides for t he i ntroduction o f cl ass actions and public interest suits. 
This development is important in promoting social justice. It is also significant for 
the creation of a stable and peaceful society where people respect the rights and 
dignity of ot hers because ev eryone ca n r ely on t he co urts to adj udicate t heir 
disputes through a fair and transparent process. Class actions and public interest 
suits are new in South African law. In some countries they have been used in a 
very significant way.  
 
                                                 
5 In Grootboom (note 1 above) para 33. See also Soobramoney v Minister of Health and Welfare, Kwazulu 
Natal 1998 (1) SA 765 (CC)  para 29. 
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Complaints and objections to use of class actions and public interest suits have 
related to the ab use of cl ass actions an d public interest s uits by i rresponsible 
litigants.6  Some have pointed to the di fficulties of managing class actions and 
argued that they should not be allowed.7 But as Pickering J in the Wildlife Society 
case poi nted o ut ‘ the f loodgates are nor mally a sp ectral f igure r ather t han 
reality.’8 What has also been co ntended for i n t his chapter i s that de nying 
standing t o a l itigant w ho br ings a co nstitutional cl aim d oes not addr ess the 
potential problem of floodgates. It is the imposition of an adverse costs order that 
has the effect of ensuring that only litigants who have genuine claims are before 
court. Another important aspect as highlighted by Froneman J in Ngxuza is that a 
party should seek leave to sue as a class from a court before embarking on that 
terrain.9
 
   
Chapter f ive deal t w ith j udicial r emedies f or t he i mplementation o f so cio-
economic rights. T here i s no r igid wall se parating r emedies against t he 
infringement of other constitutional rights and socio-economic rights.  What is of 
importance i s that when one i s dealing w ith socio-economic rights, one has to 
appreciate t hat t hese r ights require a di fferent a pproach t o l itigation and  
enforcement. A n i nfringement o f t hese r ights through g overnment i naction l ike 
failure to provide adequate housing or water or social security will affect a l arge 
number o f people. T hese people are in m any occa sions the weaker and  
vulnerable se ctions of t he po pulation w ho cannot pr ovide for t hemselves and 
depend almost entirely on the state for the provision of basic services like water, 
                                                 
6 See the decision of the Indian Supreme Court in Pandey v State of West Bengal [1988] LRC (Const) 241 
(SC). See also William H. Pryor Jr. ‘A Comparison of Abuses and Reforms of Class Actions and 
Multigovernmental Lawsuits’ (2000) 74 Tulane LR 1885. 
 
7 See J Cassels ‘Judicial Activism and Public Interest Litigation in India: Attempting the Impossible’ 
(1989) 37 American J of Comparative L 495. 
 
8 See Wildlife Society of Southern Africa v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism of the RSA 1996 
(3) SA 1095 (Tk) 1106D-G.  
 
9 See Ngxuza and Others v MEC for Welfare, Eastern Cape Provincial Government and Another 2000 (12) 
BCLR 1322 (CC) 1332D-F. This is also the current thinking of the legislature if one has regard to section 5 
of the Bill on Class Actions and Public Interest Action in South Africa (1998). 
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food, and shelter. When giving an or der against the state to give effect to these 
rights, a co urt w ill r equire t he st ate to per form a positive dut y. T he 
implementation o f t hese r ights will r equire massive ex penditure of t he b udget. 
These are important considerations that practitioners and the courts alike should 
keep in mind.10
 
  
The question that a court will ask is whether or not there is a rational program in 
place t hat c an be i mplemented t hrough r easonable means.11 The t raditional 
remedies have t o be developed t o acco mmodate t hese r ights. T he co urts are 
also mandated by  t he C onstitution to g ive appr opriate r elief w here any  
constitutional rights have been infringed. Appropriate relief is relief that remedies 
the v iolation, pr ohibits future v iolations and g rants just sa tisfaction t o t he 
aggrieved party.12
 
 In this chapter new remedies which have been u sed in other 
jurisdictions and which would also fit our new constitutional order were proposed. 
It was also emphasised that i t i s important for the government to give ef fect to 
judicial rulings without unreasonable delay. This is important in order to respect 
the co nstitutionally m andated se paration o f pow ers doctrine and  i s in ke eping 
with the doctrine of the rule of law, a cornerstone of the Constitution. 
The C onstitution cr eates a nu mber o f i nstitutions to co mpliment co nstitutional 
democracy. Some o f these are o f importance in g iving ef fect to and promoting 
human r ights generally and so cio-economic r ights in par ticular. In chapter six a 
specific focus was given to the role of the Public Protector and the Human Rights 
Commission i n t he promotion an d observance of s ocio-economic rights. T he 
Human R ights Commission has  a s pecific mandate u nder the C onstitution t o 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
10 The effectiveness of litigation in the context of the United States welfare reform litigation is discussed by 
Chris Hansen in ‘Making It Work: Implementation of Court Orders Requiring Restructuring of State 
Executive Branch Agencies’ in S. Randall Humm et al (eds) Child, Parent, and State: Law and Policy 
Reader (1994 Temple University Press) 224. 
 
11 See Grootboom (note 1 above) para 41. 
 
12 See Hoffman v South African Airways 2000 (11) BCLR 1211 (CC) para 45.  
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monitor t he i mplementation of s ocio-economic rights. T he P ublic Protector 
monitors the abuse of public resources by the executive. I t is also charged with 
the r esponsibility of  r eporting t o P arliament on m aladministration i n t he p ublic 
service. These functions are both important to ensure that public officials do their 
work properly in a m anner t hat i s consistent with t he Constitution.13 One m ust 
also note that judicial interventions even supplemented by these institutions is by 
no means adequate to realise the v ision of  social j ustice. Of importance i s the 
role t hat ci vil so ciety t hrough non g overnmental or ganisations and ot her 
institutions can pl ay i n pov erty al leviation.14 Havi E chenberg and Bruce P orter 
suggest that socio-economic rights can best be articulated and sustained if those 
people c oncerned w ith t heir i mplementation or ganise t hemselves into a 
movement that will articulate their concerns.15
 
   
The C onstitution pr esents new and i nteresting ch allenges for e veryone. T he 
socio-economic r ights provisions will sound a hol low r ing i f s teps are not taken 
towards their f ulfillment. T he v ision of  a so ciety f ounded upo n so cial j ustice i s 
                                                 
13 Although, the role of the Commission on Gender Equality was never discussed, it is important to note 
that this institution has an important role to play in  the observance of socio-economic rights specifically 
relating to women. 
 
14 L Sossin in ‘Salvaging the Welfare State?: The Prospects for Judicial Review of the Canada Health & 
Social Transfer’ (1998) 21 Dalhousie LJ 141 talks about the problems for judicial interventions in the 
determination of budgetary allocations by the Canadian federal government. A Sajo in ‘How the Rule of 
Law Killed Hungarian Welfare Reform’ (1996) East European Constitutional Rev 31 is critical of the 
Hungarian Constitutional Court for pursuing a ‘social gospel’ without paying regard to the needs and 
interests of the market.   
 
15 H Echenberg and B Porter ‘Poverty Stops Equality: Equality Stops Poverty’ in I Ryszard in Cholewinski 
(ed) Human Rights in Canada: Into the 1990’s and Beyond (1990 Human Rights Research and Education 
Centre: University of Ottawa) 1, 14-15. See also N Stammers ‘Social Movements and the Social 
Construction of Human Rights’ (1999) 21 Human Rights Quarterly 980. But see Piven and Cloward in 
Poor Peoples Movements, Why They Succeed, How They Fail (1977 Pantheon Books New York) 264. In 
the latter work the authors explain how and why the Welfare Rights Movement failed in the United States. 
They state that it essentially failed because it became a bureaucracy whose leaders could no longer relate to 
the needs of their members. See also an interesting work on the role of civil society in general and NGO’s 
in particular in Africa in the promotion of the rule of law and human rights in C E. Welch, Jr Protecting 
Human Rights in Africa: Roles and Strategies of Non-Governmental Organizations (University of 
Pennsylvania Press 1995). M Mutua’s concern in ‘Savages, Victims and Saviors: The Metaphor of Human 
Rights’ (2001) 42 Harvard Int LJ 201 is that one has to be careful in uncritically accepting ideas from 
international NGO’s because some of them were not established in order to respond to the pressing social 
problems of the third world and Africa in particular.   
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indeed an i mportant v ision for a so ciety st ill t rapped in the legacy of  i nequality 
created by  pr evious governments. The cr eation o f that so ciety pr esents a 
daunting challenge indeed. I t is by no m eans an impossible challenge. I t is the 
responsibility of  everyone to make the Constitution work. As Arthur Chaskalson 
has stated 
‘The Constitution offers a vision for the future. A society in which there will 
be so cial j ustice a nd respect for hu man r ights, a s ociety i n w hich basi c 
needs of al l our  pe ople w ill be m et, i n w hich w e will l ive t ogether i n 
harmony, showing respect and concern for one a nother. We are capable 
of realising this vision….Too many of us are concerned about what we can 
get from the new society, too few with what is needed for the realisation of 
the g oals o f t he C onstitution. What i s lacking i s the en ergy, t he 
commitment an d t he se nse o f c ommunity t hat w as harnessed i n t he 
struggle f or freedom…. A ll o f us  hav e an obligation to make t he 
Constitution work, and  i t i s in al l of  our  i nterests that t his be do ne. I t i s 
important t hat w e r egain t he e nergy, t he co mmitment and t he s ense o f 
community that we once had, and use i t to give ef fect to the values and 
aspirations of the Constitution.’ 16
 
 
 
 
    
                                                 
16A Chaskalson ‘Human Dignity as a Foundational Value of our Constitutional Order’ (2000) 16 SAJHR 
193, 205. 
